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Abstract
The problem that evil presents for Christian theism is often thought to be the most diffi-
cult problem to solve. Since Alvin Plantinga's celebrated free will defense, however, 
some have argued that the logical problem was indeed solved. Yet, many non-theists 
remain convinced that evil is a problem for Christian theism. In this dissertation I 
attempt to move the strategy of defense forward by developing a distinction between 
narrow and broad defenses to the problem of evil. The former only aims to rebuff the 
immediate charge of inconsistency and makes no claims about the additional proposi-
tions used in the defense. The latter also seeks to rebuff the charge of inconsistency, but 
in doing so only employs propositions that are consistent with the defender’s actual 
beliefs. It is hoped that non-theists find this broad defense to be more rationally persua-
sive than its narrow counterpart. In chapter 1, I develop this distinction, and in the re-
maining chapters use it to survey the consistency of traditional Christian doctrines with 
a broad defense. In chapter 2, I construct a consistency problem for two accounts of 
original sin, and consider potential solutions. In chapter 3, I explore the nature of crea-
turely freedom in heaven and attempt to refute charges of inconsistency already present 
in the literature. In chapter 4, I turn to the divine will and consider whether it was possi-
ble, or desirable, for creatures to be created with that same type of will. Finally, in 
chapter 5, I demonstrate how the project can be extended to include other beliefs Christ-
ian theists may take to be true, and also how the distinction developed in chapter one 
can be employed in discussing other alleged problems for the Christian theist.
vii
Chapter One: Discussing the Problem of Evil
Problems of Evil
It is very likely that over the course of a person’s life there will be a variety of 
bad things that happen to that person. It is probably appropriate to even say that at least 
some of these bad things are evil. This remains true for both the theist and the atheist, 
and both wonder why these things happened to them. The atheist has a means of an-
swering this question that is not available to the theist. Bad and evil things happen 
because we live in a world that pays no special attention to us.1 The human race is no 
different in any significant way from the rest of the universe and, though it is unfor-
tunate, humans too are subject to the whims of nature and to the evil acts of other 
humans. However, such a response is not available to the theist.2 The theist believes that
there is some being apart from this universe that has a say in the goings-on of this uni-
1. I differentiate 'bad' from 'evil' because it is not clear that all bad things are evil things,
even if all evil things are bad things. For example, it is bad if I back my car into a pole, 
but not evil. For an interesting article attempting to evaluate the logical problem of evil 
by comparing its structural similarity to a logical problem of bad things, see Stephen 
Griffiths, "The Problem of Pomegranates," in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, 
ed. Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 85-94.
2. There is, however, a potential problem here for even the atheist. Several philosophers 
have developed arguments that conclude the existence of evil serves as a proof for God's
existence. See C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2001), 
chapters six and seven or William Lane Craig, No Easy Answers: Finding Hope in 
Doubt, Failure, and Unanswered Prayer (Chicago: Moody Press, 1990), 99-100.
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verse. In particular, the Christian theist believes not only that this being cares a great 
deal about us, but also that he is perfectly morally good and essentially omnipotent.3 
These beliefs alone are sufficient to give a rough approximation of what has come to be 
known as the problem of evil. If there is an omnipotent and perfectly good being that 
cares about the human condition, then why do bad and evil things happen to those 
humans? As Epicurus famously stated the problem, "If God is good and omnipotent, 
whence then evil?"
It is tempting to speak as if there is one problem of evil, when in fact there is a 
host of related problems that together constitute the problems of evil. This is important 
to keep in mind because an answer to one problem of evil may have nothing to say to 
another problem of evil. In order to be clear about the problem of evil that will be dealt 
with here, it will be helpful to give a brief taxonomy of the problems of evil. 
There are two broad ways to talk about problems of evil: the existential problem 
and the theoretical problem.4 The existential problem is more concerned with difficulties
raised when a person is forced to deal with a particular evil that arises in the "real 
world." A mother in the emergency room may ask why some particular evil happened to
her family, but she does not really want a theoretical response about the compatibility of
God and evil in general or about the unfortunate natural occurrence of pain. Instead, she
3. While there are related problems of evil for other religious systems, the problem that 
evil raises for the Christian theist will be the focus of this dissertation.
4. It is common for some to refer to the theoretical problem of evil as the philosophical 
problem, but because determining if, or how, one can continue to believe in God even 
while experiencing evil is very much a philosophical question, I prefer to use 
'theoretical' to pick out the abstract nature of this type of problem of evil.
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wants to know why this horrible event happened to her family. While theists and non-
theists alike are forced to deal with this existential problem, it takes a different form for 
the theist. If the mother in the emergency room believes in God, she will likely confront
a religious version of the existential problem. If God really does love her and her family,
then why would that God allow this evil to happen to her? Here the worry is directed 
toward some being, instead of the universe in general, but it is still existential in nature. 
Alvin Plantinga points to this distinction when he writes that there is no doubt that one 
can adequately solve a theoretical problem of evil, but “this is cold and abstract comfort
when faced with the shocking concreteness of a particularly appalling exemplification 
of evil.”5 What the mother in the emergency room wants is comfort and the knowledge 
that she does not have to suffer through the tragedy alone.6 It is important to remember 
that when dealing with the theoretical problem, an answer to it may have nothing to say 
about the existential problem at all. While it is important for the Christian theist to have 
some type of answer for the religious problem of evil, the intent here is to focus on 
theoretical problems of evil for a simple reason — seeking to comfort the sufferer of a 
particular evil with appeals to a God that cannot coexist with that evil is not likely to be 
comforting at all.
What philosophers typically have in mind when they discuss the problem of evil 
5. Alvin Plantinga, "Self-Profile," in Alvin Plantinga, eds. J. E. Tomberlin and Peter van
Inwagen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 35-36.
6. For more on responding to the religious problem of evil see C.S. Lewis, The Problem 
of Pain (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2001 or John Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil:
Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books), 
chapters fourteen and fifteen.
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is the theoretical problem. This problem can be approached in at least two ways: as an 
evidential problem, or as a logical problem. However, as Daniel Howard-Snyder points 
out, these labels can be somewhat misleading. Evidential problems tend to make rigor-
ous use of logical structure, especially in terms of probabilities, and logical problems 
are often used as evidence that counts against theism.7 But with this qualification in 
mind the distinction can be useful to determine what type of problem one is confronting.
Briefly put, the evidential problem attempts to demonstrate that, given the existence of 
evil, it is more likely that there is not a God than that there is a God, whereas the logical
problem attempts to demonstrate that the existence of evil creates a logical contradiction
with the very notion of God.8 Advocates of either of these types of arguments claim that 
the argument gives an individual reason to believe that God does not exist. The logical 
problem leads one to the conclusion that God and evil are logically incompatible and 
the evidential problem that God's existence is less likely than non-existence because of 
the existence of evil. As one would expect, Christian theists have not remained silent on 
this issue. Their responses to these problems of evil have typically sought to either 
provide God's reasons for allowing evil, or to demonstrate that the proposed problem 
does not succeed in providing reasons to believe that God does not exist. It is to these 
responses that we now turn.
7. Daniel Howard-Snyder, "Introduction," in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. 
Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), xii.
8. See Howard-Snyder, ibid. for a collection of evidential problems of evil. For a 
general collection of problems of evil, including logical problems, see Marilyn Adams 
and Robert Adams, eds., The Problem of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991).
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Theodicy and Defense
Any response to a problem of evil that attempts to provide the actual reasons for 
God allowing evil is a theodicy. From an historical perspective, theodicies have been the
dominant way Christian theists have dealt with problems of evil. This type of response 
can be found not only in the writings of church Fathers as far back as Irenaeus and Saint
Augustine, but also in the modern philosopher Leibniz, who actually coined the term, 
and in contemporary philosophers such as John Hick. In giving a theodicy one attempts 
to justify God's ways to man by stating the reasons for God 's allowance of evil. Of 
course the success of a theodicy will depend upon God's actual reasons for allowing 
evil, but short of divine revelation, there is no way to judge if a theodicy does corre-
spond to those reasons. However, there are ways for an individual to determine the like-
lihood that a theodicy is successful. For example, if the actual states of affairs in this 
world, or the actual details of the religious tradition in question, do not correspond to 
the details of a theodicy, then one can know that theodicy is a failure. A theodicy that 
provides a positive explanation for the evil in this world given a particular religious 
framework must at least be consistent with what is known about this world and that reli-
gious framework.
One of the more recent theodicies that purports to satisfy this consistency re-
quirement is John Hick's Irenaean theodicy. Hick begins by distinguishing Augustinian 
theodicy from Irenaean theodicy. According to Hick, the Augustinian theodicy places 
the fall of Adam and Eve as the origin of moral evil, whereas the Irenaean theodicy 
focuses on the "creation of humankind through the evolutionary process as an immature
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creature living in a challenging and therefore person-making world."9 In contrast to the 
Augustinian picture, humans are not born fully perfected, but instead engage in various 
activities that provides them the avenue through which they become more like God. 
Some of this engagement comes in the form of responding to suffering caused by 
various types of evil. In other words, God allows his creation to undergo evil so that 
they can grow in their relationship with God by properly responding to that evil.10 While
an assessment of Hick's Irenaean theodicy is beyond the scope of this dissertation, we 
can determine what would have to be the case for this theodicy to be successful. 
If the details of such a theodicy turn out to not be consistent with one's religious 
system or with the facts of the actual world, then Hick's theodicy fails. For example, if 
God did not need to allow humans to suffer evil to grow in their relationship with God, 
then the theodicy fails because an essentially morally good God would not subject his 
creation to evil if there were a way of accomplishing his ends without that evil. Further, 
if it turns out that it is morally wrong for God to allow humans to suffer simply so they 
can become more like him, then the theodicy is not consistent with the religious system 
and fails. Of course demonstrating that a theodicy is consistent does not entail that it is 
the correct account of why God would allow evil, but that consistency is at least a nec-
9. John Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy," in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, 
ed. Stephen Davis (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 38.
10. Because I use Hick's view simply as an illustration of how a theodicy differs from a 
defense, the presentation of Hick's Ireneaen theodicy must be concise. For a full account
of Hick's theodicy see John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), and for a critique see R. Douglas Geivett, Evil and the 
Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick's Theodicy (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1993).
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essary feature of a correct account.
In contrast to theodicy is defense. When an individual gives a theodicy the claim
is that these are God's actual reasons for allowing evil to exist, and these reasons must 
be consistent with the actual world and that religious system. A defense differs in that it 
needs to only meet the final condition - consistency within the religious system. Instead 
of offering God's actual reasons, the defense offers possible reasons for God's allowance
of evil and they only need to be consistent with the religious system. This distinction 
between theodicy and defense was first formulated by Plantinga and put to use to 
respond to a logical problem of evil. According to Plantinga the aim of a theodicy is to 
"attempt to tell us why God permits evil," whereas the aim of a defense "is not to say 
what God's reason is, but at most what God's reason might possibly be."11 The reasons 
offered in a defense need only be possibly true and consistent within that religious 
system.
Even if the general structure of a theodicy is very similar to that of a defense, the
purpose of the former is to give actual reasons for evil, whereas the purpose of the latter
is to tell a possibly true story that would demonstrate that the existence of evil does not 
provide rational grounds for believing in the non-existence of God. The key difference 
between theodicy and defense is not content, but intent. In the former the intent is to 
give actual reasons whereas the latter is to give possible reasons. The reasons them-
selves might be the same, but what one is trying to accomplish by giving those reasons 
is different. Peter van Inwagen has nicely characterized this difference between theodicy
11. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 28. 
(Original emphasis.)
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and defense. He writes, 
A defense is not necessarily different from a theodicy in content. Indeed, a 
defense and a theodicy may well be verbally identical... The difference between 
a defense and a theodicy lies not in their content but in their purposes. A theodi-
cy is a story that is told as the real truth of the matter; a defense is a story that, 
according to the teller, may or may not be true, but which, the teller maintains, 
has some desirable feature that does not entail truth - perhaps (depending on the 
context) logical consistency or epistemic possibility (truth-for-all-anyone-
knows).12
This understanding of a defense centers on the attitude one takes when responding to 
the problem of evil. Because different responses to the problem of evil will take differ-
ent forms, there could be a host of different defenses to the different problems.
For example, when presented with a problem of evil the theist might respond by 
demonstrating that the premises in the argument do not provide rational reasons to 
accept the conclusion. Such a defense would be successful whether the problem of evil 
presented against Christian theism was logical or evidential in nature. If the distinguish-
ing mark between theodicy and defense is intent, then one could respond to both prob-
lems of evil by telling a just-so story that either demonstrates the logical compatibility 
of God and evil or demonstrates that the existence of evil does not make God's non-ex-
istence more likely than his existence. However, this understanding of a defense is not 
universal. Michael Murray, after relegating defenses to only logical problems of evil, 
writes "Defenses will be of little use in our context because... they do not aim to provide
explanations that undercut the evidential value of evil."13 Of course, if the problem of 
12. Peter Van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 7.
13. Michael Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal 
Suffering (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 37. (Original emphasis).
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evil addressed is not logical in nature, then a response demonstrating the logical com-
patibility of some set of propositions will not be satisfactory, but one may give a 
defense to the problem of evil that is not logical in nature at all.
What seems to lead to this misrepresentation is that defenses are typically 
thought of as a type of response. It is thought that a defense is simply the attempt to 
show that some set of propositions is logically consistent and if the set is logically con-
sistent, then the argument claiming they are not fails. While a particular defense may 
include something like this, one should not restrict all defenses to this line of argumen-
tation. For example, the proponent of the evidential argument claims that some set of 
propositions shows that God's non-existence is more likely than his existence, given 
evil. If a defense is simply a type of a response dealing with logical consistency, then it 
clearly will not work here because the claim is not that the set is logically inconsistent, 
but that even though it is possible that God exists, it is less likely that he does because 
of the existence of evil.14
There are at least two ways one could respond to the evidential argument from 
evil. The first way to respond we might call a rebuttal. Giving a rebuttal would be to 
demonstrate that there is some flaw in the original argument. That is, it would not seek 
to offer any positive argument for the co-existence of God and evil at all. but instead 
seek to show that, for example, there is an equivocation with one of the key terms or 
that an improper inference has been made between two premises.15 Either response 
14. Such a complaint can be found in Joel Thomas Tierno, "On Defense as Opposed to 
Theodicy," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2006): 167-174.
15. For an insightful exchange based upon whether an improper inference is being made
in certain evidential arguments see Stephen Wykstra, "Rowe's Noseeum Arguments 
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would be sufficient to show that the argument from evil at hand does not succeed.
A second way one could respond is by supplying some proposition that would 
explain the necessity of that evil. For example, an advocate of the evidential problem of 
evil might agree that there are some evils necessary to bring about a good and that, as 
long as that good sufficiently outweighs the necessary evils, God is morally justified in 
allowing that evil to occur. However, this person may go on to argue that some some 
evils appear to serve no good whatsoever.16 Because those evils are not needed in any 
way an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God would prevent them from occur-
ring. But since they do occur, one is justified in believing that there is no such God.
 Of course, if one were to demonstrate that those evils are indeed necessary for 
some good, then that particular argument from evil would fail. Such a demonstration 
would provide reasons to believe that God had to allow those evils in order to achieve 
some good or to prevent some worse evil. When presenting such a response one has two
options concerning the intent of the argument. One might argue that the propositions 
that demonstrate the necessity of those evils are actually true. That is, one could seek to 
give God's actual reasons for those evils and those that make such an effort would be 
engaging in theodicy. However, one might also argue that those propositions are simply 
possibly true. But, because the original argument did not concern strict logical possibili-
ty, one would have to do more than just demonstrate the possibility of those proposi-
from Evil," and William Rowe, "The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look" 
both in Howard-Snyder 1996.
16. William Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335-341.
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tions being true. One would also have to demonstrate that the probability of the proposi-
tions being true is greater than that of their being false. Those that engage in this second 
project would be offering a defense. A defense, then, would be any attempt to provide 
some proposition, or set of propositions, that demonstrate the argument from evil fails, 
and this understanding of defense applies equally to the logical problem of evil and to 
the evidential problem of evil.
This more precise understanding of a defense should be something that even 
Murray would accept given that he also suggests the main difference between a theodi-
cy and defense is that a theodicy aims "to provide the known truth about why God 
permits evil."17 The alternative to providing "the known truth" would be to provide a re-
sponse that is possibly true. But providing a response that is possibly true can equally 
apply to the logical and evidential problems. Such a response might be offered to 
demonstrate how a set of propositions are logically consistent, but a different possibly 
true proposition might be offered as a reason to think it is more likely that God exists 
given evil than that he does not exist.
To summarize, one can distinguish responses to the theoretical problem of evil 
in one of three ways: a rebuttal, a theodicy, and a defense. A rebuttal to the problem is a 
response that gives reasons to believe that the problem of evil under consideration fails 
due to an internal problem with the specific argument. In providing such a response, the
individual does not make use of any additional premises, but instead simply demon-
strates that there is some internal flaw in that problem of evil, an improper inference 
17. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 37.
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being one example, that prevents the problem from succeeding. The second way one 
might respond to the theoretical problem is to offer a theodicy. When giving a theodicy 
additional premises are presented and there is an expectation that the proponent of the 
problem of evil accepts those premises as accurately representing the way the world 
really is. Because the details of a theodicy are supposed to be reflective of the actual 
world, there is at least an implicit expectation that those details should be accepted as 
true by all participants in the debate. Finally, one might present a defense to the theoreti-
cal problem. A defense may look identical to a theodicy, but there is no expectation that 
all must accept the details of the defense as being actually representative of the way the 
world is.
Theodicy and Defense in Action
One of the most influential responses to the problem of evil is based upon 
human free will. Two of the most famous responses utilizing free will have come from 
St. Augustine and Alvin Plantinga. Each appeals to some good that is gained by God 
creating humans with free will, but many understand Augustine to believe himself as 
presenting the actual truth to the matter whereas Plantinga specifically states that he is 
only presenting what might possibly be the case. In other words, Augustine presented 
what is known as a free will theodicy while Plantinga has presented a free will 
defense.18 
18. While Plantinga's work on the problem of evil is most famously associated with his 
defense, he has recently also given a theodicy in, Alvin Plantinga, "Supralapsarianism, 
or 'O Felix Culpa'," in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van Inwagen 
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For Augustine the problem of evil was not primarily a problem in justifying 
belief in the Christian God given the existence of evil. Instead it was a problem explain-
ing how an omnibenevolent God and evil could coexist, not if they coexist.19 This is 
why, in On Free Choice of the Will, he begins his theodicy by giving a proof that God 
exists and is necessarily good. In the words of Douglas Geivett, "the cornerstone of Au-
gustine's theodicy" is that God exists and is necessarily good.20 The question is not 
"Given the existence of evil, does an omnibenevolent God exist?" but instead "Given 
the existence of an omnibenevolent God, how does evil exist?" In answering this latter 
question Augustine first argues that evil is not an actual substance, but is instead a pri-
vation of good. In Augustine's ontology, all created things are, in some measure, good 
because they were created by a good God. If a created thing is "evil" it is because it is 
lacking some measure of goodness. Here one may wonder what brings about that priva-
tion. If God created all things, and consequently all things are good, why are any of 
those created things lacking in goodness? 
Speaking of 'evil' as a privation of good fully covers the range of created things, 
but in addition to these things, there are also evil choices made or evil actions commit-
ted by humans. Humans, as rational creatures, have free wills that permit them to 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 1-25.
19. Michael Murray has argued that this is how the problem of evil was addressed by 
almost all theologians and philosophers through at least Leibniz. Michael Murray, 
"Leibniz on the Problem of Evil," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2005 Edition), ed. Edward E. N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2005/entries/leibniz-evil/>.
20. Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God, 14.
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choose rightly or wrongly. William Mann nicely characterizes this aspect of Augustine's 
thought. He writes, "A genuinely free will necessarily caries with it the liability to sin. 
But without having freedom of choice, with its built-in liability, humans would lack the 
capacity to choose to live rightly."21 Because God desired a world in which humans 
could choose rightly, and deserve reward for those choices, God had to create a world in
which humans had a genuine opportunity to choose wrongly. According to Augustine, 
"If man did not have free choice of will, how could there exist the good according to 
which it is just to condemn evildoers and reward those who act rightly?... Both punish-
ment and reward would be unjust if man did not have free will."22
It does not appear that Augustine thought this explanation was simply possibly 
true, instead it seems he believed it was actually true. A person that does not believe in 
God because of the existence of evil should be able to come to belief in God once that 
person understands how and why God allows the evil to exist. The chief advantage of 
such a theodicy is that it can advance the dialectic between theists and non-theists. Of 
course, many will not be convinced by such a theodicy, but those participating in the 
debate understand that the success of the theodicy would remove one of the chief objec-
tions to Christian theism and the failure of the theodicy would force the theist to read-
dress the problem in a more satisfactory way, or to at least have serious cause for 
concern. However, this advantage comes at a cost. The theist now must maintain that 
21.William E Mann, "Augustine on Evil and Original Sin," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Augustine, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzman (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 46.
22.Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Anna Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff 
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), book II, chapter 1, 36.
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the details of the theodicy correspond to God's reasons for allowing evil and to the 
actual features of this world.
Mackie and Theodicy
J.L. Mackie has said that the free will theodicy has been the most important re-
sponse to the problem of evil, but nevertheless fails. In the now famous paper, "Evil and
Omnipotence," Mackie argued that the existence of God is logically incompatible with 
the existence of evil and that an Augustinian type of response will not adequately deal 
with the problem. In order to see the difficulty Mackie's argument creates for a free will 
theodicy like Augustine's, a brief presentation of Mackie's argument is in order. We will 
then be able to fully see how Plantinga's defense to the logical problem of evil differs 
from Augustine's theodicy.
Mackie's presentation of the logical problem of evil purports to demonstrate a 
contradiction between the following propositions:
(1) God is omnipotent and wholly good
and
(2) Evil exists.
At first glance it appears that not only is the traditional theologian committed to both 
propositions, but that the two are inconsistent. However, as Mackie notes, there is no 
explicit contradiction in believing that both an omnipotent and wholly good being could
co-exist with evil. To get an explicit contradiction Mackie adds to the above what he 
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calls, “quasi logical rules connecting the terms ‘good’, ‘evil’, and ‘omnipotent’".23 
These additional rules are:
(3) Good is opposed to evil in such a way that a good thing always eliminates 
evil as far as it can
and
(4) There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.
Both (3) and (4) are supposed to be rules that the traditional theologian would also be 
inclined to accept, but by adding them to (1), one can see that a wholly good, omnipo-
tent being would completely eliminate evil, which explicitly contradicts (2). There is, 
according to Mackie, a logical incompatibility between these propositions. Of course 
one might simply reject that God is omnipotent or wholly good, but that would be a 
major departure from the traditional understanding of the Christian God. One might also
reject that there is evil in the world, but given the tragedies one reads about in the daily 
news, this seems to be a claim that approaches absurdity. If these are not viable options, 
what can be said of Christian theism in the face of evil? Mackie believes a theodicy 
based upon free will is a potentially adequate solution, but ultimately fails.
Mackie argues that while a free will theodicy is "Perhaps the most important 
proposed solution to the problem" it is unsatisfactory "primarily because of the incoher-
ence of the notion of freedom of the will," but also because if God is able to create indi-
viduals that freely choose the good on one occasion, then he should be able to create in-
dividuals that freely choose the good on every occasion.24 When choosing which world 
23. J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 201.
24. Ibid., 209.
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to create, God was not simply faced with the choice of choosing a world with free crea-
tures that freely commit moral evil or a world with no free creatures and no moral evil. 
Instead there was the "obviously better possibility of making beings who would act 
freely but always go right." His failure to create such a world is "inconsistent with his 
being both omnipotent and wholly good."25 If it turns out that freedom is compatible 
with that determinism, then because the Augustinian theodicy must correspond to the 
actual details of this world, this objection must be dealt with by anyone wanting to 
make use of that theodicy. Mackie's objection must be dealt with before one can claim 
to have an adequate response to the logical problem of evil.
If compatibilist freedom is all that is necessary for morally significant actions, 
then why would God refrain from creating such a world? The type of freedom refer-
enced in a free will theodicy demands that morally significant actions require a more 
robust sense of freedom of an incompatibilist sort. Do morally significant actions 
require incompatibilist freedom, or is Mackie correct in suggesting that one can act in a 
morally significant way even though he was determined to do so? While answering this 
fundamental question would be quite helpful in dealing with the logical problem of evil 
and the age old debate about how one should understand the nature of freedom con-
cerning human action, there is at least one way of answering Mackie's objection without
too much digression into this seemingly intractable debate.
25. Ibid.
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Plantinga and Defense
Alvin Plantinga has offered a response to the problem of evil that is very similar 
in structure to Augustine's free will theodicy but is what he calls a "free will defense." 
Whereas Augustine's theodicy was intended to provide a response to the problem of evil
in general, Plantinga's defense is presented as a response to Mackie's logical problem of 
evil in particular. Plantinga has actually presented two solutions to this problem, and 
neither involves rejecting (1) or (2). The first solution would be to argue that one of the 
"quasi logical rules" stated in (3) and (4) is false, or to show they are, at least, far from 
being necessarily true. Because logically incompatible sets are incompatible in all possi-
ble worlds, if it turns out that either (3) or (4) are not necessarily true, then there is some
possible world where at least one of them is false. In that possible world, Mackie's 
logical problem of evil would fail because (3) and (4) are needed to generate the explicit
contradiction. But if a set is logically consistent in any possible world, then it is logical-
ly consistent in every possible world — including this one. This negative approach only 
aims to demonstrate flaws in Mackie's argument and nothing more.
The second solution to the problem that Plantinga presents goes further by 
giving a positive argument demonstrating that (1) and (2) are consistent. The basic idea 
behind this argument is that there may be some third proposition that is consistent with 
(1), and entails (2). Plantinga writes, 
One way to show that P & Q are consistent is to find some other proposition R 
such that P and R are consistent, and such that P and R together entail Q… Now 
it is important to see that R need not be true, or probable, or plausible, or accept-
ed by the scientists of our culture circle, or congenial to ‘man come of age,’ or 
anything of the sort: it need only to be such that its conjunction with P is possi-
ble and entails Q. R can do its job perfectly well even if it is extraordinarily im-
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probable or known to be false.26
While Plantinga's strategy here is different from that of the first solution, the underlying 
idea remains the same. He is attempting to demonstrate that Mackie's argument fails by 
dealing with what might possibly be the case. If it can be shown that there is some 
proposition that is possibly true, and consistent with (1), that entails (2), then Mackie's 
argument fails. This is the case no matter how far from this world one must go to find 
such a proposition. 
In The Nature of Necessity Plantinga seeks to demonstrate that Mackie’s as-
sumption that an omnipotent God could create free creatures that always choose rightly 
is false. More specifically, he argues that it is at least logically possible that in order for 
the world to contain moral good there must be creatures that are significantly free in that
world and that any world containing significantly free creatures will also contain moral 
evil as a result of those creatures choosing wrongly. Plantinga argues that the conjunc-
tion of the following propositions are consistent with (1) and together entail (2). Those 
propositions are: 
(5) God has created significantly free creatures 
and 
(6) each of those creatures suffer from transworld depravity.
A person is free with respect to some action if “no causal laws and antecedent condi-
tions determine either that he will perform the action, or that he will not.”27 This is, in 
26. Plantinga, "Self-Profile," 42-43.
27. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1974), 165-166.
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the words of Derk Pereboom, “a paradigmatic type of libertarian freedom.”28 Plantinga 
goes on to distinguish free actions from significantly free actions. Whereas a free action 
is any act that is exercised in this libertarian sense, a significantly free action is one that 
is free and would be either morally right to perform and morally wrong to abstain from 
performing, or vice versa. Plantinga goes on to argue that in order for God to actualize a
world with moral good, he must actualize a world that contains significantly free crea-
tures. This alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that Mackie’s assumption is false 
because there may be a possible world where every creature is significantly free, and yet
always freely chooses the good. 
However, Plantinga also argues that not every possible world is an actualizable 
world and it is the essential point of the free will defense that it is not possible for God 
to actualize such a world. In showing why there are some possible worlds that God 
cannot actualize, Plantinga distinguishes between strong and weak actualization. For 
God to strongly actualize something is for him to directly bring about that state of 
affairs. If the definition of a significantly free decision includes the idea that no an-
tecedent conditions determine one’s decision to perform an action, then it should be 
clear that God cannot strongly actualize any significantly free decision. However, if 
God knows what decision a significantly free agent would make if placed in certain 
circumstances, and causes that agent to be in those circumstances, then we can say that 
God weakly actualizes that decision. When considering if an omnipotent being could 
create a world in which its participants always freely choose the good, we are trying to 
28. Derk Pereboom, "The Problem of Evil," in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy 
of Religion, ed. William E. Mann (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 150.
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determine if God could weakly actualize such a world. Is it possible for God to weakly 
actualize a world containing significantly free creatures that never choose wrongly?
According to Plantinga, if (6) is possible then God could not weakly actualize 
such a world. Any creature that suffers from transworld depravity, and is created signifi-
cantly free, will at some point choose wrongly, no matter the circumstances in which he 
is placed. This means that it is possible that not even God could weakly actualize a 
world with significantly free creatures that always choose rightly. Given the nature of 
the defense, one need not worry about the actual truth, or even the plausibility, of (5) or 
(6). To adequately solve the logical problem of evil, (5) and (6) need only be possible. 
If, as Plantinga maintains, both (5) and (6) are logically possible, then there is an R that 
is compatible with (1) and entails (2).
Some proponents of the logical problem of evil have attempted to show that 
Plantinga’s defense does not work because (6) may not be logically possible. Others 
argue that a lack of reasons showing why (6) is not possible is not sufficient to establish 
that it is possible.29 Whether these arguments succeed or not, they seem to appropriately 
understand the strategy of Plantinga’s defense. The same cannot be said for others that 
have argued that Plantinga’s free will defense does not work because (5) is false. For 
example, in The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, Brian Davies writes, “So we 
can forget about the Free Will Defence as an exoneration of God with respect to moral 
evil. The notion of human freedom which is central to this defence (freedom indepen-
29. This line of argument is developed in Keith DeRose, "Plantinga, Presumption, 
Possibility, and the Problem of Evil," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 4 (1991): 
497-512.
21
dent of God’s causal activity) is a mirage given that God is the Maker of all things, the 
source of their being for as long as they exist.”30 Davies is correct that the truth of (5) is 
important for the theist, but he has mistaken the role it is playing in Plantinga’s defense. 
Its truth would matter only if using it as a premise in something akin to an Augustinian 
free will theodicy. Plantinga only needs (5) to be possible; he does not need it to be true.
Making note of this aspect of Plantinga’s strategy highlights the difference 
between a theodicy and a defense. While a theodicy attempts to give a positive explana-
tion for the existence of evil, a defense only seeks to rebuff arguments attempting to es-
tablish the non-existence of God based on the existence of evil. To this end, it seems 
that the free will defense is a success. Prominent atheologian William Rowe writes, 
“Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent 
with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing 
such an extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism [between free will and de-
terminism], there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil 
is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God.”31 While one may believe 
that incompatibilism is false, and even argue persuasively that it is, that is different from
establishing that incompatibilism is impossible. It is the sheer possibility that incompati-
bilism about free will and determinism is true that allows Plantinga to argue that God 
has created significantly free beings, which is central to the possibility of those beings 
suffering from transworld depravity. It is that same possibility that also allows Plantinga
30. Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2006), 129.
31. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," 335, n1.
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to argue that (1) and (2) are logically consistent regarding natural evil because it is pos-
sible that, “the natural evil we find is due to free actions of non-human spirits.”32 No 
matter how unlikely or improbable we find this to be, it does not matter if the possible 
existence of non-human spirits adequately functions as an R that, conjoined with P, 
entails Q.
An Objection to Plantinga's Use of a Defense
Even though some find Plantinga's defense unsuccessful,33 his general strategy 
for responding to the logical problem of evil is mostly uncontroversial. However, there 
has been some resistance as to whether or not Plantinga's employment of that strategy is
successful. Plantinga has consistently maintained that the propositions employed in a 
free will defense need only be possible, and this prevents him from having to answer the
question as to whether or not human agents actually have libertarian freedom. However,
Jerry Walls has argued that Plantinga's defense is committed to the actual truth of liber-
tarian freedom and, because of that, Plantinga must "move out the relatively modest 
realm of defense into the bolder arena of theodicy."34 If Walls is correct, then even 
though one could simply offer some possibly true proposition that would demonstrate 
32. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 192.
33. See, for example, Fred Chernoff, "The Obstinance of Evil," Mind 89, no. 354 
(1980): 269-273.
34.Jerry Walls, "Why Plantinga Must Move from Defense to Theodicy," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 51, no. 2 (1991): 378.
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the compatibility of evil and the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God, it is not 
an option for those that employ libertarian freedom in that venture.
Walls believes that Plantinga must make this move because "If God is necessari-
ly perfectly good, as well as essentially omnipotent and omniscient, then it is not even 
possible that we are free only in the compatibilist sense, given the evil in our world."35 
If it turns out that in the actual world we are free only in this compatibilist sense, then 
there should be no evil because God could have created each human agent free in this 
sense while ensuring none choose evil. Walls's argument is as follows:
(7) If God is necessarily perfectly good, He eliminates all evil He can properly 
eliminate in all possible worlds.
(8) In all worlds in which persons are not free or are free only in the compati-
bilist sense, God could properly eliminate all moral evil.
(9) Therefore, there are no possible worlds in which persons are free only in the 
compatibilist sense, and in which there is moral evil.
(10) Our world contains much moral evil.
(11) Therefore, in our world persons are free in the libertarian sense.36
Premises (7) and (10) are not objectionable for Plantinga or any other free will defender,
and premises (9) and (11) simply follow from the argument. So, the question is whether 
or not (8) is true. In support of (8), Walls writes, "Premise [8] ... could be disputed. 
However, I do not think there is much prospect for coming up with such a reason. For 
moral evil is the product of human choices, and if freedom and determinism are compat-
ible, then God could determine all persons to make only good moral choices."37 Walls's 
35. Ibid., 376.
36. Ibid.
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argument will prove instructive in two ways. First, it demonstrates how easy it is to 
forget the limited scope of Plantinga's free will defense. Second, it demonstrates why 
Plantinga's response does little to convince the non-theist that a wholly good, omnipo-
tent God might allow horrific evils to exist. We will consider each of these in turn.
It may be true that there is not much prospect for coming up with reasons why 
God would allow moral evil to exist if freedom and determinism are compatible. But, 
that has nothing to do with the logical compatibility of the existence of God and the ex-
istence of evil, which is precisely what Plantinga has demonstrated with his free will 
defense. The free will defense does not commit one to believing that libertarian freedom
is the only way in which the consistency of the relevant propositions can be demonstrat-
ed. As Plantinga points out, "a large variety of r's can plausibly play this role."38 
Even if other explanations are difficult to come by, they simply are not needed to
set aside the logical problem of evil. The free will defense, if successful, demonstrates 
that a set of propositions is consistent. But, if a set of propositions is consistent, then 
any subset of that set will also be consistent. Plantinga's free will defense demonstrates 
that the original set was logically consistent. If it turns out that in this world there is no 
libertarian freedom, then relative to this world we know that the above set is not consis-
tent. But if we remove what generates the inconsistency in this world, libertarian 
freedom, a subset still remains and because the original set is consistent in some possi-
ble world any subset of that set will also be consistent. One's inability to demonstrate 
37. Ibid., 377.
38. Alvin Plantinga, "Ad Walls," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A 
Quarterly Journal 51, no. 3 (1991): 623.
25
that the set is consistent in this world is beside the point when it comes to determining if
it is logically consistent. By determining, or even just assuming, that compatibilism is 
true in this world we know that libertarian freedom is not the reason why evil exists in 
this world. But because there is some possible world in which the set is consistent one 
can know, apart from relying on the truth of libertarian freedom, that there is no logical 
inconsistency between the existence of God and the existence of evil. 
To rephrase the above, if the libertarian understanding of freedom does not 
reflect the way this world is, then clearly the details of the free will defense do not apply
to this world. But the defense is not intended to apply to a particular world. If we know 
that libertarianism is false in the actual world, then of course that set of propositions is 
not consistent in the actual world. However, once one removes the false proposition, lib-
ertarian freedom, a subset of propositions is created. Because the free will defense 
demonstrates that the original set is logically consistent in some possible world, that 
subset too must be consistent. This is the case even if we cannot go on to demonstrate 
how that subset is consistent in the actual world.
The nature of such a defense has left some philosophers unsatisfied. John Hick, 
while agreeing that Plantinga has resolved the logical problem finds his methodology 
“disquieting.” He writes, “That he should so easily fill a gap in his theodicy by appeal-
ing to a mythological idea, on the ground that it is logically possible, emphasizes again 
the remoteness of Plantinga’s concern from all questions of plausibility and probabili-
ty.”39 The mythological idea Hick is concerned with is Plantinga's suggestion that 
39. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 369.
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natural evil could be the result of the free actions of non-human agents. It does not seem
to be the specifics of what Plantinga appeals to that bothers Hick, but instead the strate-
gy that allows Plantinga to just appeal to some logically possibly state of affairs to deal 
with the problem. It is this feature of a defense, employing propositions that are simply 
possibly true, that seems to also be one of the more irksome features of the defense in 
general. While Hick is dissatisfied with how Plantinga "fills a gap," Mackie is unsatis-
fied with the response because it conflicts with what he takes to be the actually correct 
view about human action. He writes, “Since this defense is formally [that is logically] 
possible, and its principle involves no real abandonment of our ordinary view of the op-
position between good and evil, we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after 
all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another. 
But whether this offers a real solution of the problem is another question.”40 
While it is understandable that one may feel disquieted about the nature of this 
solution, or simply doubt whether it is a real solution at all, for the most part this misses 
the point of the defense entirely. This may explain why much of the recent scholarly at-
tention has shifted from the logical problem of evil to the evidential problem. While this
new problem is certainly a problem for Christian theism, it is a different problem — and
different problems have different solutions. Hick and Mackie, among others, seem to 
have implicitly expected Plantinga’s defense to do more than he intended it to do. Still, 
it does seem to be bothersome that one is able to summarily dismiss a problem that 
seemed, at least initially, intractable. Perhaps one of the causes of this problem is that 
40. J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 
154.
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there is no requirement for Plantinga, or anyone else, to suggest an R that he actually 
believes is true. Of course he may believe it to be true, but need not. This is what has led
many philosophers to find defenses to the problem of evil more irritating than helpful. 
In what follows I will make a distinction between two types of a defense and show that 
one of the above worries applies only to one of these types whereas the other is much 
less likely to result in such dissatisfaction.
Narrow and Broad Defenses
Recall that what distinguishes a theodicy from a defense is that the former at-
tempts to resolve the problem of evil by stating what is actually the case whereas the 
latter simply offers a solution that is possibly the case. It is with this distinction in mind 
that most recent discussions of the problem of evil have occurred. However, it seems 
that Plantinga, among others, has actually been using two senses of defense. It will be 
helpful to distinguish them clearly.41 The first sense of a defense is just what we have 
seen in action already. This is what I will call a narrow defense, which only employs 
propositions for the purpose of demonstrating the failure of a problem of evil. To this 
end, Plantinga’s defense works admirably. Mackie claimed that there is an inconsistency
between propositions that are central to Christian theology and the proposition that evil 
exists. Plantinga then showed that there is a way to resolve the apparent inconsistency 
41. I have been using Plantinga’s free will defense to demonstrate the method of a 
defense in general, what follows should apply to all defenses to the logical problem of 
evil, not simply Plantinga's.
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and in doing so, answered that logical problem of evil.
The proponent of the logical problem of evil is forced to agree that this general 
strategy is correct.42 Recall that the defense Plantinga offers maintains that all one needs
to do is provide some possible proposition, R, that is consistent with what we know 
about God and together entails that there is evil. The task of finding such an R to play 
that role seems, to some, to be too easy. However, there seems to be a rule that we can 
stipulate about R that would go a long way to make a defense less bothersome, and 
would make that additional proposition much more meaningful. This rule, let us call it 
the consistency requirement, requires that R is consistent with other things the Christian 
philosopher believes about the actual world. If R is not consistent, then the thoughtful 
proponent of the logical problem of evil only needs to broaden the original set of propo-
sitions to include the other relevant propositions that would generate the inconsistency. 
For example, if a Calvinist employed the free will defense, it would be difficult for that 
same person to satisfy the consistency requirement. On many standard views of Calvin-
ism, human agents do not have libertarian freedom and, because of certain Calvinist as-
sumptions about divine providence, the lack of libertarian freedom is essential to their 
Christian beliefs. To respond to such a person, the proponent of the logical problem of 
evil need only add to the original set of propositions, (1) and (2),
(12) Incompatibilist free will does not exist.
If (12) is added to the original set, then it will not be difficult at all to demonstrate that 
42. Of course agreeing that a strategy is correct is different from believing that 
Plantinga’s R is adequate. One might think that (5) or (6) is impossible, and yet still 
realize that there may be another proposition that can successfully fill that role.
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(5) and (12) are not compatible. This Calvinist would have to give up one of the two in-
compatible propositions, but because he takes (12) to be essential to Christian doctrine, 
(5) would have to be rejected. And of course rejecting (5) means that the original logical
problem of evil would remain. 
I will call a defense that intends to answer the logical problem by only including 
propositions that satisfy the consistency requirement a broad defense. While I am not 
aware of Plantinga making such a distinction, it seems to be one he at least tacitly rec-
ognizes. We previously noted that Plantinga thinks “R need not be true, or probable, or 
plausible…,” but in that very same essay goes on to write, “Many philosophers endorse 
a compatibilist analysis of freedom, according to which it is perfectly possible that some
of my actions be free, even though all of them are causally determined by causal chains 
extending back to events entirely outside my control. And of course if compatibilism is 
correct, the Free Will Defense fails.”43 We can make sense of this apparent contradiction
by employing the distinction between broad and narrow defenses. The free will defense 
would fail in this instance only if we take it to be a broad defense because, when nar-
rowly construed, the truth of compatibilism does not make incompatibilism impossible. 
However, if one is offering a broad defense, then he must also take into account every-
thing that he believes and maintain consistency in doing so. If someone agrees that in-
compatibilism is false, as did our Calvinist above, then he will not be able to consistent-
ly employ it as part of a broad defense, but that does not mean that the narrow defense 
fails as well.
43. Plantinga, "Self-Profile," 43, 45. (Emphasis added).
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It is important to point out that another component of the consistency require-
ment is that the theist also believe R to be true. There are several options one has when 
considering the truth of a proposition. One might: believe the proposition to be true, 
believe it to be false but possibly true, believe it to be possibly true but refrain from any 
judgment concerning its truth value, and believe it to be necessarily false. Because a 
broad defense aims to establish a defense to the logical problem of evil by only employ-
ing propositions consistent with what the defender actually believes to be true, the de-
fender cannot satisfy the consistency requirement if he actually believes ~R because that
would immediately create an inconsistent set. Additionally, if the defender aims to con-
vince the atheologian that there are good reasons to reject the logical problem of evil, 
then it will seem sleight of hand to appeal to a proposition he believes is only possibly 
true, but he has no reason to think it actually is true. It seems this is at the heart of 
Hick's difficulty with Plantinga's willingness to appeal to the existence of non-human 
agents to explain the occurrence of natural evils. The simple fact that R is possible is 
sufficient for a narrow defense, but when giving a broad defense the theist is more likely
to convince the atheologian that his defense works if he actually believes R to be true.
All the consistency requirement demands is that the defender does not believe 
~R; actually believing R, though helpful, is not strictly necessary.44 On any account, if 
one is concerned with giving a broad defense, the first step he must take is to ensure any
of the propositions employed in that defense are consistent with his other beliefs. If 
44. It seems like the more one focuses on this second aspect of the rationality 
requirement, the closer one gets to giving a theodicy. In this dissertation, I will 
concentrate mostly on the first part of the consistency requirement of a broad defense.
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there is an inconsistency between the free will defense and an essential Christian doc-
trine, then the defense, broadly construed, fails. However, if the inconsistency involves 
propositions that are not essentially connected to Christianity, then one must decide 
whether he should reject those propositions to ensure the success of the defense, or 
maintain those propositions and give up the broad defense. 
If the Christian philosopher makes use of a broad defense, then it seems that the 
atheologian would have reasons to find the defense more to the point. There is a qualita-
tive difference between saying to the atheologian, "This defense demonstrates how the 
Christian God can co-exist with evil" and "This defense not only demonstrates how the 
Christian God can co-exist with evil but is also consistent with everything else I take to 
be true." This approach brings a defense much closer to theodicy because the truth of 
other propositions becomes relevant, but it does not go as far as theodicy in offering the 
actual answer to the problem of evil. A broad defense would need to eventually encom-
pass everything that one believes and not just Christian beliefs, but it seems most 
reasonable to begin the process with those Christian beliefs because they are most 
closely tied to the free will defense. 
As we have seen, an essential feature of the free will defense is the possibility 
that incompatibilism is true. If there are Christian doctrines that require incompatibilism
to be false, then there will be an inconsistency between those doctrines and a broad free 
will defense. There are at least three specific Christian doctrines that might generate 
such an inconsistency: the notion of original sin, the belief that human agents in heaven 
are free yet never sin, and traditional conceptions of the divine will. Even though 
various branches of Christendom all have their own take on how one should understand 
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the specifics of these doctrines, all are squarely within an orthodox understanding of 
Christianity. We will now evaluate each of these doctrines in turn.
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Chapter Two: Original Sin
In chapter one several responses to the problem of evil were presented: theodicies, re-
buttals, narrow defenses, and broad defenses. There it was claimed that the salient dif-
ference between theodicy and defense is the intent of the response. In a theodicy the so-
lution to the problem of evil is taken to be the way the world actually is. Thus, there is 
an expectation, at least implicitly, that the interlocutor accept that explanation as true. 
However, with a defense there is no such expectation. The defender is merely offering 
what is logically possible, or true as far as anyone knows. The salient difference 
between a rebuttal and a defense is that a rebuttal deals with the the problem by demon-
strating an internal difficulty with the argument, whereas a defense supplies some addi-
tional proposition(s) to demonstrate one way the problem can be resolved. 
One might give many different defenses to a problem of evil, but what is cur-
rently under consideration is a broad free will defense to the logical problem of evil. 
Recall that a broad defense to the logical problem of evil is one that only employs 
propositions that satisfy the consistency requirement. Because Plantinga's defense is 
generally considered to be the most influential defense, we have so far only considered 
that specific response to the logical problem of evil. It may very well be appropriate to 
continue in that fashion if for no other reason than his response is probably the most 
likely to succeed. However, for present purposes, it should be noted that the following 
should easily apply, mutatis mutandis, to other versions of free will defenses as long as 
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they include at least the following three features. First, there must be an internal reliance
upon a libertarian understanding of free will. Second, it must maintain that libertarian 
freedom is necessary, in some way, for God to bring about a good. Finally, that good ob-
taining is a morally sufficient reason for God to allow the possibility of accompanying 
evils. Any response to the logical problem of evil that includes these three features can 
be considered a type of free will defense and will have to address the concerns to be 
raised in this chapter and those that follow.
Introductory Issues
In this chapter a problem for a broad free will defense will be raised. It will be 
shown that prominent versions of the doctrine of original sin are not consistent with the 
free will defense. It will then be demonstrated that certain popular reformulations of the 
doctrine fare no better.
Why Original Sin?
Central to Christian theology is the belief that God the Son, the second member 
of the Trinity, became incarnate, died, and rose again after three days. Why was such a 
dramatic event necessary? This was the divine answer to a problem that humanity 
created for itself — a problem of sin. As Alvin Plantinga nicely puts it, "it is sin that oc-
casions Incarnation and Atonement, redemption and renewal."1 But why is it that sin 
1. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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seems to be such a universal problem? Why is it that no one is able to go through life 
without sinning?2 According to traditional Christian teaching, such people cannot be 
found because all are born with a condition that has been called 'original sin'. 
A more detailed presentation of original sin will be presented below, but for our 
current purposes we can take 'original sin' to mean the following: the Christian doctrine 
that teaches that the first sin of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden is somehow 
imputed to their progeny, which has an initial disastrous effect upon all mankind. Now 
obviously the idea of a literal Adam and Eve and a literal Garden of Eden sounds a bit 
farfetched to the modern mindset, especially since it does not easily comport with evo-
lutionary accounts of the human race, but many Christian theists do maintain such an 
account.3 Given that most philosophers today no longer have much need for a doctrine 
of original sin, some justification is in order for spending time evaluating this particular 
Christian doctrine.
There are at least two, closely related, reasons for the necessity of examining the
consistency of original sin with a free will defense. The first reason is that a great 
2000), 201.
2. The observation that no one refrains from sinning at some point or another led G.K. 
Chesterton to conclude that the doctrine of original "is the only doctrine within 
Christianity that can be proven." G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1995), 19.
3. Most contemporary systematic theologies do not attempt to establish that the doctrine
of original sin is true, but instead begin with its truth and seek to explain it. Two popular
accounts can be found in Millard Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Books, 1998), 648-656 and Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An 
Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 
1994), 494-498.
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number of Christian philosophers and theologians do believe in some version of the 
doctrine of original sin. Of course there is a great deal of variance in how one under-
stands the doctrine, but almost all branches of Western Christendom explicitly endorse 
the doctrine. This near-universality of the doctrine within the Western church can be 
traced to one of its earliest proponents, St. Augustine. The Catholic theologian Alfred 
Vanneste writes, "It was not until the outset of the fifth century that this doctrine, under 
the impulse of Augustine (354-430) was clearly and neatly formulated. The Council of 
Carthage (418) and later the Council of Orange (529) confirmed the essential elements 
of the Augustinian doctrine, thus incorporating them into the patrimony of the Western 
Church."4 That incorporation is evidenced by the doctrine's continued acceptance 
outside of the Catholic church during and after the Reformation by the likes of Martin 
Luther, John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards. This fifth century doctrine is still embraced
today, and anyone attempting to resolve the logical problem of evil by making use of a 
broad free will defense will need to ensure that their understanding of original sin is 
consistent with that defense.
The second reason for focusing on original sin is its centrality to the core of 
Christian theology. Initially this statement may come as a surprise, but in some respect 
the whole of Christian theology can be seen as God's attempt to right the wrong brought
forth from Adam's sin.5 This is a grand oversimplification, of course, but throughout 
4. Alfred Vanneste, The Dogma of Original Sin (Paris: Louvain, 1971), 30-31.
5. While it would be more accurate to speak of both Adam and Eve that originally 
sinned, I shall, for the sake of simplicity generally follow the historical and Biblical 
precedent of referring to that event as Adam's sin.
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both Old and New Testaments God is presented as working to restore the relationship he
had with his creation that was severed in the Garden. According to Christian theology, 
all mankind has been separated from God and Jesus' death and resurrection were neces-
sary to remedy that separation. While Augustine was deeply influenced by the Apostle 
Paul, and in turn greatly influenced the way Western Christians think about original sin, 
one would still have an implicit doctrine of original sin even if neither Paul nor Augus-
tine ever discussed the topic. The fact that Jesus' death is presented in the New Testa-
ment as being for all mankind is enough to generate some type of doctrine of original 
sin, a doctrine that teaches all mankind is in need of assistance. Noting the centrality of 
original sin, Robert Gleason writes, "Even if there had been no Pelagian controversy, no
Augustine, no Paul to comment on Genesis, there would be an implicit doctrine of origi-
nal sin because it is implied in the universality of Christ's redemption. His saving grace 
is absolutely necessary and for all men."6 
As we have already seen, the doctrine of original sin teaches that all humans are 
somehow negatively impacted by Adam's decision to sin in the Garden. The specifics of
the doctrine vary widely, but most versions will be presented in one of two ways. One 
way to understand the doctrine of original sin is to distinguish one's being born guilty 
from one's being born in a condition that inevitably leads to sin. The former I will call 
original guilt and the latter original inclination, but both are the result of Adam's sin. 
One might hold that a correct account of original sin will include both of these features, 
as Augustine did, but they are distinct nonetheless. 
6. Robert W. Gleason, introduction to Ibid., 16. (Original emphasis.)
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Original Guilt
While adherents to both understandings of original sin believe that original sin is
the result of Adam's sin, the disagreement is in determining how we should understand 
what it means to be born "with the taint of original sin."7 We shall begin by discussing 
the understanding of original sin as that of original guilt. On this account, Adam's deci-
sion to sin in the Garden of Eden has forever affected all of mankind, with the exception
of Jesus and possibly Mary, his mother, and the initial effect was that all mankind is 
born guilty before God.8 Why might one hold to this view? Why think all humans are 
born into a state of guilt? What could an infant have done to warrant a guilty judgment 
from an omnibenevolent being? According to Augustine, all mankind was somehow 
with Adam in that first sin. Augustine writes, "Man, however, depraved by his own free 
will, and justly condemned, produced depraved and condemned children. For we were 
all in that one man, since we all were that one man who fell into sin through the woman 
who was made from him before they sinned."9 J.N.D. Kelly writes of Augustine's under-
standing of original sin, "As [Augustine] sees it, the essence of original sin consists in 
our participation in, and co-responsibility for, Adam's perverse choice. We were one 
7. Aquinas, On Evil, trans. Richard Regan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford 
University Press), q. 5, a. 1, resp. 2.
8. I say "possibly Mary" because many non-Catholics maintain the same understanding 
of original sin as Catholics, but also maintain that Mary too was affected by it.
9. Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 555-556, chap. 13, bk. 14. Emphasis added.
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with him when he made it, and thus willed in and with him."10 It is this participation in 
that original sin that brings about the guilt into which all mankind is born.11 
Not only are we guilty for participating with Adam, but we are also guilty for the
corruption that results from that participation. Because of Adam's sin, all are born in a 
state that will inevitably lead to further corruption at some point in the course of one's 
life. The guilt, then, is twofold: we are guilty for participating in Adam's first sin and we
are guilty for being born in the corrupted state that resulted from that sin. According to 
Michael Rae, this is not just Augustine's view of original sin. In fact, "Augustine, 
Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin all explicitly endorsed the doctrine of [original guilt], and 
endorsement of that view is typical of theologians in the Reformed tradition."12 This un-
derstanding of original sin was clearly influential throughout the history of the Christian
tradition, but we will see below that it is not the only way in which one must understand
the doctrine. But first we will examine whether or not this understanding of original sin 
is compatible with a broad free will defense.
The Free Will Defense & the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Recall that in a broad free will defense propositions are offered that purport to 
10. J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, rev. ed., (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1960; Prince Press ed., Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 2004), 364.
11. Kelly also notes that this is the primary reason Augustine thought all infants should 
be baptized. See Early Christian Doctrines, chapter 13. This concern regarding infants 
is found in Aquinas as well. See On Evil, q. 4, a. 1.
12. Michael Rae, "The Metaphysics of Original Sin," in Persons: Human and Divine, 
eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 324.
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demonstrate the logical consistency of God and evil and these propositions must be con-
sistent with other propositions the theist holds. In giving a free will defense it is main-
tained that it is at least possible that God could only achieve some moral goods by creat-
ing creatures with a certain type of freedom. What conception of freedom is being 
utilized in such a defense? William Rowe writes, "The basic assumption in [the free will
defense] is that it is logically impossible for a person both to perform some act freely 
and to have been caused to perform that act. Without this assumption the Free Will 
Defense collapses."13 Louis Pojman makes the understanding of freedom even more ex-
plicit, "The [free will defense] assumes a libertarian view of freedom of the will... This 
view is opposed to determinism as well as compatibilism. If you are committed to com-
patibilism or determinism, the free will defense will not be effective against the argu-
ment from evil."14 Finally, Richard Gale writes "A crucial premise in every version of a 
[free will defense] is the Libertarian theory of freedom."15 The reliance of the free will 
defense upon libertarian freedom is clear. But what does it mean to say that someone 
has libertarian freedom? That is, under what conditions can it be said that a person has 
libertarian freedom? 
So, what does it mean to have libertarian freedom? A large number of philoso-
phers pick out the ability to refrain from some action as the distinguishing feature in de-
13. William Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 117. (Original emphasis.)
14. Louis P. Pojman, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2003), 138. (Emphasis added.) 
15. Richard Gale, "Evil and Alvin Plantinga," in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Deane-Peter Baker
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 49. (Emphasis added.)
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termining whether that act was free in a libertarian sense. For example, Randolphe 
Clarke writes, "Following many other writers on a basic characterization of this 
freedom, I shall say that when an agent acts freely (or with free will), she is able to do 
other than what she does then."16 Hugh McCann argues that to have freely decided to 
perform some action in the libertarian sense one "must, categorically, have been able to 
do otherwise."17 This ability to do otherwise is now commonly referred to as the princi-
ple of alternate possibilities and according to Robert Kane "many people have thought 
that the existence of alternative possibilities is the characteristic of free will that makes 
it incompatible with determinism."18 On this understanding of libertarian freedom, to be 
free with regard to an action is just is to have alternative possibilities regarding that 
action. If this reading of libertarian freedom is correct, then the free will defense utilizes
something much more precise than libertarian freedom. That is, it seems that for most 
libertarians, the free will defense requires a principle of alternative possibilities.19
16. Randolphe Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 3.
17.Hugh McCann, The Works of Agency (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 174.
18.Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 33.
19. Though the term 'principle of alternate possibilities' was first coined by Harry 
Frankfurt in his now famous article, Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility," The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969): 829-839, it is now 
commonly used as a way to refer to a family of principles that share the same structure 
concerning what it means to be free. See, for example, David Hunt, "On a Theological 
Counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Faith and Philosophy 19, 
no. 2 (2002): 245-255.
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The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Original Guilt
Now that we have a rough understanding of the original guilt reading of the doc-
trine of original sin and have seen that the free will defense rests upon a principle of al-
ternative possibilities, we are in a place to present the problem this understanding of 
original sin poses for a broad free will defense.
(1) To be guilty for some action entails moral responsibility for that action. 
[meaning of 'guilt']
(2) So, if all humans subsequent to Adam are guilty at birth for participating in 
the original sin of Adam, then all humans subsequent to Adam are morally re-
sponsible at birth for participating in the original sin of Adam. [direct application
of (1)]
(3) If one is morally responsible for an action, then there must have been alterna-
tive possibilities available to that person regarding that action. [PAP]
(4) So, if all humans subsequent to Adam are morally responsible at birth for 
participating in the original sin of Adam, then there must have been alternative 
possibilities regarding that original sin available to all humans subsequent to 
Adam. [direct application of (3)]
(5) So, if all humans subsequent to Adam are guilty at birth for participating in 
the original sin of Adam, then there must have been alternative possibilities re-
garding that original sin available to all humans subsequent to Adam. [2, 4, by 
hypothetical syllogism]
(6) But, no alternative possibilities regarding that original sin were available to 
any humans subsequent to Adam.
(7) So, it is false that humans subsequent to Adam are guilty at birth for partici-
pating in the original sin of Adam. [5, 6 by modus tollens] 
The argument is valid, but there are at least three ways for the proponent of orig-
inal guilt to deny that it is sound. However, each ultimately fails. The first is to deny 
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premise (3).20 But, as we have seen above, this denial would prevent the vast majority of
libertarians from being able to use a broad free will defense because of the central role 
PAP plays in libertarian understandings of freedom. While it is true that this would 
negate the force of the argument, it comes at a price many libertarians would not be 
willing to pay.21
A second way is to deny premise (6) and argue that humans subsequent to Adam
did in fact have alternate possibilities regarding the original sin of Adam. This might be 
an approach that Augustine would consider given his repeated comments regarding the 
presence of all humankind in Adam. Recall that according to Augustine all humans were
somehow present in Adam and that because of that presence all humans participated in 
that first sin. Because all were, "in that one man [Adam]"22 all are born "depraved by 
[their] own free will and justly condemned."23 It is not clear what that participation con-
sists in, but that there is some type of participation is clear. Elsewhere, Augustine writes,
20. One should not be surprised if most Calvinists take this route since many are also 
compatibilists regarding free will and determinism. But such compatibilists are not 
likely to have much use for a broad free will defense at all.
21. Some libertarians, however, deny that PAP is a necessary condition for free action. 
Instead, what makes for a free action is that it issues from the agent and no prior 
conditions are what brings about that action. Because that condition is clearly not met in
accounts of original guilt, I will not pursue such conceptions of libertarian freedom as a 
way to avoid the problem above any further.
22. Interestingly, Augustine's belief that all were in Adam comes from, in part, his 
understanding of Romans 5:12, which in the New American Standard Bible reads 
"Therefore, just as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin, 
and so death spread to all men, because all sinned."  However, Augustine's source was 
Ambrosiaster's Latin Vulgate edition which instead, incorrectly, reads, "in whom all 
sinned."  See Tatha Wiley, Original Sin: Origins, Developments, Contemporary 
Meanings (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2002), especially chapter 3.
23. Augustine, City of God, chap. 13, bk. 14.
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"that infants are involved in the sins of their parents, not only of the first pair, but even 
of their own, of whom they were born," which is why "each one of them must be born 
again, so that he may thereby be absolved of whatever sin was in him at the time of 
birth."24 The problem with this approach is that it is not at all clear how one would 
explain unborn persons having options available to them concerning that original sin. 
Even if that could be done, one would then need an explanation of why no one in fact 
did exercise an alternative possibility. Recall that one of the leading questions con-
cerning sin is why all of humanity does in fact sin. One cannot, in good form, simply 
appeal to original sin as the explanation for everyone's complicity in that sin because 
that complicity is what is supposed to generate the doctrine itself. 
The final, and seemingly most plausible, way is to deny premise (1) as stated. 
This can take at least two different forms. One way would be to refine what we mean by
'guilt'. and the second way would be to deny that humans are guilty because of their 
participation in the original sin of Adam. We will begin with this second approach, 
which is often referred to as 'federalism'.
The long and rich tradition of federalism is mostly located within the Reformed 
theological tradition and dates at least to John Calvin.25 According to the federalist ex-
planation of original guilt, humanity is born guilty not because of some particular action
24. Augustine, Enchiridion, section 46. Erickson also states that one is guilty for Adam's
sin because of co-participation in that sin. He writes, "It is no imitation or repetition of 
Adam's sin [for which we are guilty], but participation in it." Christian Theology, 1998, 
653.
25. For Calvin's presentation see his Institutes of Christian Religion, book 2, chaps. 1-6.
For a contemporary presentation see Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 3, Sin 
and Salvation in Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), chaps. 1-2.
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in which all participated, but because Adam is the representative for all humans. This 
view claims that "Adam was 'a public person,' or 'a Parliament man,' for whose conduct 
all men are responsible."26 The federalist picture emphasizes the Biblical parallel of 
Adam as the "first man" and Jesus as the "second man."27 Both engage in some particu-
lar act that has an effect on all humanity. Concerning this picture of original guilt, 
Millard Erickson writes, "Bound by the covenant between God and Adam, we are 
treated as if we have actually and personally done what he as our representative did."28 
Of course, there is much more that can be said of this view, but this should be sufficient 
to evaluate the underlying assumption of the view.
The main problem with this reading of original guilt is that we do not normally 
hold people guilty for the actions of their representatives — unless they had a role to 
play when it came time to decide what action to take. For example, at the close of the 
First Gulf War, it would have been morally wrong for Kuwait, or any other country for 
that matter, to punish Iraqi citizens as a result of Saddam Hussein's decision to invade 
another country. This is especially true since they seemed to have no say in whether or 
not they wanted Hussein to act on their behalf. Even though Hussein did represent the 
citizens of Iraq, they had no say in whether or not Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Iraqi citi-
zens may have had to deal with the consequences of those actions, but that is distinct 
from being punished as a result of the invasion. The original guilt component of the 
26. H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original Sin, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1955), 3.
27. !See Romans 5:12-21.
28. Erickson, Christian Theology, 652. (Emphasis added.)
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doctrine of original sin does not simply say that humans have to deal with the conse-
quences of Adam's sin, it maintains that they are guilty for it because Adam was their 
representative. This concept can be seen even more clearly when one considers the 
fierce opposition among many Americans to the invasion of Iraq that began the Second 
Gulf War. Even though the invasion was initiated by appropriately elected officials, and 
thus representatives of even those opposed to the invasion, it would not be morally ap-
propriate to deem these Americans as guilty for the invasion.
The most promising way to affirm original guilt and reject the above argument is
presented by contemporary philosopher William Wainwright.29 Wainwright argues that 
premise (1) should be redefined because it does not convey the appropriate meaning of 
'guilt' in this context.30 So how does Wainwright understand guilt?
Wainwright notes that guilt typically entails three things, "one's offense was 
within one's control, one should be blamed for it (if only by oneself), and one is an ap-
propriate candidate for (legal, social, or divine) punishment" and that "the standard 
objects of guilt are actions."31 However, Wainwright agrees with Robert Adams that 
there are other instances in which it is appropriate to consider a person guilty. One can 
also "be guilty of, and blamed for, beliefs and attitudes which are not within our 
29. William Wainwright, "Original Sin," in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. 
Thomas Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 31-60.  Before 
addressing the notion of guilt, Wainwright actually presents and rejects aspects of 
Jonathan Edwards's view of Inherited Guilt, what I have called original guilt.
30. The definition of guilt that Wainwright offers would also serve as grounds for the 
denial of premise 2.
31. Ibid. 54.
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control," but punishment for such beliefs and attitudes may not be appropriate.32 This 
leads Wainwright to distinguish two senses of guilt. He writes, "In its primary sense, 
guilt presupposes control and entails that one is an appropriate candidate for punishment
as well as blame. In a secondary sense, guilt does not imply control and only entails that
blame is appropriate."33 When it comes to original sin, Wainwright does not believe that 
guilt in the primary sense is appropriate. He agrees with Pelagius that "a person cannot 
be guilty of something in the primary sense unless it springs from his own will or affec-
tions" but disagrees that "sin is no more than 'the performance of a deed wrongly 
done.'"34 Understanding original guilt in the secondary sense allows one to bypass the 
need for PAP entirely.35 One should only be concerned with PAP if guilt in the primary 
sense is under consideration, but since it is sometimes appropriate to blame, though not 
punish, individuals for involuntary beliefs and attitudes, it is appropriate for God to do 
so concerning humans because of their original guilt. What should one make of this dis-
tinction between the two senses of guilt? Will such a distinction allow the broad free 
will defender to also endorse the doctrine of original guilt? I will argue that it does not.36
32. Ibid. See also Robert Merrihew Adams, "Involuntary Sins," The Philosophical 
Review 94, no. 1 (1985): 3-31.
33. Wainwright, "Original Sin," 54.
34. Ibid. The internal quote is from Robert F. Evans, Pelagius, Inquiries and 
Reappraisals (New York: A. & C. Black, 1968), 97.
35. One should note that here the claim is not that PAP is not necessary for a libertarian 
understanding of freedom, just that it is not needed when assessing the doctrine of 
original guilt.
36. For a short critique of Adams's "Involuntary Sins" see Richard Swinburne, 
Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapter two, 
but especially footnote 1. Since Wainwright's view depends upon Adams, if Swinburne 
is correct, then there will be difficulties with Wainwright's position too. I am not 
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If the doctrine of original guilt was only concerned with whether or not one is 
blameworthy because of Adam's sin, then Wainwright's argument would be quite 
helpful. However, the doctrine of original guilt maintains much more than humanity's 
blameworthiness. Even if we accept that there are two different senses of guilt, original 
guilt is concerned with the primary sense and not the secondary one. At least according 
to Augustine and those that follow him in this regard, unbaptized infants are not just 
blamed for the sin of Adam, they are subject to punishment. Being subject to punish-
ment, in Wainwright's terminology, is to be guilty in the primary sense. In fact, it is this 
guilt that "baptism was designed to remove."37 Recall that because of Adam's sin all are 
born "depraved and condemned." Being depraved may be consistent with the secondary 
sense of guilt, but being condemned is not. While Wainwright's distinction between the 
senses of guilt may, in many contexts, be accurate, it is not helpful in this discussion 
because of the notion of guilt that is actually employed by defenders of original guilt.
It seems that any doctrine of original sin that includes the notion of original guilt
will not be compatible with a broad free will defense. Those that follow Augustine, 
Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, or Edwards in endorsing original guilt will not be able to offer 
a broad free will defense to the logical problem of evil because original guilt is incom-
patible with PAP, which is central to the libertarian understanding of freedom that is 
contained in the free will defense.
presently concerned with whether or not Adams is right because, even if he is, his 
argument does not actually help Wainwright's case.
37. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 364.
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Original Inclination
Although most Christians have understood the doctrine of original sin as a doc-
trine of, at least, original guilt, many contemporary philosophers who endorse libertari-
an accounts of freedom have recognized that there are difficulties with the notion that 
someone is held morally responsible for some action over which they had no control. 
This had led to a rejection, by some, of the traditional Augustinian understanding of 
original sin in favor of the view that original sin is a malady that affects all humankind 
since Adam, but it is not a guilt-conferring malady. That is, all humans are born in a 
condition of sin, but being born in that condition is not something for which one is 
guilty. Of such a condition Plantinga writes, "Unlike a sinful act I perform, original sin 
need not be thought of as something for which I am culpable (original sin is not neces-
sarily original guilt); insofar as I am born in this predicament, my being in it is not 
within my control and not up to me."38 Though he denies original guilt, Plantinga retains
a doctrine of original sin according to which the condition of sin causes cognitive and 
affective disorders. But these are disorders with which the agent is born and for which 
he is not culpable. He writes that there is a “cognitive limitation that first of all prevents 
its victim from proper knowledge of God and his beauty, glory, and love… It therefore 
compromises both knowledge of fact and knowledge of value.” But, sin is “perhaps pri-
marily an affective disorder or malfunction. Our affections are skewed, directed to the 
38. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 207.
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wrong objects; we love and hate the wrong things.”39 This disorder results in the indi-
vidual reversing God’s decrees; for example, instead of loving God and neighbor, origi-
nal sin causes the individual to primarily love himself while often hating God and 
neighbor. Even if one is able to see what is right and what he should do, he finds 
himself preferring that which he should not. This affective disorder is not guilt-confer-
ring in of itself. But having the disorder leads one to sin, and it is that act of sinning for 
which one is held morally responsible.
Whereas Plantinga is silent on some of the mechanics of the transmission of 
original sin and the process of actually sinning, Paul Copan attempts a more thorough 
explanation. He explains Plantinga's position this way, "we do not sin necessarily (that 
is, it is not assured that we must commit this or that particular sin), we sin inevitably 
(that is, in addition to our propensity to sin, given the vast array of opportunities to sin, 
we eventually do sin at some point)."40 Both Copan and Plantinga seem to want to 
affirm that every person will sin, but yet deny that any person must commit some partic-
ular sin. It is not hard to discern why this would be a desirable feature of their account. 
If it turns out that I had no say regarding some particular sin, then it will be quite diffi-
cult to explain why I can be held guilty for that sin. As Copan puts it, "while we may 
have an inclination to sin... as a result of Adam's sin in the Garden, his transgression 
does not entail the conferral of an alien guilt upon us at conception."41 But nevertheless 
39. Ibid., 208-09. (Original emphasis.)
40. Paul Copan, "Original Sin and Christian Philosophy," Philosophia Christi 5, no. 2 
(2003): 531 (parentheses in original). In a footnote Copan notes that this explanation is 
based upon a discussion with Plantinga.
41. Ibid., 530.
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we do have an original inclination to sin, making sin at some point or other — but at no 
particular point — an inevitability for each of us. This preserves a fairly robust doctrine 
of original sin and explains why all of mankind is in need of redemption.
Plantinga and Copan are not alone in understanding original sin in this more 
nuanced way. Keith Wyma has also argued that "the predominant view on original sin 
needs alteration." Wyma's altered account is much like Plantinga's in that it proposes 
that "original sin should be understood more as a shortfall than as a transgression... 
Original sin is a sinful state in that its disorder disposes us to become actual sinners, but 
is not in itself grounds for guilt."42 So, Wyma affirms that all humans suffer from origi-
nal sin, but denies that having original sin is something for which all are guilty. Having 
an original inclination to sin is what Wyma calls "innocent sinfulness."43 We are born 
with a condition that makes sinning inevitable, but no one is guilty for being born with 
that condition.
Here Wyma considers a potential objection to his view. Someone might argue that since 
we are not responsible for the original state of innocent sinfulness, and since it is this 
original state that ensures that we will commit sins, at some point or another, during our 
lifetimes, then we cannot be held responsible for those sins that we commit. So, the 
denial of original guilt should extend to a denial of guilt for sinful actions we actually 
perform.
42. Keith Wyma, "Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Divine Justice," in 
Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 271.
43. Ibid., 271.
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Wyma’s response is to appeal to a distinction between the inevitability of 
sinning and the inevitability of committing a particular sin. Like Copan, he endorses the
former but rejects the latter. To illustrate the position, Wyma offers the following (over-
simplified) disjunction, arguing that he inevitably makes at least one of the disjuncts 
true, though for any particular disjunct, it is not inevitable that he make it true:
(S1) Four-year-old Wyma covets his older brother’s Christmas present, or (S2) 
seven-year-old Wyma falsely accuses his younger brother of breaking a lamp, or
(S3) ten-year-old Wyma mocks a classmate’s disability, . . . or (Sn) twenty-year-
old Wyma presents a false I.D. to buy beer, . . . or (Sz) on his deathbed Wyma 
curses God.44
Since for any single one of these disjuncts, Wyma can avoid making that disjunct true, 
he is guilty for any of them that he does make true. It is inevitable that he will make at 
least one of them true, and so it is inevitable that he will be guilty of sin.
This example nicely illustrates Wyma's distinction between the inevitability of 
sinning and the inevitability of committing a particular sin, but there is a potential 
problem, one that Wyma recognizes. How does Wyma's theory account "for guilt as-
signed to persons who refrained from sinning until their last possible action"?45 To con-
tinue with the above example, if disjuncts S1 through Sn were all false, Sz was the last 
morally significant action, and Wyma's account of innocent sinfulness is correct, then Sz
must be true. Because that particular sin must be committed, it is false that no particular 
sin is necessitated. Wyma recognizes that this scenario presents a difficulty for his view,
but denies that it is truly problematic. He agrees that "that specific action [Sz] would 
44. Ibid., 272.
45. Ibid., 273.
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become unavoidable, and guilt for it appears to be excluded," but thinks this is not a real
problem because "the simple truth is that no one who survives past (early) childhood 
waits till the end of his or her life to sin."46 While this may in fact be true, we will see, 
by considering a different scenario — one that considers the making of only one 
morally significant decision — that Wyma's response either does not fully appreciate 
the claim being made by proponents of the doctrine of original inclination, or it does not
take seriously the problem raised by the scenario he himself presents.
This modified conception of original sin present by Plantinga, Copan, and 
Wyma is what I refer to as the doctrine of original inclination.47 This doctrine can be 
formulated as follows:
(8) Necessarily in a world tainted by original sin, (a) every human subsequent to 
Adam is born in a condition such that it is inevitable that she sin (given that she 
performs at least one morally significant action),48 but (b) it is not inevitable that
she sin on any given occasion.49
46. Ibid., 274.
47. There is no reason why one's account of original sin could not include both original 
guilt, as discussed before, and original inclination. Such an account would maintain 
humans are born guilty, though being born guilty does not necessitate any future 
particular sin. It would, however, necessitate some future sin.
48.On some conceptions of sin, the parenthetical should read, “given that she performs 
at least one morally significant action, or adopts one morally significant attitude, or fails
in a morally significant way to perform an action or adopt an attitude.” Given that in 
each of these cases, the moral significance entails that a blameless action or attitude 
could have been performed or adopted, or a blameworthy action or attitude avoided, this
should not affect the argument below.
49. If there are worries about the second conjunct and moral dilemmas that we get 
ourselves into through sinning, the conjunct can easily be amended to: 'it is not 
inevitable that any human commit her first sin on any given occasion.' Again, (1) admits
of at least one exception — Jesus — and possibly Mary as well.
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(8a) expresses the idea that humans sin inevitably, while (8b) expresses the idea that 
humans do not sin inevitably on any given occasion. The ‘necessarily’ merely indicates 
that this is an account of what it means for a world to be tainted by original sin; a world 
in which (8a) and (8b) are not both true is not one which satisfies this account.
If Wyma's account of original incination is true, one that ranges over the course of an in-
dividual's life, then it would also be true when considering the individual that performs 
only one morally significant action. Consider the following claim:
(9) Possibly, some human performs only one morally significant action in her 
lifetime.
Surely (9) is true. Thousands of people of all ages die every day, many of them children.
Some of these people die at an age when they have performed very many morally sig-
nificant actions. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise for someone who lives an average 
lifespan. And many of these people die at such a young age that they have performed no
morally significant actions. But surely some of them die at an age that they have per-
formed only a very few morally significant actions. And among these, it seems likely 
that some have performed only one morally significant action before death. And even if 
in fact, against all odds, there has not ever been someone who died performing only one
morally significant action, there is nothing that rules out the possibility of this hap-
pening. So (9) seems assured.
(8a) tells us that every human who commits at least one morally significant act 
inevitably sins. Given (8a), then, the following conditional is true:
(10) If some human performs only one morally significant action in her lifetime,
then that action is inevitably sinful. 
(8b) tells us that it is not inevitable that any human sin on any given occasion. Given 
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(8b), then, the following conditional is true: 
(11) If some human performs only one morally significant action in her lifetime, 
then that action is not inevitably sinful.
But from (10) and (11) it follows that:
(12) If some human performs only one morally significant action in her lifetime,
then that action both is and is not inevitably sinful.
But (12) is absurd. (9) tells us that its antecedent is possible – indeed its antecedent even
seems likely. But then, if (12) is true, its consequent should be true as well. But its 
consequent is not even logically possible. So, at least one of (8) — (11) must be 
rejected. Since (9) seems obviously true, and since (10) and (11) follow directly from 
(8), that leaves only (8) as a candidate for rejection. (8) leads to an absurd result, and so 
must be discarded. But (8) is merely an expression of the doctrine of original 
inclination. So, the doctrine of original inclination must be discarded.
If the argument is sound, then (8) must be rejected. But nothing in the argument 
implies that both (8a) and (8b) must be rejected. Rejecting either (8a) or (8b) is 
sufficient. We shall now briefly consider each of these options before considering three 
general solutions to the problem that original sin poses for a broad free will defense.
Reformulating the Doctrine
Richard Swinburne has embraced (8b) while rejecting (8a). He maintains that in 
each of our actions we are free to refrain from sinning, and denies that it is inevitable 
that each of us sin at some point in our lives. He attributes to humans “a disease, origi-
nal sinfulness” which is “a proneness to wrongdoing.” “The bad desires in which it [this
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proneness to wrongdoing] consists incline, they do not (as such) necessitate.” The claim
that “they do not necessitate” is a rejection of (8a) rather than merely an endorsement of
(8b) is clear from Swinburne’s explicit rejection of the view of “some theologians [who]
have wanted to go further and say that it is a proneness which led necessarily to sin.” 
Swinburne endorses (8b) because “unavoidable sin is not culpable”, and he seems to 
reject (8a) on the same grounds. For if we inevitably sin at some point, then it looks as 
if even if this or that sin is avoidable, sin is unavoidable. So even while Swinburne 
differs from defenders of the doctrine of original inclination on (8a), he shares their 
motivation to avoid attributing culpability for unavoidable actions.50
Rejecting (8a) comes at a cost. After all, (8a) was at least partly motivated by a 
desire to account for the universality of humanity’s fallenness, and the universal human 
need for redemption. But if (8a) is rejected, then it is possible — even if unlikely — for 
someone to go through his entire life without sinning, and so to go through life without 
the need for redemption. This is a departure from the classical doctrines of original sin 
and of grace. Indeed, it is difficult to see what is distinctively Christian about this 
account of original sin. Many atheistic ethicists and ethicists from non-Christian reli-
gious traditions will readily agree that humans have a strong tendency to do wrong 
throughout their lives. Perhaps this is due to selfish traits that have been selected 
because of their evolutionary advantages,51 or to similar explanations. If the doctrine of 
original sin is simply expressing this idea, then it hardly deserves the title of doctrine, 
since doctrines are usually taken to be distinctive claims of a religious tradition.
50. Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, 137-139.
51. This is Swinburne’s preferred explanation; see Ibid., 142-144.
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Those in the Reformed tradition, and indeed compatibilists in general, are likely 
to reject (8b). If genuine freedom, and the accompanying moral responsibility for 
action, does not require alternative possibilities, then there is no reason to suppose that 
sinful actions cannot be inevitable. So, the compatibilist can retain (8a) and affirm uni-
versal human fallenness and need for redemption, while rejecting (8b) and so avoiding 
the absurd consequences of (8). But of course those that believe free will and determin-
ism are compatible are not likely to have much use for a broad free will defense in the 
first place.
While only committing oneself to either (8a) or (8b) avoids the absurd conclu-
sion, from what we have seen, this is not an option for Plantinga, Copan, or Wyma. 
Further, it does not seem to be an option for anyone that desires to endorse a broad free 
will defense. But perhaps this is too quick. We will now examine three ways in which 
one might attempt to retain the a doctrine of original sin while still endorsing a broad 
free will defense.
Possible Solutions to the Problems of Original Sin
For a large part of the history of Western Christianity, the doctrine of original sin
has been taken to teach that all humans subsequent to Adam suffer from an infliction 
that was brought about by the moral failing in the Garden of Eden. A substantial portion 
of the Christian church has followed Augustine in saying that the infliction includes 
both being born guilty for the sin of Adam and being born with a further inclination to 
sin. Problems with each of these components were raised. The original guilt component 
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of original sin is problematic because it maintains that one is held morally responsible 
for some action over which he had no control. It was shown that to hold someone 
morally responsible at birth for the sin of Adam conflicts with the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities. Because the free will defense internally relies upon libertarian 
freedom, and many libertarians believe that libertarian freedom requires the principle of 
alternative possibilities, such an inconsistency prevents one who accepts the doctrine of 
original sin from being able to advance a broad free will defense. The original inclina-
tion aspect of original sin is problematic for a similar reason. Instead of maintaining that
someone is morally responsible at birth, it teaches that sinning at some point or another 
is inevitable for all humans subsequent to Adam, even though no particular sin is 
inevitable. It was then shown that this understanding of original inclination leads to an 
absurd conclusion, that in cases where an individual performs only one morally signifi-
cant action, that action both is and is not inevitable. 
While these are genuine problems for anyone who wants to maintain a tradition-
al understanding of original sin and wants to use a broad free will defense to answer the 
logical problem of evil, all is not lost. There are at least three potential solutions to the 
problems raised for the doctrine of original sin as it relates to a broad free will defense. 
The first two are less than ideal because they require a major departure from many free 
will defenders' prior beliefs. The first solution we will consider requires the rejection of 
previously held theological beliefs, and the second a rejection of previously held philo-
sophical beliefs. We will briefly consider these solutions before turning to a much more 
robust solution that is not only consistent with the free will defender's prior beliefs, but 
actually relies upon aspects of the free will defense itself.
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Reject Original Guilt & Original Inclination
One way to respond is by simply refashioning the doctrine of original sin entire-
ly in such a way that both original guilt and original inclination are excluded. If one's 
doctrine of original sin includes neither original guilt nor original inclination, then there 
is at least prima facie reason to think that it will be compatible with a broad free will 
defense. Of course one would need to look carefully at what remains of the doctrine, but
it does not seem to be too difficult to construct such a doctrine that avoids the problems 
presented.52 Of course, rejecting both historically central components of original sin will
likely put one outside the boundaries of orthodoxy.53
While this may not be a problem for some, it is an even further departure from 
the traditional understanding of original sin — a departure that many would not find de-
sirable. This can be especially problematic for those who associate the universal bene-
fits of Christ's death with the universal problem of original sin. If one's doctrine of origi-
nal sin rejects both original guilt and original inclination, one may rightly wonder for 
what reason Christ had to die. If it is possible for someone to live and die without ever 
sinning, then it appears that Jesus' death may not have been truly for everyone. Of 
course, some may find this acceptable, given that the likelihood of someone going 
52. Earlier it was shown that this is the route Swinburne takes in relation to original 
inclination; a similar rejection of original guilt should not be hard to imagine.
53. Such a re-working of original sin is quite similar to the teaching of the fourth 
century monk Pelagius. However, his most prominent disciple, Celestius, was 
condemned as a heretic at the Council of Carthage in 431. Of course if staying within 
the boundaries of orthodoxy set by the early councils is not important, then affirming 
heretical teachings should not be an obstacle. However, many Christian theists do want 
to stay within those boundaries.
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through life without sinning is very low. Whatever the merits of such a resolution to the 
problem, it does not appear to be one that Wyma or Copan could appeal to. This possi-
bility is not an option for Wyma, who writes that original sin is an "essential inheritance
and corruptive power"54 or for Copan, who approvingly notes that "orthodox Christiani-
ty has held that the pervasiveness of sin is semper, ubique, ad omnibus!"55
Reject the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
A much simpler solution, allowing one to remain with the bounds of traditional 
orthodoxy, is to simply reject the principle of alternative possibilities entirely. As was 
shown above, the problem with original guilt is directly connected to this principle and 
now it has been shown that the problem with original inclination is also connected to the
principle, though indirectly. Reject the principle and, of course, there is no longer a 
problem. There are two primary reasons why one might find such a solution troubling. 
The first reason is that, as shown above, most libertarian conceptions of freedom require
some version of PAP. If this is correct, then a broad free will defense will no longer be 
available.56 One might still offer a narrow defense to resolve the immediate charge of 
54. Wyma, "Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin," 276. (Emphasis added.)
55. Copan, "Original Sin and Christian Philosophy," 529. Because Plantinga says very 
little about the exact workings of original sin it is hard to say whether this is an option 
he could endorse. However, from what he does write in Warranted Christian Belief, it 
does not appear that he could avail himself to such a radical re-working of original sin.
56. While it appears this is the majority view among libertarians, it is not universal. See,
for example, William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to 
Time (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001), 261-62, David Hunt, "Moral 
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action," Philosophical Studies 97 (2000): 195-227, or 
Linda Zagzebski, "Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities?" 
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contradiction, but such a defense is not likely to do much for the atheologian, especially 
since not even the theist believes that is an accurate description of reality. One might 
rightly expect the theist to give an answer for the evil that appears in this world, or at 
least an answer that is compatible with the way the theist believes this world to actually 
work. The theist could still avail himself to other types of responses, but the solution 
that many believe is best will have to be neglected. 
The second reason why rejecting the principle of alternative possibilities may be
problematic is that many theists that initially employ a free will defense do so because 
they think it captures something correct about the nature of free will and moral respon-
sibility. The free will defense trades heavily on the idea that if God desires to create a 
world with moral good, then he needs to create individuals with a genuine capacity to 
commit moral evil. The person that accepts this idea is likely to also accept the idea that 
moral responsibility for an action requires there to be alternatives for that action avail-
able. Of course free will compatibilists reject such a notion, but free will compatibilists 
are not likely to depend too heavily on a free will defense anyway. For many that find a 
broad free will defense attractive do so because of the way it characterizes human 
freedom. To reject the princple of alternative possibilites in order to retain the doctrine 
of original sin would come at the cost of not only a broad free will defense, but also a 
geneal theory of free will in moral responsibility. This may be too high a price to pay.
Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 231-248.
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Appeal to Middle Knowledge
A third way one might respond to the problems above is to appeal to God's 
middle knowledge. The main advantage this response has over the first two is that those
can only be adopted at the expense of rejecting some other prior belief, but the middle 
knowledge solution does not require such a rejection. Instead, for anyone offering a free
will defense along the lines of Plantinga's, this response will be quite appealing because 
it makes use of components of that very defense.
Middle knowledge is a view of God's knowledge that traces back to the six-
teenth-century philosopher Louis De Molina. It aims to provide an account of how God 
could foreknow what free agents will do in the future, while remaining providentially in
control of that future. While a full length treatment of middle knowledge is not possible 
here, a brief account of the view will be helpful.57 According to this account, God has 
three types of knowledge, each corresponding to a different logical moment. In keeping 
with most standard accounts of foreknowledge, this view maintains that God has natural
and free knowledge. The first of those is knowledge of all the necessary truths, truths 
that are independent of God's will. The second, free knowledge, is knowledge of all the 
contingent truths that are dependent upon God's will. They are true because of the world
that God in fact decided to create. What makes Molinism distinct is that it also main-
tains that God has middle knowledge. Middle knowledge is also knowledge of contin-
57. For an in depth treatment of middle knowledge see Alfred Freddoso's introduction 
to, and translation of, Molina's, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1988) or Thomas Flint's Divine Providence: The 
Molinist Account (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). The brief account of middle 
knowledge that I will provide is influenced by Flint.
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gent truths, but these truths are not dependent upon God's will. These are true not 
because of some decision that God makes, but instead they are true because of what free
creatures would freely do in various circumstances. Logically prior to God's creative 
act, he is able to know what every free creature would do when placed in any situation. 
This is how God is able to exercise providential control over the world he creates, and 
yet still allow those creatures to exercise morally significant freedom.
There is obviously much more that can be said about middle knowledge, but this
should be sufficient for the purpose at hand.58 God's ability to know what each person 
would do if placed in any circumstance allows God to actualize the world that satisfies 
his own desires and intentions. Such a view of God's foreknowledge can be quite useful 
in explaining a host of philosophical and theological difficulties. For example, those 
who believe Mary was sinless can explain more fully that belief by appealing to God's 
middle knowledge. One might suggest that the reason God chose Mary to be the mother
of God incarnate was precisely because he foreknew, via his middle knowledge, that she
would freely refrain from sinning. One might also use God's middle knowledge to 
explain how it is just for God to punish for eternity those who did not accept his plan for
salvation, even though they never heard of that plan. If God decided to actualize a world
in which the individuals who never hear of his plan for salvation are the same individu-
58. Molinism is by no means an uncontroversial view. For two forceful arguments 
against Molinism see Robert Adams, "An Anti-Molinist Argument," Philosophical 
Perspectives 5 (1991): 343-353 and William Hasker, "A Refutation of Middle 
Knowledge," Noûs 20, no. 4 (1986): 545-557. For responses see William Lane Craig, 
"Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection'," Faith and 
Philosophy 18, no. 3 (2001): 337-352 and Thomas P. Flint, "Two Account of 
Providence," in Thomas Morris, ed., Divine and Human Action (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 147-181.
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als who would have rejected who plan even if they did hear it, then, the argument goes, 
he is not unjust for punishing individuals that do not accept his plan because they never 
heard it. Such knowledge would be possible if Molinism is correct.59 
Can middle knowledge be used to also resolve the above problems for a traditio-
nal doctrine of original sin? Both Wyma and Copan suggest that a view of original sin 
informed by the doctrine of middle knowledge will be less susceptible to the worries 
raised above. But how precisely is middle knowledge supposed to help?
Recall that above we saw there are at least two ways of thinking about what 
original sin is. According to both lines of thought original sin is some type of corruption
that is inherent in all human beings since the first human pair. There are, however, two 
different ways of thinking about how Adam's progeny acquires original sin. One way is 
to say that all humans, somehow, participated in the first sin of Adam and so are pun-
ished in the same way that Adam was punished. The second way is to say that all 
humans have acquired original sin because Adam was the representative for all humans. 
While neither Wyma nor Copan explicitly address this distinction, we will see that 
Wyma's account appears to be designed to answer concerns associated with the former 
understanding of how humans acquire original sin and Copan's account is designed to 
answer concerns associated with the latter.60
59. I am not aware of anyone that advances this type of argument regarding the 
sinlessness of Mary, but William Lane Craig does make such an argument regarding the 
unsaved. See William Lane Craig, "'No Other Name': A Middle Knowledge Perspective 
on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ," Faith and Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1989): 
172-188. Both doctrines, the sinlessness of Mary and Christian exclusivism, will be 
evaluated in light of a broad defense in chapter five.
60. While it may turn out that both Wyma and Copan endorse both aspects of original 
sin, their appeal to middle knowledge seems to focus on answering objections 
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Wyma begins his account by explaining that many have thought that God's om-
niscience includes middle knowledge and that "in deciding whom to create, and in what 
conditions and circumstances to place them, God would have reference to truths about 
what any possible creature would freely do, in any circumstances possible for it."61 No 
matter what state of affairs an individual found himself in, God would know what that 
individual would freely do in that situation. When creating Adam's progeny, "God could
restrict himself to the set of possible humans who would freely have done as Adam did 
in the circumstances of his temptation and fall." Of all the possible humans that God 
could have created, he decided to create a "subset of those possible humans who would 
freely have fallen, just as Adam did."62 God creates only those whom he knew would 
have sinned if they were in Adam's place and simply creates them as if they had actually
sinned as Adam did. It is not that humans actually participated in the sin of Adam, but 
that they would have done the same thing if they were in his place. According to Wyma,
"Adam's rebellion becomes a kind of paradigm for all of us, since his action represents 
what each of us would have done in his place. In him, we all sinned figuratively 
speaking."63 While it is true that no one actually participated in Adam's sin, the fact that 
we would have done the same makes it just for God to punish us as if we did.
Copan's appeal to middle knowledge attempts to explain why God is morally 
justified in treating Adam as the representative for all of humanity and so, in this 
associated with only one aspect of original sin.
61. Wyma, "Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin," 268.
62. Ibid., 269.
63. Ibid.
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respect, is designed to avoid worries associated with a federalist account of original sin. 
Copan begins by considering a possible objection to the doctrine of original sin, one that
is particularly aimed at a federalist understanding of original sin. Why should Adam be 
everyone else's representative in the first place? According to Copan, the objector has 
the "arrogant presumption" that if she were in Adam's place she would have obeyed 
God's command to not eat the fruit and could have prevented the "calamitous fallout 
from the first disobedience."64 Since such an objection depends upon divine middle 
knowledge, Copan believes that he has the resources to deny this possibility. While 
human sinlessness in the garden was certainly logically possible, "it could be the case 
that those human beings God has actually created would have, according to His middle 
knowledge, chosen the same Adamic course, resulting in the same Adamic curse... Had 
any of us actualized human beings been in Adam's place, none of us by his free choice 
would have avoided bringing about the fall and its consequences."65 The appeal to 
middle knowledge is supposed to deflate "charges of divine injustice regarding Adam's 
being our representative head since God knows that the rest of us would have acted in 
the very same way in the same circumstance."66 If we would have done the same thing 
as Adam, then there is nothing morally wrong with Adam serving as our representative, 
and thus there is nothing morally wrong with God punishing us for something that our 
representative did. 
64. Copan, "Original Sin and Christian Philosophy," 540.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 541.
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There are at least three reasons why an appeal to middle knowledge along the 
lines suggested by Wyma and Copan does not succeed. First, both make the tacit as-
sumption that it is acceptable for God to base his moral evaluation of humans in this 
world on some decision made in another possible world. On this account of original sin 
all humankind is morally evaluated not by what action was actually performed, but by 
what would have been performed in some other possible world. Of course this assumes 
that it is morally acceptable for God to make such a counterfactual judgment. But it is 
not the case that this is how current moral evaluations are performed and it is not clear 
why it would be morally acceptable for God to evaluate humankind in such a manner. 
For example, even if it were true that were I born in Darfur I would have freely partic-
ipated in the intentional killing of innocent life, no one includes that truth as part of their
moral evaluation of me. The world in which I am born in Darfur would be vastly differ-
ent from the actual world, and thus it would not be morally appropriate to base a moral 
evaluation of me in this world on that one. The closest approximation to this practice is 
in morally evaluating a person's future intentions. If a person is arrested on the sus-
picion of terrorist activities, and then authorities subsequently find in his home various 
bomb making supplies and detailed drawings of prominent public spaces one might 
reasonable morally condemn the suspect based on those findings. It is false that the 
suspect actually did commit some terrorist activity, but given what was found in his 
home, it seems reasonable to believe that he would have committed some terrorist activ-
ity. While it is true that it is morally acceptable to punish the suspect for something 
which did not occur, this case simply does not apply, at least in any straightforward way,
to the case of original sin.
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There are two reasons for this. First, the suspect's punishment differs based upon
what actually happened. If the authorities did not foil his plan, but he was caught after-
ward, his punishment would be based upon the crime he actually committed. But if the 
authorities did foil his plan his punishment would be based upon what he intended to 
do, and that punishment would be less severe than if he successfully carried out that in-
tention. In the legal context, which in this case appears to coincide with our moral intu-
itions, the punishment would be less severe for intending to commit terrorist activities 
than for actually committing them. The punishment is based upon what actually did 
happen and not upon what would have happened. However, when it comes to original 
sin, according to Wyma and Copan, humans are treated in the actual world as if each did
participate in that original sin. It is obvious that no human other than Adam did actively 
participate in that original sin, so the only basis for morally evaluating humans regard-
ing that act is on what would have happened. Since this runs counter to standard prac-
tices of moral evaluation, it appears that one is justified in expecting some account of 
why it is permissible for God to evaluate humankind in such a radically different way.
One can see that the suspected terrorist example of morally evaluating someone 
for what would have happened fails in a second way as well. If one looks at the biblical 
data regarding that calamitous event, the source for the doctrine of original sin in the 
first place, it appears that Adam's progeny receive a punishment worse than that which 
he received even though his sin was committed in the actual world while the rest of hu-
manity only commits the sin in a possible world. The relevant biblical passages record 
that Adam's punishment included being removed from the Garden of Eden, having a 
more difficult time working the fields, and being subject to physical death and suffering.
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Each of Adam's descendants are afflicted in the same way but, additionally, are born in 
such a state that sinning is inevitable. Not only is humankind punished for an action that
is committed in some other possible world, but that punishment includes everything that
was dealt to Adam plus the inability to refrain from sinning in the actual world — some-
thing that results in further punishment.
A second problem with the counterfactual moral evaluation envisioned by 
Copan and Wyma is that it is not clear why God chooses to form his basis for moral 
evaluation on those worlds in which all humans decide to sin as Adam actually did.67 
The question is, why would God pick out those possible worlds and not the possible 
worlds in which humans do not sin as Adam did? Presumably it is not the case that 
every human would have sinned, necessarily, if in the same situation as Adam. If it is 
not, then there are at least some possible worlds in which some humans do not choose 
as Adam did. If so, what reasons would God have for not using those actions as a basis 
for his moral evaluation? Perhaps one might object and simply deny that there are possi-
ble worlds in which humans do not sin as Adam did. The problem with such an objec-
tion is that it fails to recognize that there is no original sin at this point that would 
explain why every human does sin as Adam did. That first decision to sin is supposed to 
be the explanation for all other sinful decisions — it cannot be the explanation for why 
all humans would choose to sin in every possible world.
67. For a different worry about the appropriateness of counterfactual moral evaluation 
as it relates to religious luck see Linda Zagzebski, "Religious Luck," Faith and 
Philosophy 11, no. 3 (1994). The concern there is that such counterfactual moral 
evaluation appears to make the actual world meaningless. This appears to be compatible
with the above worry and, if legitimate, would make the case against the middle 
knowledge solution that much stronger.
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This is a problem even for free will defenses that utilize Plantinga's notion of 
transworld depravity. Plantinga, one will recall, admits that it is logically possible that 
some humans freely refrain from ever committing a wrong action, it just so happens that
none of those worlds is actualizable.68 But if it is logically possible that some person re-
frains from ever committing a wrong action then, of course, there is a possible world in 
which that person does no wrong. In such a world that person does not even choose to 
sin as Adam did. Why, then, does God choose to punish that person in this world based 
on what she did in some other possible world if there is yet another possible world in 
which she does no wrong at all? It appears that even if one can make sense of counter-
factual moral evaluation, such an account is of no use for explaining original sin.
A final problem for attempting to resolve the difficulties with original sin by ap-
pealing to middle knowledge is that it is not clear what it means to say that any one 
person would have eaten the fruit if that person were in the same situation as Adam. 
What type of world would it be such that Paul Franks is born in the Garden of Eden and
is deceived by the serpent? If counterfactual moral evaluation is acceptable, it seems 
that one condition of such a evaluation would be that those other possible worlds in 
which we commit some wrong action, and are morally responsible for it in this world, 
be at least relevantly similar to the actual world. As stated above, even if it is true that I 
would have participated in genocide if I were to have been born in Darfur, no one holds 
me morally responsible for actions in that possible world. Why am I not now held 
morally accountable for those actions? One reason is that the world in which I am born 
68. See page 20 above.
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in Darfur is simply too different from the actual world. The world in which the suspect-
ed terrorist fulfills his intention is quite similar to this world. In fact it looks as if the 
worlds are identical until the terrorist is apprehended by the authorities. But, this is not 
true in the case of my having been born in Darfur. Such a world would be vastly differ-
ent from this one, thus making it morally unacceptable to now hold me morally respon-
sible for what I would have done in that world. But if that world is too different for such
counterfactual moral evaluation, then surely the world in which I commit that first sin is
even more different, making such counterfactual moral evaluation unacceptable.
Conclusion
We have seen that one may separate the doctrine of original sin into two distinct 
doctrines: original guilt and original inclination. Adhering to both doctrines presents 
problems for those wishing to advance a broad free will defense to the problem of evil. 
There are solutions available to each of these problems, but those solutions present diffi-
culties of their own. For example, rejecting the principle of alternative possibilities may 
allow one to retain both original guilt and original inclination, but such a rejection 
would make it difficult to advance a free will defense because such a defense relies on 
libertarian freedom. And libertarian freedom, for many, relies upon that principle. One 
might also attempt to resolve the problems above by appealing to God's middle knowl-
edge, but such appeals are ultimately unsuccessful, even if one assumes that there are 
such things as true counterfactuals of freedom. The primary failure of the middle knowl-
edge solution is due to the inappropriateness of counterfactual moral evaluation. 
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Because of the difficulties raised in this chapter, it does not appear that maintaining both
a traditional doctrine of original sin and a broad free will defense is promising.
The proponent of a broad free will defense is now faced with a decision. Should 
she continue to advance a broad defense, at the expense of traditional understandings of 
original sin, or should she give up on the broad defense and fall back on a narrow one? 
Ideally one will be able to come up with an account of original sin that avoids the prob-
lems raised above, but is still able to do the same theological work as the traditional 
doctrine of original sin. It remains to be seen, however, whether such an account of 
original sin is available.
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Chapter Three: Heaven
In the previous chapter a problem was raised for those who want to maintain both an 
historically orthodox account of original sin and a broad free will defense. In sum, the 
idea that humans are either born guilty or in a condition that guarantees some action for 
which they will be guilty runs counter to certain implicit ideas within a free will 
defense. If the theist aims to give a response to the logical problem of evil that goes 
beyond stating what is merely broadly logically possible, but is also consistent with 
other beliefs the theist maintains, then a modification of either that account of original 
sin or of the free will defense is necessary. We shall now turn to the other end of the 
spectrum. Instead of considering a Christian doctrine regarding how humans begin their 
time on earth, we shall look at the state of existence humans experience once their time 
on earth is complete.
Introductory Issues
The biblical data regarding the nature of heaven is sparse, so differences among 
accounts of heaven are commonplace. A contributing factor to the presence of these dif-
ferences may be that the biblical data regarding heaven is mostly negative. For example,
the author of Revelation informs the reader that in heaven God "will wipe away every 
tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor 
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crying, nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away."1 Such a description 
makes it clear that heaven will be a place without many ills that are frequently experi-
enced on earth, but the reader is not told what heaven is. This fact leaves a lot of room 
for various presentations of the doctrine. There is room to debate whether heaven is a 
located in space and time, and if so, how it is related to this universe.2 Questions also 
emerge surrounding the nature of one's existence in heaven as well. Are the inhabitants 
of heaven numerically identical with those on earth? If so, how is that identity retained? 
How one answers these sorts of questions is important for the overall coherence of 
Christian theism, but because they are not immediately problematic for free will defens-
es they will not be addressed here.3
A Different Soteriological Problem
Much attention has been paid, and rightly so, to various difficulties that Christ-
ian theists have in believing that a wholly good God would consign a significant portion
of his creation to damnation. Some have argued that a loving God would not punish 
someone eternally for finite wrongs. Others have argued that it would be unjust for God 
1. Revelation 21:4 (English Standard Version). 1 Peter 1:3-4 also provides details of 
heaven in the negative.
2. Perhaps the uncertainty regarding this is the cause of people regularly speaking about 
living "on earth," but speak of living "in heaven." Whether heaven is a state or place is 
not directly relevant to broad free will defenses, but I will speak of heaven as a place 
simply for the sake of simplicity.
3. For development of these sorts of questions, see Trenton Merricks, "The Resurrection
of the Body and the Life Everlasting," in Reason for the Hope Within, ed. Michael 
Murray (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 261-286.
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to punish people for failing to follow Christian teachings when they were never exposed
to those teachings. While these are important issues that Christian theists must carefully 
consider to ensure that their theological system is coherent, they will not be pursued 
here because none of these issues is immediately problematic for broad free will defens-
es. If the notion of hell is indeed, in Marilyn Adams's words, "a problem of evil for 
Christians,"  then it is simply a different type of problem of evil.4 Christian theists ought
to develop a response to the problem, but such a response may have nothing to do with 
a free will defense at all. In the same way that a solution to the problem of natural evil 
may be quite distinct from a solution to the problem of moral evil, the problem of hell 
may require its own unique solution. For these reasons the focus of this chapter will be 
on a different soteriological problem.5 
Instead of focusing on those that are not saved, the question pursued here is 
whether or not orthodox conceptions of heaven are compatible with a broad free will 
defense. A more precise formulation of the problem will be given below, but the general
worry stems from the traditional Christian teaching that heaven is essentially good. If 
heaven is essentially good, then it is not even logically possible for agents in heaven to 
do evil. However, the the free will defense maintains that having the freedom to choose 
4. Marilyn McCord Adams, "The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians," in
Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. 
Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 301-327.
5. One can pursue these difficulties in Keith Yandell's, "The Doctrine of Hell and Moral 
Philosophy," Religious Studies 28 (1992): 75-90 or Michael Murray, "Heaven and Hell,"
in Reason for the Hope Within, 287-317. For book-length treatments of the doctrine of 
hell see John Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)
or Jerry Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1992).
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between good and evil is a great good. If it is not possible for agents in heaven to 
choose evil, and the free will defense is correct in maintaining that such an ability is 
necessary for freedom, then it appears that those agents are not free in heaven. But 
because the free will defense also maintains that such freedom is a great good, one may 
wonder why it is not had in heaven. A slightly different way of looking at the issue 
starts with the traditional Christian teaching that heaven is as good of a place to be as 
any. That is, it is a place overflowing with joy and other associated goods. If agents in 
heaven are not free to sin, and yet it is such a great place to be, then why would a 
wholly good God bother with creating humans on earth in the first place? What reason 
would a perfect being have for not directly creating humans in heaven?
The problem these questions pose for a free will defense is this. If the theist 
wants to give a broad free will defense, then the details of that defense must be consis-
tent with all the beliefs that theist holds. As noted in chapter two, free will defenses 
must rely upon the existence of libertarian freedom, maintain that libertarian freedom is 
necessary to bring about some good, and maintain that the obtaining of that good is a 
morally sufficient reason for God to allow the possibility that evil may accompany that 
good.6 The Christian teaching that heaven is essentially good, and overflowing with 
goods, appears to conflict with the first two of these features. If the result of heaven 
being essentially good is that human agents in heaven do not have libertarian freedom, 
then some explanation is needed as to why those agents on earth have libertarian 
freedom but do not have it in heaven. In addition, if heaven contains such great goods 
6. See page 35 above.
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and yet does not have libertarian freedom, then there appears to be a straightforward ob-
jection to the free will defense's insistence that libertarian freedom is necessary for the 
bringing about of great moral goods.
In this chapter a brief overview of the doctrine of heaven will be presented and then two
problems the doctrine causes for a broad free will defense will be considered. It will 
then be shown that the Christian theist has several distinct ways of reconciling a robust 
doctrine of heaven with a broad free will defense. 
The Orthodox Account of Heaven
There are two characteristics to orthodox accounts of heaven. The first is that it 
is a place overflowing with good and the second is that it is essentially free of evil. That 
heaven is a good place to be is so obvious that it hardly needs to be stated. It should be 
noted, however, that heaven is not just a good place to be, it is a place that surpasses 
that of any other. Among the great-making features of heaven is that it is a place in 
which one can build meaningful friendships with other saints and continue the friend-
ships that were had on earth. In an attempt to comfort those afraid of dying, the seven-
teenth century Anglican clergyman, Jeremy Taylor, reminds his readers of one of the 
aspects of heaven that makes it so great. In heaven one is able to "converse with St. 
Paul, and all the college of apostles, and all the saints and martyrs, with all the good 
men whose memory we preserve in honor, with excellent kings and holy bishops, and 
with the great Shepherd and Bishop of our souls, Jesus Christ, and with God himself."7 
7. Jeremy Taylor, Holy Living and Holy Dying, ed. P.G. Stanwood (Oxford: Clarendon 
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This social component is often what brings comfort to theists when faced with the loss 
of loved ones, but as great as this will be, it is not the primary thing that makes heaven 
so great.
While having social relationships with family, friends, and great saints is some-
thing to look forward to, such social relationships are not what ultimately makes heaven
so great. What makes heaven greater than any other place is the direct experience of 
God. Instead of experiencing God indirectly through creation, in heaven one is able to 
see and experience God directly. Of this experience, the author of the New Catholic En-
cyclopedia entry on heaven writes, "In heaven we know and love God as He is in 
Himself, i.e., as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in whose divine life we along with all 
the other blessed fully share. The infinite perfection of the Blessed Trinity and the infi-
nite love which we shall then fully possess provide a never-ending source of satisfaction
to our entire selves. Our restless hearts have at last found rest where alone they can, in 
the Blessed Trinity."8 Similar ideas are found in the Protestant tradition as well. For 
example, Wayne Grudem writes, "From time to time here on earth we experience the 
joy of genuine worship of God, and we realize that it is our joy to be giving him glory. 
But in [heaven] this joy will be multiplied many times over and we will know the ful-
fillment of that for which we were created."9 While popular accounts of heaven may 
Press, 1993). According to Plato's Apology (40d-41b), Socrates also appealed to such 
soon-coming social relationships as a way to comfort those concerned with his 
impending death.
8. Forshaw, B. "Heaven (Theology of)." New Catholic Encyclopedia. 2nd ed.
9. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 1164. 
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present heaven as a place more akin to an extended Hawaiian vacation, traditional or-
thodoxy teaches that it is one's full relationship with God that makes heaven paradise.10
The second feature of traditional orthodox accounts of heaven is that it is a place
free of all evils. According to James Sennett, it is not just that heaven happens to be free
of evil, "it is not even possible that any should arise." This absence of evil "owes its 
purity to the unmediated presence of God" and is "essentially pristine, grounded in 
divine immanence, not contingently due to the fortunate choices of humans."11 Sennett 
goes on to argue that "if heaven is only evil-free contingent on the choices of its human 
occupants, then it is constantly in danger of losing its evil-free status" which is "con-
trary to traditional theism." If heaven is to remain free of all evil "it must be necessarily 
evil-free—it cannot be possible for there to be evil."12 Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy 
and Nick Trakakis have also identified the essential goodness of heaven as being an 
aspect of orthodox accounts of heaven. They write that "according to the orthodox view,
it is not an accidental matter that Heaven [be free of evil]: it is part of the essence of 
Heaven that it should be a place in which there is no evil."13 While it is true that Christ-
10. This feature of heaven serves as the foundation for many theistic responses to the 
problem of hell. If seeing God fully is what makes heaven so great, then a case can be 
made that those that die having no desire for God whatsoever would not be capable of 
enjoying heaven at all and so God mercifully does not admit them. For a more detailed 
account see Murray, "Heaven and Hell" or Jerry Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal 
Joy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter two.
11. James Sennett, "Is There Freedom in Heaven?" Faith and Philosophy 16, no. 1 
(1999), 69. (Original emphasis.)
12. Ibid., 70. (Emphasis added.)
13. Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis "Salvation in Heaven?" 
Philosophical Papers 33, no. 1 (2004): 99. (Original emphasis.)
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ian theism has traditionally held that those in heaven will not sin, it is not clear that this 
means heaven is essentially free of evil.
There is a problem with characterizing heaven, the place, as being essentially 
free of evil. In addition to Christian teaching about the future enjoyment of heaven by 
humans, there is also the Christian teaching of the angelic fall. According to this doc-
trine, at one point Satan and his fellows were actually angels, but choose wrongly and 
thus were removed from heaven. If this is so, then it is not correct to say that heaven is 
essentially free of evil since at one point an evil action was taken in heaven. Sennett 
considers this but has reservations about whether the angelic fall is a legitimate compo-
nent of Christian theism. Regarding this concern he writes, "First, traditional theism in 
no way entails the story of a Satanic fall, and there are serious questions about whether 
or not it even represents good biblical exegesis14 It is true that one could reject the 
angelic fall without serious damage to the Christian system, but a large number of 
Christian theists do accept the angelic fall and the difficulty remains for those who do 
and who also want to characterize heaven as being essentially good.
One may also attempt to reconcile the notion of the essential goodness of heaven
with an account of the angelic fall by arguing that the heaven that will be inhabited by 
humans is somehow different than the heaven that was inhabited by the pre-fallen 
angels. Sennett considers this strategy as well and believes it to be "perhaps representa-
tive of most theists who accept the story of the fall of Satan."15 The key difference 
14. Sennett, "Is There Freedom in Heaven?" 79-80 n. 4.
15. Ibid.
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between heaven-past and heaven-future is that "the fall of Satan constitutes the final er-
adication of evil from heaven, so that, consequent to his expulsion, no evil can ever 
arise again."16 The problem with this approach is that it has the consequence of heaven 
gaining an essential property. It is not clear how the eviction of a group of agents from 
heaven is capable of changing the very essence of heaven. It may be that an entirely 
new heaven was created, and the new heaven has free-of-evil as an essential property, 
but then questions emerge concerning what happened to the old heaven, what sort of re-
lationship is had between God and these two heavens, and why God would ever create 
the obviously inferior heaven in the first place. However, there is a better way to deal 
with the problem that allows one to forego these types of issues altogether.
Instead of describing heaven itself as being essentially free of evil, as Sennett 
and Nagasawa, Oppy and Trakikis appear to do, one can more simply make a claim re-
garding the individuals in heaven. If one interprets claims regarding the essential good-
ness of heaven as actually a claim about the inability of individuals in heaven to commit
moral evil, then one can give a coherent story regarding the fall of Satan and the future 
state of the blessed. For reasons untold,17 Satan was the type of being that was capable 
of sinning in heaven even though humans will not be. Simon Gaine notes that according
to Augustine "before their fall, both angels and the first human beings were able not to 
sin but were also able to sin... In the beatific vision, however, both angels and human 
16. Ibid.
17. To those seeking an answer to why angels would ever turn away from God 
Augustine writes, "If we seek an efficient cause of the evil will of the wicked angels, we
shall find none . . . An evil will is the efficient cause of an evil action, but nothing is the 
efficient cause of an evil will." Augustine, The City of God, bk. 12, chap. 6.
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beings are unable to sin."18 Here the difference between heaven-past and heaven-future 
is not a change in the place, or state, of heaven itself but a change within the agents in 
heaven. The reason why angels were ever able to fall was that they had yet to have the 
beatific vision and it is the beatific vision that renders agents impeccable. Gaine goes on
to note that the historically dominant position of the church was that the reason why no 
one ever leaves heaven is because those in heaven are rendered incapable of sinning. 
This doctrine of impeccability explains the perpetuity of the blessed and, following Au-
gustine, "emerged as the orthodox Christian view."19 It is not that heaven-past was 
somehow fundamentally different, but that those in heaven then did not have the beatific
vision and so were still able to sin. However, according to orthodox accounts, future 
denizens of heaven will have the beatific vision, become impeccable, and therefore not 
be able to sin.
To summarize, orthodox accounts of heaven have two main features. The first is 
that heaven is overwhelmingly good and the second is that it is essentially good. This 
means that its inhabitants must be rendered impeccable upon entry. That impeccability 
means that once one is in heaven, she will never leave it. Each of these features gener-
ates difficulties for broad free will defenses. The first feature, that heaven is overwhelm-
ingly good, creates what will be called the Motivational Problem of Heaven. Because 
orthodox accounts of heaven maintain that 
(1) Heaven is overwhelmingly good, and
18. Simon Gaine, Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? (New York: T&T Clark Ltd., 
2003), 10.
19. Ibid.
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(2) the inhabitants of heaven are unable to do evil,
one appears to have good grounds to question the motivations of a perfect being for cre-
ating humans on earth. Traditionally, free will defenses have maintained that not even 
an omnipotent being could create a world in which there is a great amount of good and 
no evil. So, if this perfect being desired to create a world with a great amount of good, 
then a world with good and evil would have to be created. But the orthodox account of 
heaven appears to be a direct counterexample to that claim. In heaven, there is an over-
whelming amount of good but no evil at all. Since such a world is not only logically 
possible but, according to Christian theism, also able to be actualized, what would moti-
vate a wholly good God to create humans on earth at all? Even if it is true that a free 
will defense can satisfy the atheologian's charge of logical inconsistency when it comes 
to the existence of evil and a wholly good God, a broad free will defense requires one to
also consider the other beliefs of the theist. In this case it seems that orthodox accounts 
of heaven preclude the possibility of a successful broad free will defense because 
heaven is overwhelmingly good and yet free of evil.
The second feature, that heaven is essentially good and its inhabitants never 
leave because they are impeccable, creates what will be called the Libertarian Problem 
of Heaven. The problem can be seen most clearly by considering the following subset of
propositions regarding orthodox accounts of heaven and free will defenses. 
(3) Libertarian free will includes the ability to do moral evil.
(4) The existence of libertarian free will is necessary for the amount and kinds of
goods on earth. 
(5) No one in heaven is able to do moral evil.
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(6) Heaven is overwhelmingly good.
Even allowing for slight modifications, one can generally take (3) and (4) to be the 
backbone of any free will defense and (5) and (6) to be the backbone of any orthodox 
account of heaven. Of course, including (3) and (4) as part of a free will defense is not 
problematic on its own. However, if one is attempting to present a broad free will 
defense, and also adheres to an orthodox account of heaven, then (5) and (6) must also 
be taken into consideration. If libertarian free will includes the ability to do moral evil 
and no one in heaven has the ability to do moral evil, then no one in heaven has libertar-
ian free will. But if heaven is a place that is overwhelmingly good without agents in 
heaven having libertarian free will, then one has the resources to doubt the truth of (4). 
If heaven is a better place than earth, and agents in heaven do not have libertarian free 
will, then why think that libertarian free will is necessary in order for the goods on earth
to obtain? We shall begin by considering the Motivational Problem.
The Motivational Problem of Heaven
A version of the motivational problem of heaven can be found in a recent paper 
by Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis.20 The authors begin by arguing 
that because orthodox accounts of heaven maintain that heaven is essentially good and 
20. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, "Salvation in Heaven?" While an earlier version of 
the motivational problem can be found in George B Wall, "Heaven and a Wholly Good 
God," Personalist 58 (1977): 352-357, the present focus will remain on Nagasawa, 
Oppy, and Trakakis because their argument is more precise and also more difficult to 
dismiss. A successful response to the later argument should also succeed against the 
earlier one.
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essentially free of evil those same accounts are also committed to the idea that humans 
in heaven are not morally significantly free.21 They write, "if it is part of the essence of 
Heaven that it should be a place in which there is no evil, then there is at least some 
reason to think that Heaven must also be a place in which human beings have severely 
limited freedom of action."22 According to the authors, this severely limited freedom of 
action means that "theists must suppose that it is possible for very great goods—'infi-
nitely great', 'incomparably great'—to be realised in a domain in which there is no 
freedom." That such great goods can be realized in a domain without freedom leads Na-
gasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis to ask, "If there can be an abundance of goods without 
either freedom or evil, then what justification could a perfect being have for making a 
universe like ours?"23 The authors begin by arguing that orthodox accounts of heaven 
and libertarian conceptions of freedom together entail that there is no morally signifi-
cant freedom in heaven. The argument for this is straightforward.
(1) Necessarily, there is no evil in Heaven.
(2) If there is morally significant freedom in Heaven, then it is not the case that, 
necessarily, this is no evil in Heaven.
(3) (Therefore) There is no morally significant freedom in Heaven.24
21. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis do not specifically address this as a problem for 
Christian theism, speaking only of "orthodox theism,", but because the philosophers 
with whom they interact are all Christian philosophers, it seems warranted to assume 
that this is the variety of theism they have in mind.
22. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, "Salvation in Heaven?" 99. (Original emphasis.)
23. Ibid., 103.
24. Ibid. The first premise can be read as either a claim about heaven itself or about the 
inhabitants of heaven. While the latter seems preferable, see above, the distinction does 
not affect the current argument.
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The first premise is justified by an appeal to an orthodox account of heaven and the 
second by the libertarian conception of freedom. At first glance this conclusion may 
seem innocuous regarding Christian theism. Some Christian philosophers appear to 
have willingly endorsed it. For example, William Lane Craig is ready to accept that one 
is not morally significantly free with respect to at least one morally significant action. 
Writing in defense of Christian exclusivism, Craig argues that the unsaved person's 
"ability to reject God's love is testimony" to his status as a "morally significant 
person."25 However, this ability is lacking in heaven. In an earlier paper defending the 
same position he writes, "I do not find it objectionable to affirm that the blessed in 
heaven in the the presence of Christ no longer have the freedom to reject him."26 Given 
that being able to accept or reject God's love is a sign of one having morally significant 
freedom, and inhabitants of heaven do not have that ability, it appears that a prominent 
proponent of the free will defense may in fact fully endorse (3).27 
In his book Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, Jerry Walls argues that human 
agents do not have free will in heaven with respect to morally significant actions. 
Human agents will be free, but it "will be free in something like the compatibilist sense 
with respect to our choice of God and the good. That is, we will invariably act in accor-
25. William Lane Craig, "Middle Knowledge and Christian Exclusivism," Sophia 34, 
no. 1 (1995): 134.
26. William Lane Craig, "Talbott's Universalism Once More," Religious Studies 29, no. 
4 (1993): 514.
27. Craig defends the free will defense in William Lane Craig, "Inspiration and the Free 
Will Defense Revisited," Evangelical Quarterly 73, no. 4 (2001): 327-339. See also J.P. 
Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian 
Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2003), chapter twenty-seven.
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dance with our transformed character, but we will do so willingly... While our character 
will rule out any choice of evil or disobedience to God, we will still retain libertarian 
freedom within the happy limits of joyous obedience and worship."28 Since Walls 
affirms that human agents will have significant freedom in heaven, but denies that it 
will be morally significant freedom it appears that he too would willingly accept the 
truth of (3). From here the authors present the rest of their "argument from Heaven."
(4) Heaven is a domain in which the greatest goods are realised. (Premise, justi-
fied by appeal to the orthodox conception of heaven.)
(5) (Therefore) The greatest goods can be realised in a domain in which there is 
no morally significant freedom. (From 3, 4.)
(6) (Therefore) A perfect being can just choose to make a domain that contains 
the greatest goods and no evil. (From 5, appealing to the omnipotence of a 
perfect being.)
(7) A world that contains the greatest goods and no evil is non-arbitrarily better 
than any world that contains the greatest goods, incomparably lesser goods, and 
the amounts and kinds of evils that are found in our universe. (Premise.)
(8) If a perfect being chooses between options, and one option is non-arbitrarily 
better than the other options, then the perfect being chooses that option. 
(Premise.)
(9) (Therefore) It is not the case that a perfect being made our universe. (From 6,
7, 8.)29
Before considering how this argument is potentially problematic for Christian theists 
that seek to employ a broad free will defense to logical problems of evil, it should be 
noted that there appears to be a structural problem with Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis's
argument. 
28. Jerry Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), 61.
29. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, "Salvation in Heaven?" 103-104.
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If (9) is true then there is no reason to accept the truth of premises (1) or (4) 
because both of these premises are justified by appealing to "the orthodox conception of
Heaven."30 The following demonstrates how quickly the problem becomes apparent.
(10) If (9), then the universe was not made by God.
(11) If the universe was not made by God, then Christian theism is false.
(12) If Christian theism is false, then there is no reason to accept specific claims 
based upon Christian theism.
All orthodox Christian conceptions of God maintain that God is a perfect being, so (10) 
is assured. Support for (11) will vary slightly depending on one's theological tradition, 
but the core of such support will remain the same. Christian theism maintains that God 
is the one "who made the world and everything in it."31 God is the only necessary being 
and so everything owes its existence to God. (11), too, is assured. But what of (12)? 
Why think that the falsity of Christian theism precludes one from believing any specifi-
cally Christian metaphysical claims? Simply put, if one believes that Christian theism is
false and the support for a particular claim comes only from Christian theism, then there
is no reason for anyone to believe that the claim is true. For example, once Copernicus' 
hypothesis was well established, and the falsity of Ptolemy's was no longer in doubt, the
justification for believing Ptolemaic-specific claims regarding planetary motion was 
gone. The system as a whole was shown to be false, and since the system itself was the 
sole rationale for specific beliefs within that system, one would no longer be justified in 
taking those specific beliefs to be true. Of course this does not mean they are false, just 
30. Ibid. 103.
31. Acts 17:24 (English Standard Version).
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that one's justification for those beliefs would have to come from outside the system. 
In the same way, if one accepts the conclusion of the authors' argument, then 
there is no justification for two of their premises. The support for both premises (1) and 
(4) was that they are part of an "orthodox conception of Heaven." The claim was not 
that these are general truths one ought to accept regardless of whether or not Christian 
theism is true. Because they are justified by the specifics of Christian theism itself, if 
Christian theism is false there is no reason to believe that either (1) or (4) is true. Of 
course, either one may in fact be true, but because the authors' own conclusion under-
cuts any reason to believe that they are, until additional reasons are provided, there is no
rational obligation to accept that they are indeed true. 
Because Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis start with component beliefs of Christ-
ian theism and conclude that Christian theism cannot be true, one would think they were
constructing a reductio. However, this is clearly not what the authors were attempting. A
reductio starts with an assumed premise so that a contradiction can be deduced from it. 
Once the contradiction has been made evident, the argument concludes with the denial 
of that assumed premise. None of these features are present in the authors' argument. In 
this case the authors do not demonstrate that either (1) or (4) lead to a contradiction, or 
that the conjunction of (1) and (4) leads to a contradiction. Moreover, the conclusion of 
their argument relies on the truth of the two premises, not their denial. If one had inde-
pendent reasons to accept these premises, then this problem would not arise. However, 
in this case, there are no additional reasons to think that these premises are true. So 
where, then, does the problem arise? What is the structural defect in the argument? The 
problem with the argument is that it seeks to prove too much. What began as an argu-
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ment attempting to demonstrate that morally significant freedom is not a great good, as 
some theists claim, it concludes by stating that the universe was not made by a perfect 
being.
There is a simple way to remedy this problem, and this remedy highlights the 
problem that Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis's argument causes for Christian theism. If 
the authors had simply concluded the argument at (6), then one could still accept their 
justification for premises (1) and (4) because what follows from (6) is not that Christian 
theism is false, but that particular components of Christian theism are false. Further, the 
truth of (6) gives one reason to reject any free will defense that includes the belief that 
not even God could create a world with the greatest goods and no moral evil. Such a 
conclusion would not entail that any of their premises are false since it may turn out that
Christianity is true even if the free will defense fails. All that can be concluded from the 
failure of the free will defense is that it is not an acceptable solution to the problem of 
evil. One might then give different arguments against other proposed solutions, but the 
details of those arguments would not produce any immediate problems for the logical 
structure of this argument.32
If (6) is true then there is an obvious difficulty for broad free will defenses. Free 
will defenses maintain that libertarian freedom is necessary for obtaining some kinds of 
good and those goods are morally sufficient to warrant any accompanying evils that 
32. Perhaps this is what motivated Mackie to address all the solutions to the problem of 
evil he could imagine in his "Evil and Omniptoence." The failure of one solution does 
not entail the falsity of Christian theism. In fact, the failure all proposed solutions would
not entail that Christian theism is false, though it would certainly create a significant 
difficulty for it.
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come with that libertarian freedom. However, if (6) is true then these central features of 
free will defenses are false. If God could just create a world with the greatest goods and 
no evil then how is it that libertarian freedom is necessary for the obtaining of some 
goods? In other words, proponents of free will defenses are obviously going to reject 
(6), but what makes this problem interesting is that it is not clear that such proponents 
have the resources available to do so.
Responding to the Motivational Problem of Heaven
Because (1) through (3) are all likely to be endorsed by Christian theists, (5) 
follows from (4), and (6) appears to follow logically from the previous premises, one 
aiming to reject that conclusion must deny (4). The problem is that (4) is not easily re-
jected on orthodox conceptions of heaven. In fact, one might think that believing heaven
is a domain in which the greatest goods are realized is simply a requirement to even be 
considered orthodox from the start. If one accepts each of the premises and the logical 
structure of the argument, then how is the conclusion avoided? The conclusion at (6) 
can be avoided once one recognizes that there is an ambiguity in one of the key terms in
(4) and (5). Once that ambiguity is resolved, the defender of an orthodox view of 
heaven will be able to deny that (6) follows.
Recall that
(5) The greatest goods can be realised in a domain in which there is no morally 
significant freedom
allegedly follows from
(3) There is no morally significant freedom in Heaven
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and
(4) Heaven is a domain in which the greatest goods are realised.
According to the authors, when one adds to (5) the omnipotence of a perfect being one 
can conclude,
(6) A perfect being can just choose to make a domain that contains the greatest 
goods and no evil.
However, in this argument the authors fail to recognize that a good may be realized in at
least two distinct ways. Further, one of these ways, the one the authors employ, is not 
something a large segment of orthodox Christian theists are likely to accept. What is 
missing from the argument is a recognition that a good could be directly realized (DR) 
or it could be conditionally realized (CR). Consider the following:
(DR): A good G is directly realized by person P at time t if and only if P's 
willing that G be brought about at t guarantees that G is brought about at t.
(CR) A good G is conditionally realized by person P at time t if and only if P's 
willing that G occur at t is conditional on the actions of another agent prior to t.
Imagine that you are dining with a friend and you know that your friend recently 
became unemployed. Even if your friend is financially able to pay for his meal, you are 
able to directly realize the good of paying for your friend's meal, allowing him to use 
that money for something else. Your paying for the meal does not require any action on 
the part of your friend. You could even make arrangements to pay for the meal with the 
wait staff prior to your friend's arrival so he is not even presented with the opportunity 
to accept or reject your offer to pay. The prior arrangement with the wait staff guaran-
tees that the good is brought about.33 However, not all goods are realized in this way.
33. The scenario can be told in such a way that your friend is not offended by your 
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Imagine further that you own a small business, are in need of another employee, 
and this same friend is qualified to fill the position. Here you are able to realize the 
good of your friend having gainful employment. But because this good requires that 
your friend accepts the offer of employment and actually shows up to work, you are not 
able to directly realize that good. You are, however, able to conditionally realize that 
good. The good is there to be had because of you, but that good's being realized is con-
ditional on your friend's actions. If he turns down the position, or accepts but never 
shows up to work, then no matter how greatly you want your friend to be employed the 
good cannot be brought about. 
When determining which understanding of 'realize' the authors' argument uti-
lizes, there are two basic options. The goods spoken of in (4) and (5) could be directly 
realized or conditionally realized. Consider the first option, that 
(4)* Heaven is a domain in which the greatest goods are directly realized
and 
(5)* The greatest goods can be directly realized in a domain in which there is no 
morally significant freedom.
Because (5)* follows validly from (3) and (4)* the question is whether or not (4)* is 
true. 
According to a large segment of Christian theism, (4)* is false because salvation
requires an explicit acceptance by the individual receiving that salvation. It may be true 
that even though God has made an offer of salvation to all humans, some never accept 
paying for the meal, and thus preventing any good from being realized at all, but since 
such details are trivial they have been left out.
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that offer. Just as the realization of the good of your friend having gainful employment 
is conditional on the actions of your friend, the realization of the good of entering 
heaven is conditional on the actions of human agents. In other words, entrance to 
heaven is conditional upon the individual. Of course, Christian theists that trace their so-
teriology to John Calvin, among others, would likely accept (4)* since they already 
believe that the eternal destinies of each person was preordained by God before anyone 
was created at all. In fact, on Calvinism there simply is no offer of salvation at all. The 
elect are chosen by God to spend eternity with God, being chosen is a sufficient condi-
tion for spending eternity with God, and being among the elect is unconditional. 
However, it is not likely that the authors intend to create a problem for those in the 
Calvinist tradition since those same individuals would reject the appeal to a libertarian 
conception of freedom that is used in support of (2). Most Christian theists that are 
willing to accept a libertarian conception of freedom are going to reject (4)* because it 
conflicts with the notion that libertarian-style choices are required for certain goods to 
obtain. If God were able to directly realize goods like that which is found in heaven, 
then the free will defense would fail because there would be no reason for God to 
refrain from directly realizing those goods in the first moment of creation. However, 
Christian libertarians do not believe that it is possible for God to directly realize those 
goods. The first option, that (4) and (5) rely upon the understanding of a good being di-
rectly realized, is not tenable for those that hold to a libertarian conception of freedom.
Now consider the second option, that in (4) and (5) one ought to understand the 
realization of a good as a conditional realization. On this understanding, (4) becomes 
(4)** Heaven is a domain in which the greatest goods are conditionally 
realized
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and (5) becomes
(5)** The greatest goods can be conditionally realized in a domain in which 
there is no morally significant freedom.
Both (4)** and (5)** are consistent with the libertarianism expressed in (2) because 
both allow for the goods referred to in (4)** and (5)** to come about as the result of 
libertarian free choices. Of course, given (3), those choices do not take place in heaven, 
but even if the choices do not occur in heaven the goods that result from those choices 
may be realized in heaven. That is, the goods of heaven are conditional upon the choices
that one makes prior to entering heaven. However, even if one accepts the truth of (4)**
and (5)** the authors are faced with a new problem. 
Christian libertarians are wont to deny that God had the ability to create a world 
in which the greatest goods are realized and yet there is no evil. This idea may even be 
thought of as the central idea to the whole free will defense enterprise. But are Christian
libertarians justified in rejecting (6)? After all, if one accepts (4)** and (5)**, and (6) 
follows from them, then it appears that the Christian libertarian must accept (6) and deal
with any of the ramifications its truth has for their philosophical framework. Fortunately
for the Christian libertarian, (6) does not actually follow from (4)** and (5)**.
According to (4)** and (5)** there are goods in heaven that are realized because
of the free choice of another agent. That is, the goods realized in heaven are only real-
ized because of the choices that the inhabitants of heaven made. But, as (3) tells us, 
there is no morally significant freedom in heaven, so one must ask where these choices 
are made.34 One candidate would be the earthly existence that heaven's inhabitants expe-
34. Here one may wonder why the goods in heaven must be moral goods. One, though 
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rienced prior to entering heaven. Even though there is no morally significant freedom in
heaven that does not mean that there was no morally significant freedom on earth. In 
fact, this is something that free will defenders already believe and have incorporated 
into their philosophical explanation for the existence of evil. All (4)** and (5)** state is 
that certain goods are brought about in a place in which there is no morally significant 
freedom. They do not state that there are no other domains in which there is morally sig-
nificant freedom or that the goods brought about in the heavenly domain are able to be 
brought about only because of that morally significant freedom in the earthly domain.
The problem for the authors' argument arises when one considers (6) with this in
mind. Since the goods spoken of in (4)** and (5)** require there to be at least one other
domain in which there is morally significant freedom, it becomes clear that (6) does not 
follow. In fact, the rationale for accepting the truth of (4)** and (5)** serves as a reason
to think that (6) is false. If the goods in heaven are only able to be conditionally real-
ized, as (4)** and (5)** state, then that alone is sufficient to deny that (6) is true. Ac-
cording to (4)** and (5)**, the domain spoken of in (6) must include heaven and earth 
since heaven alone does not contain morally significant freedom.35 If one broadens the 
domain to include earthy and heavenly existence, then it is easy to see why (6) is false, 
not the only, line of reasoning may go as follows. If hell is place of eternal punishment, 
and punishment is a moral notion, then one would have good reason to think that 
heaven is a place of reward, which would also be a moral notion. Thus, the goods of 
heaven too are moral goods.
35. Douglas Erlandson and Charles Sayward have argued that if one believes the 
concept of heaven has a necessary connection to another world, then one is able to 
reject the idea that God could create heaven alone. See their "Is Heaven a Possible 
World?" International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1981): 55-58.
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at least according to Christian libertarians. Christian libertarians deny outright that God 
could have created the universe in such a way that the greatest goods are able to be 
brought about in a domain in which there is no evil. Those typically in favor of a free 
will defense maintain that morally significant freedom is a necessary condition for a 
moral good being brought about. Even if some of those goods are immediately realized 
in the same domain in which that morally significant action occurs that does not mean 
that other goods are not realized at a later point in which there is no morally significant 
freedom. In other words, even if a moral good being brought about requires the possibil-
ity of evil in the domain in which that moral good is brought about, it may also be true 
that other moral goods, the conditions for which are satisfied on Earth, are realized in 
heaven. If one accepts the idea that the goods of heaven are conditioned upon the free 
choices that one makes prior to entering heaven, then (6) must be false.
According to Christian theism, there are some goods that are realized in heaven 
that require some choice or action by a human agent on earth. This means that not only 
is (6) false, but the question about why a perfect being would refrain from creating 
heaven right away is simply mistaken. God did not bypass the earthly domain because if
a heaven of the Christian variety was what God was after, then he had to first create that
earthly domain. The motivational problem of heaven falls flat once one sees that the 
Christian heaven is not a possible world on its own, but connected to some other 
domain. Because Christian theism maintains that some goods of heaven require earthly 
free choices, it is logically impossible for God to create the Christian heaven without 
first creating the earthly domain. Of course there are other heavens that God could have 
created, but the Christian theist need not bother with those heavens because the Christ-
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ian theist is not committed to defending concepts of heaven that are outside the Christ-
ian system. When faced with the problem of evil, the Christian theist must make sense 
of how evil could exist given that Christian system. In doing so all the details of the 
Christian system ought to be employed—including the details of the Christian account 
of heaven.
The Libertarian Problem of Heaven
The libertarian problem of heaven arises when one attempts to affirm the ortho-
dox Christian theist's claim that no one in heaven can do evil and that libertarian 
freedom is necessary for the obtaining of some good. Whereas the motivational problem
assumes that it is possible for God to create heaven directly, a proponent of the libertari-
an problem is asking a different question altogether. Even if earthly existence is neces-
sary for the Christian heaven to obtain, why would a perfect being refrain from creating 
humans on earth with the same type of freedom that is had in heaven? If libertarian 
freedom is necessary for the obtaining of certain goods, as the free will defense main-
tains, then it looks as if those goods must not be had in heaven. This by itself may not 
be a problem, but since orthodox accounts of heaven also maintain that heaven is over-
whelmingly good, one wonders if the goods associated with libertarian freedom are as 
good as the free will defense needs them to be.
One can also find this version of the problem of heaven in Nagasawa, Oppy, and
Trakakis's argument.36 The argument begins with the same assumption that orthodox ac-
36. Because the Nagasawi, et al. article appears to be the most complete, it will be the 
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counts of heaven makes,
(1) Necessarily, there is no evil in heaven.
If it is not even logically possible for someone to commit evil in heaven, then surely
(13) No agent is free to commit evil in heaven.37
As it was noted above, orthodox accounts of heaven do not just specify that heaven is 
essentially free of evil but also that
(14) Necessarily, heaven is overflowing with good.
If heaven is, by necessity, overflowing with good, but there is no freedom to commit 
evil in heaven, then it appears that one ought to conclude that,
(15) The freedom to commit evil is not a great good.
While Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis do not provide an explicit account of why one 
should believe that (15) follows from (13) and (14)38, it appears they are employing a 
focus of the current discussion. However, a similar argument is also presented in Wall, 
"Heaven and a Wholly Good God," and John Donnelly, "Eschatological Enquiry," 
Sophia 24 (1985): 16-31. Wall concludes that problem forces the Christian theist to 
abandon attempts to use heaven as a way to remedy the problem of evil. Donnelly, on 
the other hand, concludes that the Christian theist ought to simply deny that inhabitants 
of heaven are unable to sin.
37. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis justify this premise by arguing that to be free to 
commit some action one must first have the power to commit that action. If it is 
logically impossible for the action to be committed, then no one has the power to 
commit that action (99-100). While elucidating this step in the argument may be useful 
in some way, it still relies on the intuition that the logical impossibility of evil being in 
heaven precludes an agent from having the power to commit evil in heaven. Because it 
is not clear that this is any more obvious than the claim that the logical impossibility of 
evil being in heaven precludes one from being free in heaven I have bypassed that step 
of the argument.
38.The authors simply state that "If morally significant freedom of action really were 
such an important and weighty good, then surely there would be lots of it in Heaven." 
"Salvation in Heaven?" 100.
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general principle regarding the nature of heaven's goodness along the lines of,
(16) If some x is a great good, then x is had in heaven.
The rationale for (16) is simple. Because heaven is, essentially, overflowing with good 
then one would expect it to contain all that is good. If some good were only a good on 
earth, but not in heaven, then one could imagine a scenario in which heaven becomes 
greater than it is. By adding the good that was only had on earth to the heavenly realm, 
then one has increased the amount of goodness in heaven. But heaven is supposed to be 
"as good as any place can possibly be,"39 so this possibility should be ruled out. The 
only way to rule it out is by arguing that all goods are had in heaven. 
If (15) is true, then it turns out that a broad defense to the problem of evil is very
likely to fail. If libertarian freedom is not a great good, then it is not likely at all that it 
will be good enough to justify the amount of kinds of evil that come with having it. 
When responding to the problem of evil the theist needs to do more than simply argue 
that a perfect being's creating humans with libertarian freedom is what leads to evil. The
theist needs to also argue that this perfect being would be morally justified in creating 
humans with that freedom. But in order to make the moral case for having libertarian 
freedom, it appears that libertarian freedom needs to be a great good in of itself. If it is 
not, then the non-theist appears to be well within his rights to wonder why a perfect 
being would bother with it at all. Why not, instead, create humans with some type of 
compatibilist-style freedom that would allow this perfect being the ability to more di-
rectly control how freedom is exercised? Here the non-theist is not simply asking why 
39. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, "Salvation in Heaven?" 100.
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would a perfect being bother creating the earthly domain in the first place, which is the 
focus of the motivational problem of heaven, but instead seeks to know why such a 
being would refrain from creating humans with a different type of freedom altogether. If
libertarian freedom is not a great good then this is going to be a difficult question for the
Christian theist to answer. The problem becomes even more pressing when one consid-
ers how difficult it is to give a satisfactory response to the problem of evil when em-
ploying a type of freedom that is compatible with determinism. It looks as if Christian 
theists need there to be libertarian freedom to explain the problem of evil, but according
to this argument, that very freedom is not sufficient to morally justify all of the evils 
that come with it.
Responding to the Libertarian Problem of Heaven
There are at least two types of responses that one can give to diffuse this 
problem. The first type of response admits that the authors' argument is valid, but denies
the truth of (13). That is, this first response rejects what has been described as the Chris-
tian orthodox position that agents in heaven are incapable of doing evil. The second 
type of response attempts to retain Christian orthodox beliefs regarding heaven, but 
denies the analysis of libertarian freedom that is presented. Once one has a fuller under-
standing of the type of libertarian freedom that agents in heaven have, the problem 
disappears.
The first type of response to the libertarian problem of heaven can come in one of two 
ways. One could argue that those in heaven are able to do evil, and some agents do in 
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fact exercise that ability. This is the approach that John Donnelly has taken in his paper, 
"Eschatological Enquiry." According to Donnelly, one need not, in fact ought not, 
believe that agents in heaven are incapable of doing evil. Of the inhabitants of heaven 
he writes, "There would still be the possibility of moral evil (sin) in heaven, and I would
underscore that to forget this is to ignore the crucial lesson of Lucifer and his fallen 
cohorts."40 Donnelly takes the account of an angelic fall to be an indicator that human 
agents in heaven too will have the same ability to do evil. This account has not been 
adopted because it helps solve the problem at hand, but instead follows naturally from 
what Donnelly takes to be the Christian background evidence regarding the fallen 
angels. In fact, "a depiction of heaven as a mode of existence in which the possibility of 
vice has not been eradicated" is entailed by views of heaven that refer to heaven as a 
"personal, post-mortem life with God."41
Even though this account is not motivated by a desire to reject the libertarian 
problem of heaven, Donnelly notes that it does have that effect. George Wall had previ-
ously argued that if it is "logically impossible for a god to have created a world with as 
much value as this one, but less moral evil," then Christian theists must explain the 
absence of evil in heaven. If that explanation includes the idea that freedom "is jetti-
soned in heaven" then one ought to explain why such freedom in not simply jettisoned 
on earth as well.42 To this charge Donnelly's account of heaven holds up remarkably 
40. Donnelly, "Eschatological Enquiry," 22.
41. Ibid., 20, 23.
42. Wall, "Heaven and a Wholly Good God," 352.
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well. It is simply false that human freedom is ever jettisoned.
While Donnelly's account does adequately deal with the libertarian problem of 
heaven there are two problems with this solution. First, as noted above43, orthodox ac-
counts of Christianity do not allow for the existence of evil in heaven. While Donnelly 
appeals to the story of the angelic fall to justify his account, there are other alternative 
explanations of that event that do not require such a radical modification of one's under-
standing of heaven. However, while remaining within the bounds of orthodoxy is some-
thing to strive for, there is no guarantee that those orthodox boundaries are right. Point-
ing out that a response is not orthodox is not sufficient to know that the response fails. 
The second problem for Donnelly's account goes beyond concerns regarding orthodoxy 
and instead questions the internal commitments of the view.
Donnelly's solution to the libertarian problem of heaven is considered, and re-
jected, by Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe because it results in heaven not being a place
of ultimate happiness. Pawl and Timpe consider two redeemed individuals, one "experi-
ences the joys of heaven but isn't sure that he will be with God forever" because to use 
Donnelly's phrase, "heavenly eviction" is a genuine possibility. The other "experiences 
the same joys but also has an assurance that she will always be with God in heaven." 
When one considers which of the two will be happier, "it is clear that certainty of 
eternal life with God brings more happiness with it than the lack of certainty." The first 
person could have a greater amount of happiness if she were certain that she would 
never be evicted, but that means that on Donnelly's account heaven "isn't a place of ulti-
43. See page 80 and following.
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mate happiness" and so is "no heaven worthy of the name."44 While Donnelly's solution 
does resolve the worry, it not only requires a modification of the orthodox view that 
heaven is essentially free of evil, but also of the orthodox view that it is a place as good 
as any could possibly be. 
This Certainty Argument, if successful, would provide a sufficient reason to 
deny Donnelly's account. However, even if the Certainty Argument is not successful 
there are alternatives methods of resolving the libertarian problem of heaven which do 
not require such a radical departure from orthodox Christian beliefs.45 Just as one might 
avoid the problem of evil altogether by denying, for example, God's omniscience, one 
should first seek to resolve the problem without departing from the classical conception 
of God. In the same way, if there are alternative methods for resolving the libertarian 
problem of heaven without such a departure, then those methods should be pursued.
We shall now consider the second way in which one can respond to the libertari-
an problem of heaven by denying that those in heaven are essentially unable to do evil. 
The virtue of this response is that it is able to avoid the problem of heavenly eviction 
that Donnelly had. On this account of heaven, it is true that no one in heaven is essen-
tially unable to sin. However, God was able to ensure via his middle knowledge that 
those in heaven never do in fact sin. If there are true counterfactuals of freedom that are 
44. Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven," 
Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 4 (2009), 403.
45. If the Certainty Argument is correct, then there may be difficulties with consistently 
maintaining that agents in heaven exercise libertarian freedom in refraining from 
committing some evil action. If agents in heaven are aware of the fact, something the 
Certainty Argument commits one to, that it is logically impossible to do evil, then it is 
not clear they are able to exercise their will at all with respect to that action.
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known by God, then it might turn out that not even God is able to actualize a world in 
which all free creatures, or at least worlds with as many free creatures as this one, 
always choose rightly. He might, however, be able to create a world in which those that 
happen to do evil on occasion on earth never in fact do evil once in heaven. Nagasawa, 
Oppy, and Trakakis consider this response and state that it does not make "any addition-
al difficulties for Molinism" but they believe there are "very good independent reasons 
not to adopt a Molinist version of the free-will defence."46 It is true that many people 
also find Molinism problematic for a variety of reasons, but not all philosophers do. For 
example, some, like Alvin Plantinga, have already incorporated counterfactuals of 
freedom into their free will defense and so appealing to other aspects of Molinism to 
explain heavenly freedom is not a problem at all. Those that do rely on some type of 
Molinist free will defense might even make the case that it is a virtue of their system 
that the same theory can help explain various parts of Christian theism.
Pawl and Timpe disagree that Molinism can successfully remedy the problem. 
They argue that this account ultimately fails because it fails to adequately capture what 
orthodox accounts of heaven mean when speaking of the redeemed in heaven. Accord-
ing to Pawl and Timpe, the Molinist account maintains that "those in heaven could 
retain their libertarian freedom. But on the basis of His middle knowledge, God could 
make sure that once in heaven, the redeemed will find themselves in circumstances in 
which they will freely not sin." Inhabitants of heaven will only find themselves in "sin-
free circumstances" as opposed to "sin-prone circumstances" because God uses his 
46. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, "Salvation in Heaven?" 106. (Original emphasis.)
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middle knowledge to guide them into the former and never the latter. While Pawl and 
Timpe agree with Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis that Molinism itself faces serious ob-
jections that are sufficient for many to reject it outright, they reject this solution because
it faces a dilemma.
On any account, it is either possible for the inhabitants of heaven to do evil or it 
is not possible. The Molinist response appears to take the first horn of the dilemma, but 
according to Pawl and Timpe "this solution does not do justice to the heavenly perfec-
tion of the redeemed."47 If what keeps an individual from doing evil is only that God is 
preventing that person from entering sin-prone circumstances, then it does not appear 
that the person is actually morally perfect. To illustrate they present the following 
thought experiment. Suppose that Smith is one that is prone to committing adultery and 
that Smith's wife knows this. Because she also knows exactly which situations will lead 
her husband to commit adultery, she simply prevents her husband from ever getting into
those circumstances. If one extends the situation, then one can imagine that Smith's wife
could also prevent her husband from ever being in circumstances in which he would lie,
cheat, or steal. Because of the actions of Smith's wife, Smith may never do anything 
morally wrong. Even though Smith never does wrong, one must ask if it would be right 
to consider him to be morally perfect. Pawl and Timpe conclude, rightly, that to consid-
er Smith to be morally perfect is no different than rendering a coward "courageous by 
being kept away from the front lines."48 The first horn of the dilemma does not appear to
47. Pawl and Timpe, "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven," 405.
48. Ibid.
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be an appealing choice for the proponent of the Molinist solution. What, then, of the 
second horn?
The second horn of the dilemma appears to make the Molinist strategy superflu-
ous. If it is not possible for the redeemed in heaven to sin, then it is not clear what work 
the Molinist solution is actually doing. One must still provide an account of how it is 
possible for someone to have libertarian freedom in heaven and yet not have open to her
the possibility of sinning. The Molinist solution was first presented to explain how one 
could deny that those in heaven are essentially unable to sin, but the second horn of the 
dilemma accepts that very claim.49
What should one make of the Molinist solution then? Pawl and Timpe are right 
that the second horn of the dilemma precludes the Molinist solution from doing much 
work and it does seem unlikely that one would consider Smith to be morally perfected 
because of the maneuvering of his wife. However, the defender of the Molinist solution 
might simply argue that the first horn of the dilemma presented by Pawl and Timpe is 
the wrong way to look at the issue. Pawl and Timpe present the solution as if God is ac-
tively working to prevent someone from getting into sin-prone circumstances, but that 
may not be the best way to understand how those in heaven happen to never do evil. 
Instead, one may, ironically, adopt Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis's description of the 
Molinist account. On this reading, "even though all of the creaturely essences that the 
49. It should be noted that if Molinism is true, then it may turn out that it ought to be 
incorporated into an account of heaven. However, even if it is true, and the redeemed in 
heaven are essentially unable to sin, then one must still provide an additional account 
explaining how it is that those in heaven can have libertarian freedom and not be able to
sin.
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perfect being can instantiate suffer from transworld depravity, at least some of those 
essences have possible instantiations in which their 'final segments' always go right."50 
On this account God is not actively preventing the denizens of heaven from doing evil, 
but instead God chose to create a world in which those who go to heaven are also those 
who will always freely refrain from doing evil while in heaven. It may have turned out 
that there are possible worlds in which some people make it to heaven, but once in 
heaven choose to do evil. The actual world, however, is one in which those who enter 
heaven never do evil. God is no more actively involved in preventing their doing of evil 
in heaven than he is involved in preventing persons from doing evil on earth. 
This version of the Molinist solution solves the libertarian problem of heaven 
because it allows one to deny the premise that those in heaven are essentially unable to 
do evil. This solution also avoids the seemingly unorthodox consequence of individuals 
being evicted from heaven and avoids both horns of the dilemma as presented by Pawl 
and Timpe. However, it does still commit one to a metaphysical framework that many 
philosophers are unwilling to accept. Fortunately for such philosophers there is a re-
maining way one might respond to the problem without requiring such a heavy meta-
physical commitment.
The second type of response attempts to retain all of the orthodox Christian 
beliefs regarding human freedom in heaven. That is, it affirms that those in heaven are 
50. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, "Salvation in Heaven?" 106. Here the authors are 
attempting to present the view using Plantinga's nomenclature. While such an account is
consistent with Plantinga's free will defense, it would also be consistent with any other 
free will defense that employs counterfactuals of freedom, regardless of whether it also 
makes use of a notion like transworld depravity.
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essentially unable to do evil. However, advocates of this response deny that the account 
of libertarian freedom presented in the libertarian problem of heaven is accurate. This is 
the approach that Sennett takes in his "Is There Freedom in Heaven?" and is also Pawl 
and Timpe's preferred solution. Though the two accounts are not identical, the overall 
structure is the same.51 According to this account, the redeemed in heaven are unable to 
sin, but this inability is due directly to morally free actions undertaken by the redeemed 
while on earth.
Sennett argues that the libertarian problem of heaven relies on the mistake of as-
suming that humans in heaven do indeed have libertarian freedom. Instead, one is able 
to avoid the problem by "opting for a compatibilist or soft determinist view of 
freedom."52 This solution may initially seem to be doomed to fail if one is attempting to 
give a free will defense to the problem of evil since such defenses start with the assump-
tion that incompatibilism is true. However, Sennett argues that one can retain the view 
that incompatibilism is true when considering human actions on earth, but is false when
considering human actions in heaven. On Sennett's view, free will is compatible with an
agent's being determined as long as that which determines the agent is brought about by 
some previously undetermined action. For example, it may be true that most people's 
character is such that that they are unable to torture children for fun. On Sennett's view, 
one can go as far as saying that their character determines them to refrain from such an 
51. This approach can also be seen in Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, 61-62. 
However, I will focus on Pawl and Timpe's article since their account is more fully 
developed.
52. Sennett, "Is There Freedom in Heaven?" 71.
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activity. However, if their character was formed by actions that were not determined 
then it is still appropriate to say that those people freely refrain from torturing the 
children.53
With this understanding of freedom in mind, Sennett has the resources to explain
why humans on earth are able to do evil but are not able to do so in heaven. The actions 
that one takes in heaven are the result of the character that was formed while on earth. 
The character that was formed while on earth determines that those in heaven do not do 
evil. This allows one to still maintain that libertarian freedom is important, and thus is 
compatible with free will defenses, and explains why those in heaven do not do evil.
Pawl and Timpe's account of freedom in heaven is very similar to Sennett's. In 
heaven the redeemed will not be able to sin because of the character that was formed 
while on earth. If the character that was formed on earth was formed as a result of unde-
termined actions, then it is still appropriate to consider the redeemed in heaven to be 
free. However, Pawl and Timpe argue that one need not believe that all of one's actions 
in heaven are determined as Sennett does. On their view, "even if one's character deter-
mines that one not perform certain actions, it doesn't determine all the actions that one 
does perform; rather, one's freely chosen moral character underdetermines at least some 
of one's actions."54 The character that is formed on earth does not determine all actions, 
but instead just precludes certain ones. To illustrate, Pawl and Timpe note that one need 
53. Sennett notes, in Ibid., footnote 13, that his account does not rely upon Robert 
Kane's account of libertarianism, but finds it "quite reassuring" that his account is 
similar to Kane's. For Kane's discussion of this type of libertarianism, see The 
Significance of Free Will, especially 73-78.
54. Pawl and Timpe, "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven," 410.
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not think that whether one sings in a heavenly choir or plays the harp is determined by 
one's character. Because both are consistent with the essential goodness of heaven, 
either action may be pursued in a way that is not determined by anything at all. The 
same is true for any action that is consistent with the essential goodness of heaven and 
not just seemingly trivial cases like singing in choirs or playing the harp. If one has the 
option to "pray for all of her descendants, all of her Godchildren, or just one particular 
friend" then each of these options is available to this person because all are consistent 
with the nature of heaven. Praying for others is not morally trivial, yet something that 
one can exercise libertarian freedom in choosing the object of those prayers.
This second type of response has much in its favor. It allows one to retain beliefs
common to the Christian system while also avoiding contradictions with a broad free 
will defense. However, it is not without its detractors. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis 
consider this response but reject it outright because "it is not plausible to think that there
are—or ever have been—any people whose characters are such that, when they die, it is 
logically impossible for them to make evil choices."55 It appears to be unlikely that the 
types of actions one engages in while on earth are sufficient to form one's character to 
such a degree that it becomes logically impossible for that person to ever do evil. Fur-
thermore, if one has freely chosen to do evil, then those actions are going to form one's 
character in the same manner. But many Christian theists allow for even these types of 
people to have a "deathbed conversion." If this is a legitimate possibility, then how 
could Sennet's or Pawl and Timpe's account explain that this person with an evilly 
55. Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, "Salvation in Heaven?" 110.
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formed character is suddenly unable to engage in evil after entering heaven?
Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis are right to point out the difficulty in explaining 
how it is logically impossible for those in heaven to refrain from sinning based upon the
character that was formed while on earth. There is, however, a remedy for this problem. 
If one has developed a doctrine of purgatory, then the worries about one's character not 
being sufficient to ensure one never does evil in heaven disappear. Defenders of a free 
will defense are already committed to the view that God values the libertarian free will 
of humans. This allows humans to shape their character, which in turn guides their 
future actions. There appears to be no reason that such a process must cease upon death.
If, at death, one's character is not sufficient to ensure that no evil will be done in heaven,
then that person's character needs further refinement. Since such refinement is not pos-
sible in heaven, given its essential goodness, then there must be some other state of ex-
istence that allows for further development of character.56
Many Protestant Christians are not willing to accept a doctrine of purgatory 
because they find a lack of evidence for it in the Biblical text and there is a concern that 
the credit for one's sanctification would be due to the human individual rather than God.
In his rejection of the doctrine, Millard Erickson writes, "the concept of purgatory 
implies a salvation by works. For humans are thought to atone, at least in part, for their 
56. Such an account of purgatory is developed in Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal 
Joy, 51-62 and also in his recently released Purgatory: The Logic of Total 
Transformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Richard Swinburne also 
appears to accept that some doctrine of purgatory is useful in accounting for the fate of 
those with a less than fully developed character. See Swinburne, Responsibility and 
Atonement, 197-198.
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sins. This idea, however, is contrary to many clear teachings of Scripture."57 For Protes-
tant Christians that reject the doctrine of purgatory altogether, then the second type of 
response is not available to them. Without such a doctrine it is not likely that Nagasawa,
Oppy, and Trakakis's obection can be met. These individuals must either reject the view 
that heaven is essentially good or refrain from giving a broad free will defense 
altogether.
There is, however, one remaining problem for those who attempt to use the doc-
trine of purgatory to supplement their view that those in heaven are determined to do 
good by their character. George Wall agrees that for advocates of this type of response 
"purgatory seems an absolute necessity, for few, if any, persons adequately develop the 
required virtues in this life." The problem, for Wall, is one must then ask why this "life 
now is not purgatorial in nature." If purgatory is better at instilling the virtues than life 
on earth is, then "purgatorial existence should have been introduced to begin with."58 
There are two problems with Wall's objection. First, he misunderstands the doc-
trine of purgatory itself and second, he assumes that it is possible for God to directly 
create humans in purgatory. Purgatory is not inherently better at instilling virtues than 
this life, but instead is a place where character development can continue. It may in fact 
be better, but that may only be due to the fact that those in purgatory are now fully 
57.Erickson, Christian Theology, 1186. While Erickson is representative of many 
Protestant Christians, it is not clear that the doctrine of purgatory itself poses any 
additional problems when it comes to discussions regarding whether salvation is 
achieved by works or by grace. If one is willing to accept that human agents on earth 
are in some way responsible for the development of their character, then there seems to 
be no reason why that same process could not continue after death.
58. Wall, "Heaven and a Wholly Good God," 354.
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aware that God exists and have, in at least a limited way, already attempted to orient 
their life towards God. Doctrines of purgatory do not specify that all human agents 
spend time there. Instead, at death each person is judged according to how his life was 
lived on earth. Some will enter heaven directly and some will enter hell directly. But 
some, if not most, are not candidates for either. Individuals who have attained salvation,
but do not yet have the character required to spend eternity with God, are sent to purga-
tory to work out their remaining character flaws. Once one has a proper understanding 
of purgatory it is easy to see the second problem with Wall's objection. God can no more
create people in purgatory directly than he can create people in heaven directly. The 
good of purgatory, like the good of heaven, is something that can only be conditionally 
realized.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that there are two distinct problems that arise when 
one considers the compatibility of orthodox beliefs about heaven and a broad free will 
defense. The motivational problem arises mostly because of worries about why God 
would not create humans in heaven directly and the libertarian problem arises because it
appears to result in libertarian freedom not being as good as a free will defense needs it 
to be. The motivational problem rests on the mistaken notion that it is possible for God 
to create humans in heaven. The libertarian problem can be resolved, but only by either 
rejecting the belief that heaven is essentially good or by accepting a view of incompati-
bilism about free will that allows for some actions to be determined by one's character.
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Chapter Four: The Divine Will
The previous two problems that were raised for those giving a broad free will defense 
focus on aspects of human freedom. The first problem had to do with whether or not 
classical Christian views of original sin were compatible with the libertarianism that un-
derlies free will defenses. The second problem had to do with whether or not such liber-
tarianism is compatible with views of heaven that maintain those in heaven are unable 
to sin. While neither problem would result in the failure of a narrow defense to the 
logical problem of evil, there is the potential for that when it comes to a broad defense. 
This chapter will attempt to discern whether traditionally held beliefs about the type of 
will that God has cause problems for the broad defense. If something one believes about
God's will is either inconsistent with a broad defense or undercuts one's ability to accept
a belief crucial to that defense, then the theist will not be able to employ a broad 
defense.
Introductory Issues
Central to any conception of Christian theism is the idea that God is worthy of 
worship. This worthiness can be spelled out in various ways, but two themes are likely 
to emerge. One is that God is worthy of worship simply for being who he is. God, as a 
perfect being, commands the respect and admiration of any other being. The second 
theme, that follows from the first, is the idea that God is worthy of worship because of 
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what he does. On traditional Christian theism it is taken to be true that God not only 
created, and sustains, the universe, but also interacts with it. This interaction with cre-
ation produces great goods. This much is settled opinion and, seemingly, quite benign. 
However, when one considers the type of will that God has problems arise for a broad 
free will defense. If God is able to act in such great ways, and bring about such great 
goods through those actions, then why do humans need to have such a different type of 
will in order for them to bring about goods? This is a pressing question regardless of 
whether you think that God is free in a compatibilist or libertarian sense. However it is 
that God is able to bring about great goods without also, given his perfection, being able
to bring about evils, why would God create humans differently? If God is free in the 
compatibilist's sense, and with that freedom is able to bring about great goods, then why
are not humans created in the same way? If God has libertarian freedom, then why is it 
that he is unable to do evil even given that freedom? Further, why would the details of 
that answer not be applicable to humans with libertarian freedom? This chapter will not 
attempt to settle the matter as to what type of freedom God has, but instead attempts to 
determine whether it is possible, or desirable, for humans to have the same type of will 
as God — whatever type that may be.
Most enquiries into the divine will surface as questions about divine freedom as 
it relates to whether God's creative activity could have been different than it in fact was. 
For example, it may seem unobjectionable to say that God could have created a differ-
ent world than the one he did in fact create and that God exercised his freedom in creat-
ing this world. However, there are reasons to think that if God were to create, then he 
was not free to create any world but this one. This, for example, was famously proposed
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by Leibniz. Because "no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a 
sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise,"1 God must have had some sufficient 
reason for creating this world. But if there was a sufficient reason for its creation, then it
is false that God could have simply created another possible world. It looks as if 
Leibniz's reasoning, based upon the principle of sufficient reason, commits him to af-
firming God was not free to create at all. There being a sufficient reason means just that.
The reason for creating this world, or for creating at all, is sufficient for God doing just 
that. While the principle of sufficient reason also gives one reason to think this world is 
the best, it also suggests that God was not free at all with respect to his creative 
activities.2 
A different sort of enquiry into God's freedom focuses more specifically on 
things that are true within a world and which of those things could have been created 
differently. There appears to be a commonsensical intuition that the world God created 
could have been different in almost every way imaginable.3 What is less commonsensi-
cal is whether mathematical and logical truths are some of the things that could have 
1. Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology (1714), para. 32, in Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip P. 
Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951). 
2. William Rowe argues that Leibniz's attempt to explain how God could remain free 
given his omnibenevolence and the principle of sufficient reason fails. See William 
Rowe, Can God Be Free? (New York: Oxford, 2004), chapter two. Robert Adams 
argues that even if there is a best possible world God need not create it. See Robert 
Adams, "Must God Create the Best?" The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972): 
317-332. Bruce Langtry has recently argued that a being like God could rationally 
choose to create even if there is no best possible world as long as the world God does 
create is good enough. See Bruce Langtry, God, the Best, and Evil (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).
3. Of course, such an intuition would not sit well with those in agreement with Leibniz.
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been different. For example, Descartes is famous for arguing that even the "eternal 
truths" are what they are because of God's creative activity. Mathematical and logical 
truths turn out to true only because God created them that way. After God has created 
the eternal truths then they are necessary, but it was not necessary for God to create 
those eternal truths. If God had desired to create different necessary truths, then it would
have been within his power to do so. On this account God has a great deal of freedom 
because he not only is able to choose which world to create, but he also must choose 
which eternal truths to create as well.4
Some might argue that while God could not have created different logical or 
mathematical truths, he could have created different moral truths. It may be true that in 
the actual world God did not command selfishness or prohibit selflessness, but there 
was nothing preventing him from doing just that. Having such freedom to create moral 
truths however he saw fit is how we can make sense of the notion of divine freedom.
The complex discussions surrounding the topics above all have at least one thing
in common. They all, in one way or another, start with a feature we take to be true about
the actual world and then ask whether God was free, with respect to that feature, to 
create differently. Questions of that sort are important for the Christian theist to answer, 
and some of them may even have a significant bearing on the logical problem of evil. 
This chapter, however, seeks to answer a different question altogether. Instead of focus-
4. I owe this reading of Descartes to Edwin Curley, "Descartes on the Creation of the 
Eternal Truths," The Philosophical Review 93, no. 4 (1984): 569-597. Harry Frankfurt's 
reading results in a much more radical view of Descartes' voluntarism. On Frankfurt's 
reading Descartes believed there are no necessary truths at all, that anything is logically 
possible. Harry Frankfurt, "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths," The 
Philosophical Review 86, no. 1 (1977): 36-57.
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ing on what God did create and ask if he was free to create differently, this chapter will 
focus on something that God did not create but presumably could have. Namely, why 
would God refrain from creating humans with a will like his own? 
The Problem of Divine Action
Proponents of a broad free will defense attempt to give a plausible explanation 
for why there is evil in this world. Such an explanation must include all that one takes to
be true in the actual world, which, of course, includes one's beliefs about God. It is in 
this context that the problem of divine action arises. When faced with the logical 
problem of evil the Christian philosopher may respond with some version of a free will 
defense demonstrating that given the existence of morally significant freedom, God and 
evil are not logically incompatible. To this the atheologian may ask why an omnibenev-
olent God would bother with creating human beings with such a free will in the first 
place. After all, is all the evil that comes with it really worth the price? Here the advo-
cate of a free will defense can respond in one of two ways. First, she might advance 
various pieces of natural theology in an attempt to demonstrate, independent of ques-
tions about evil, that there is a God. With that established, she might then argue that the 
free will defense is the best way to make sense of two seemingly disparate facts about 
the actual world: the existence of God, established by natural theology, and the exis-
tence of evil, established by a brief glance at the morning paper.5 A second, and more 
5. This approach corresponds nicely with Michael Murray's account of approaches to 
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common, way to respond to the question is by arguing that 
(1) there are some goods that can only be obtained if humans have morally sig-
nificant freedom, 
(2) the having of morally significant freedom allows for the occurrence of evil, 
and 
(3) the goods that result form having morally significant freedom outweigh the 
evils that come along with that freedom.6 
This second response, while perhaps initially plausible, may in fact be untenable 
because of the dilemma it generates.
Either the goods that are brought about by humans as a result of having morally 
significant freedom are greater in value than the goods God brings about or they are not.
Those committed to traditional accounts of Christian doctrine are going to be reticent to 
accept any view of man's activities that puts them on a higher moral plane than God. So,
the first option is, at the least, unappealing. But, if these goods are less valuable than 
that which results from God's actions, then an account must be given spelling out why 
God would not simply create humans with the same type of freedom that he has since 
that freedom brings about greater goods with no associated evils. A world in which crea-
tures bring about greater goods than they do in the actual world without bringing about 
any accompanying evils would appear to be vastly superior to the actual world. Without 
an account as to why a wholly good God would not actualize such a world the atheolo-
gian has the resources to reject one of the underlying motivations for the free will 
the problem of evil up to Leibniz. See his "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil."
6. Here one may note that this response would appear to turn the free will defense into a
type of greater goods defense. Whether or not such a taxonomic revision of responses to
the problem of evil is problematic will not be considered — though at first glance it 
does not appear to be so.
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defense.
The Problem as a False Dilemma
There are several ways one might attempt to respond to this problem of divine 
action. One way is to argue that it is actually a false dilemma. The dilemma above can 
only be generated if one assumes that the goods brought about via divine or human 
actions are comparable. God, on traditional accounts of Christianity, is not a super-
human as the Greek gods might be characterized. Instead, God is "wholly other" and it 
is incorrect to even try to compare actions between these two very different kinds of 
beings.
While it may be true that God is a different kind of being than humans, this re-
sponse is unsatisfactory for two reasons. One potential worry with this response is that it
precludes one from making use of an Anselmian strategy in determining God's various 
attributes. This strategy starts with an a priori understanding of God as a maximally 
perfect being. This means that God possesses the set of all the great-making properties 
and each property is had to the greatest degree possible. So, for example, because it is 
intrinsically better to possess power than to not, God must have that property to the 
greatest degree. However, if God and humans are such different kinds of beings that 
their actions are incomparable, then it is highly unlikely that one will be able to use this 
Anselmian strategy for identifying God's attributes. One would still be able to begin 
with a conception of God as the greatest-conceivable being but could not draw anything
from that conception regarding God's specific attributes. Those in the Anselmian tradi-
tion must first look at what they take to be great-making properties in humans and then 
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infer that they would be great-making for God as well. If the two beings are so funda-
mentally different that they cannot be compared, then there is no guarantee that a great-
making property in one would be so in the other.
There is a second objection to this response that is not limited to those Christians
in the Anselmian tradition. If God and humans are indeed too different to compare, then 
it is inaccurate to say that God's actions are better than human actions. If the two are in-
comparable then we are left with only being able to say that God's actions are different 
from our own, but we cannot say they are better. This is only marginally better than 
saying they are worse than our actions. If we are unable to say that God's actions are 
better than our own, then are also unable to say God's actions are praiseworthy. If we 
have independent reasons for thinking that God is wholly good and cannot do wrong, 
then we could still say God praiseworthy but this would be closer to praising a child for 
being intelligent than praising a child for doing the laundry without being asked. The 
Christian tradition, however, is full of examples of God being praised for who he is and 
for what he has done.7
Rejecting God's Essential Moral Perfection
A second way the proponent of a broad free will defense can avoid the problem 
above is to reject one or more of the beliefs that lead to the dilemma. That is, one might 
7. For this reason Bergmann & Cover focus on divine thankfulness instead of divine 
praiseworthiness when examining whether either is appropriately attributed to an 
essentially perfect being. Michael Bergmann and J. A. Cover "Divine Responsibility 
Without Divine Freedom," Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2006).
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reject or modify one or more of the attributes traditionally ascribed to God. It is true that
God's moral perfection, moral praiseworthiness, and moral freedom are well-entrenched
within the Chrisitan tradition, but one might attempt to modify one or more of these in a
way that is consistent with much of that tradition, yet avoids the problem above. This is 
precisely what Theodore Guleserian has tried to do by rejecting the idea that God is es-
sentially morally perfect.8 Human creatures are obviously not essentially morally 
perfect, but if it turns out that God is not either, then one might respond to the above 
dilemma by arguing that the goods brought about by divine and human agents are actu-
ally of the same type because they issue from the same type of will.
In his paper "Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil" Guleserian attempts to 
"render the Free Will Defense more plausible" by arguing that one ought to reject the 
idea that it is a greater excellence for God to essentially conform to the moral law than 
to do so contingently.9 If traditional "Anselmian" accounts of divinity are right and it is 
better for God to have an essentially perfect will (PW), "then it should be true for any 
moral agent who can have essential PW that it would be a greater excellence for that 
agent to have PW essentially than to have it freely and hence contingently."10 Further, if 
God is omnipotent, then he has the ability to create humans with essential PW. Because 
8. As will be seen below, Guleserian does not reject the idea that God is morally perfect 
but only that he is so essentially. His strategy is different from those that attempt to 
resolve the problem of evil by simply denying altogether one or more of the attributes 
regularly ascribed to God. Guleserian is rejecting the traditional understanding of God's 
perfection, but is not rejecting the idea altogether.
9. Theodore Guleserian, "Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil," Faith and 
Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2000): 348.
10. Ibid., 350. (Original emphasis.)
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the traditionalist believes both that it is better for God to have essential PW and that 
God is omnipotent, she is committed to believing that God could create humans with es-
sential PW and that it would be better for him to do so.11 Not only would it be better for 
God to create such a world, it turns out that his ability to do so undercuts the primary 
reason proponents of free will defenses give for why God would choose to create a 
world with morally significant freedom rather than one without. If Guleserian is correct,
God could have created a world in which all moral agents have the same type of will 
that God has, resulting in the complete lack of evils associated with the greatly inferior 
type of will moral agents actually do have. However, if it is false that having essential 
PW is greater than having it contingently, then the free will defense stands on a much 
greater footing. The reason God would create moral agents with morally significant 
freedom is because the goods that go along with having a genuinely free will are suffi-
ciently great to justify the evils that may come along with it.
Guleserian begins by discussing the necessary features for a being to be morally 
perfect. He argues that there are at least two distinct concepts at work in the notion of 
moral perfection. First, a morally perfect being must have PW. Any agent with this 
property will always will to conform to the moral law in any situation where the agent 
recognizes both that the moral order calls for a particular action and that the agent has 
11. I will use 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' instead of Guleserian's 'Anselmian' and 
'nonAnselmian' because Guleserian's conclusion is consistent with Anselmian accounts 
of divinity. If one understands, as Guleserian does, "Anselmian" accounts of divinity to 
maintain that for any property p, if it is a greater excellence for God to have p than to 
not, then God does indeed have p, then Guleserian's account is still Anselmian. The 
difference is that on the non-traditional view having PW contingently is a greater 
excellence than having it essentially whereas the traditional view maintains the 
opposite.
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the power to do that action. This alone is not sufficient for moral perfection because 
there is no guarantee that the agent will in fact act in accordance with the moral order. 
One might will to conform to the law but not have the requisite knowledge to ensure she
actually does conform to it. What is needed for moral perfection, in addition to PW, is 
"perfect conformance of outward action with the moral law" (PC). Any agent with this 
property will always act in accordance to the moral law any time the agent has the 
power to do so. This alone is not sufficient for moral perfection either because it does 
not preclude the possibility that one might always intend to break the moral law but 
because of some cognitive defect, for example, this agent always finds himself con-
forming to it. However, if an agent has both PW and PC, then together those entail 
"perfect intentional conformance" (PIC).12 Any agent with PIC will always intend to 
conform to the moral law and will always actual do so. That is, a being with PIC will be
morally perfect.
That Christian theists take God to have PIC is obvious, even for Guleserian. The
question is whether God has PIC essentially or contingently. Because both PW and PC 
have essential and contingent counterparts, any being that has either contingently will 
also have PIC contingently. According to Guleserian, the traditional understanding of 
God has maintained that God has PIC essentially. As will be shown momentarily, Gule-
serian does not believe that God's having PIC essentially would mean that created 
beings could have it too. However, for Guleserian to generate the problem for a free will
defense he does not need it to be the case that God could create creatures with essential 
12. Ibid., 348-349.
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PIC. Created beings having contingent PIC is enough. If God could have created crea-
tures with PIC, even contingently, then he could have created a world in which every 
agent in that world always conforms to the moral law because they always intend to do 
so. In that world one would have far greater beings than what is found in this world and 
there would be no evil of the sort we find in this one. But why, exactly, does Guleserian 
think it's true that a created being could have both PW and PC?
First, it should be noted that even though Guleserian believes God can create 
other beings with essential PW, that does not commit him to the idea that God can 
create other perfect beings. Guleserian admits that a "perfect being has the attribute of 
necessary independent existence—a property which no created being could have" but 
nothing in his argument requires the creation of other perfect beings.13 In fact, while 
Guleserian is optimistic about God's ability to create beings that are both omnipotent 
and omniscient, provided that God is also able to exercise something like middle knowl-
edge to ensure that any such created being would always conform to his own will, he re-
stricts the discussion to essentially finite creatures, "who due to their essential finitude 
cannot be omnipotent and cannot be omniscient." The essentially finite creatures under 
consideration are not perfect but are able to have essential PW. They are not, however, 
capable of having essential PC because for any finite being there "are some possible 
worlds in which that person is in a situation S in which the moral law requires that 
person to do a certain act A, but in which she does not believe that she is in S or does 
13. Ibid., 351. (Original emphasis.)
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not believe that the moral law requires her to do A in S."14 In such a situation this person
refrains from doing A and thus does not perfectly conform to the moral law. If this 
person had essential PC then such a world would be impossible.
Even though created beings cannot have essential PC, the same sort of argument
does not apply to considerations of created beings having essential PW. Why, then, 
think that God could create creatures with essential PW? The basic argument for this 
starts with the traditionalist's assumption that "It is really possible for a divine being to 
have moral and factual beliefs that metaphysically necessitate its moral volitions." If 
one accepts this assumption then "there seems to be no reason to suppose that the same 
may not be true of a creature." Here one might object that a finite creature could not 
have essential PW because even if he wanted to act in accordance with the moral law, 
without omniscience there may be times that he was ignorant of what the moral law ac-
tually requires or, without omnipotence, be unable to comply with it. Guleserian consid-
ers, and rejects, this objection. Creatures with essential PW do not need to have omnipo-
tence or omniscience. All that is required are beliefs sufficient to "metaphysically 
determine or necessitate one's acts of will about moral matters" and the power required 
to act as the moral law requires.15 This allows the range of beliefs and the range of 
power to fall short of omniscience and omnipotence while retaining essential PW. 
However, this does not mean that such an agent would always act in conformance with 
the moral law. There may still be situations in which the agent fails to have the correct 
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
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moral beliefs about some situation he finds himself in. All essential PW states is that 
when the agent is in a moral situation, and believes himself to be in one, the agent 
always wills to act rightly in that situation.
God's ability to create creatures with essential PW creates a problem for a broad 
free will defense because there is no reason to think God could not also give such crea-
tures the requisite moral and factual knowledge that, along with their perfect will, ne-
cessitates they always conform to the moral law. The creatures would have contingent 
PC and essential PW, which together entail PIC. If this is correct, then "God could have 
avoided the intentional wrongdoing in this world of morally free creatures by actualiz-
ing instead a world of better creatures." This undercuts one's ability to explain actual 
evil by referencing the goods associated with the libertarian freedom found in free will 
defenses. God's inability to create free creatures that always do what is right is irrele-
vant because God could have instead created "these more excellent nonfree creatures 
having PW."16 If one takes seriously the idea that "moral freedom is an excellence so 
great that even a world of creatures who by nature conform perfectly to the moral law 
would not be greater than our world, because of our moral freedom" then the free will 
defense remains plausible.17 This, however, requires that traditionalists explain why this 
type of moral freedom is a great good for created beings but not a great good for God.
What should we make of this type of argument? Does Guleserian's argument 
succeed in resolving the initial worry raised above? I will argue, first, that there are 
16. Ibid., 353-354.
17. Ibid., 363.
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good reasons to reject his conclusion because it depends on the assumption that there is 
a best possible world and that God must create it. I will also demonstrate that Guleser-
ian's argument is useful in providing an account of why the worry raised above is mis-
guided because it assumes that God and created creatures are able to possess the same 
type of will. 
The first way one might object to this type of argument is by denying that a 
perfect being like God must actualize a world with creatures that have essential PW and 
contingent PC, even if it turns out that such a world is better than a world like this one 
where creatures have free PW. While many take it to be the case that God must always 
do what is best, Robert Adams has given an argument to the contrary. According to 
Adams, it would not be wrong for God to create the world he did create, even if another 
much better would could have been created in its place. As long as none of the creatures
in the created world would exist in the better world, none are so miserable in the created
world that it would be better had they not existed, and every creature in the created 
world is at least as happy overall as it would have been in any other possible world in 
which it exists, then it is false to say that God has wronged anyone in creating less than 
the best.18
Guleserian considers this type of objection but finds it lacking because, primari-
ly, in creating a world God must evaluate the "overall moral character" of a world and 
not simply the "amount of moral good and moral evil" in that world as it relates to some
other possible world that God could create. Even if two worlds contain the same overall 
18. Adams, "Must God Create the Best?" 320.
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amount of moral good "it would be morally wrong" for God to choose to create a world 
with moral monsters if the alternative available to God does not create such morally de-
ficient beings.19 Guleserian justifies this with a thought experiment where two univers-
es, U1 and U2, both contain an infinite number of people. In U1 every person commits a
great moral evil but also performs just enough morally right actions to outweigh that 
evil. In U2 every person also commit a moral evil, but it is of the much more mundane 
variety, like lying about one's weight. In U2, however, the goods each person performs 
greatly outweighs the evils they committed, but because in each world there is an infi-
nite number of people the overall amount of good and evil is the same. Who, Guleserian
asks "would consider herself justified in choosing to create U1 instead of U2, if the 
choice were hers?"20
At first there is an intutive appeal to Guleserian's argument but it's not clear that 
this helps his case against Adams. First, in order for this thought experiment to serve as 
grounds for rejecting this Adams-style objection, we must specify that the beings in U1 
and U2 are entirely different beings. This is required for two reasons. First, one should 
recall that the creatures that could have essential PW are of a different sort altogether 
from the free creatures God did create. Second, the first of Adams's conditions is that 
none of the beings in the less-than-best possible world exist in the best possible world. 
The choice is not simply between creating U1or U2, the only difference between the 
two being the kinds of evil in each. Instead, the choice is between creating U1 with one 
19. Guleserian, "Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil," 360. (Original emphasis.)
20. Ibid., 359.
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type of creature that does great moral wrong and creating U2 with an entirely different 
type of creature that does moral wrong but not egregiously so.
With this in mind, we can see how the defender of the objection is going to 
respond. In order to say it would be morally wrong for God to create U1 instead of U2 
one must specify who is being wronged. The creatures in U1 cannot have been wronged
by God creating U1 instead of U2 because they do not exist at all in U2. As long as they
are, on the whole, better off having been created than not, then God could not have 
wronged them for creating U1. If those in U1 have no complaint against God, then 
perhaps one could say the creatures in U2 have been wronged because they were not 
created when they could have been. This idea Adams explicitly rejects because "The 
moral community consists of actual beings. It is they who have actual rights, and it is to 
them that there are actual obligations. A merely possible being cannot be (actually) 
wronged or treated unkindly."21 If those in U1 were not wronged and neither were those 
in U2, then it is not clear what would make it the case that choosing U1 over U2 is 
morally wrong.
This type of response does seem able to adequately undercut Guleserian's argu-
ment, but it is not without weaknesses of its own. For example, William Rowe has 
argued that Adams's contention that God does not have to create only demonstrates that 
it would not be morally wrong for God to create less than the best, not that he could ac-
tually do so. Even if it is morally acceptable to create less than the best it remains true 
that "one being may be morally better than another even though it is not better by virtue 
21. Adams, "Must God Create the Best?" 319.
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of the performance of some obligation that the other failed to perform. It may be 
morally better by virtue of performing some supererogatory act—a good act beyond the
call of duty—that the other being could have but did not perform."22 From the fact that 
one being does something morally better than a second it does not follow that the 
second did something morally wrong. This does not mean that a perfect being could 
refrain from creating the best, it only suggests that the reason why a perfect being like 
God must create the best may not be moral in nature. In fact, according to Rowe, the 
principle reason why God must create the best is that if he did not, it would be possible 
for there to be a being that is morally better.23 The traditional conception of God, 
however, is that God is morally perfect which would make it logically impossible for 
there to be a being morally better.
A full discussion of whether God must create the best is beyond the scope of this
project, but even with that aside one is able to see that Guleserian's argument is suscep-
tible in a second way. It may turn out that God does not have to create the best possible 
world simply because there is no best possible world. Plantinga, for example, has 
argued that:
Just as there is no greatest prime number, so perhaps there is no best of all possi-
ble worlds. Perhaps for any world you mention, replete with dancing girls and 
deliriously happy sentient creatures, there is an even better world, containing 
even more dancing girls and deliriously happy sentient creatures. If so, it seems 
reasonable to think that the second possible world is better than the first. But 
then it follows that for any possible world W there is a better world W' , in 
which case there just isn't any such thing as the best of all possible worlds.24 
22. Rowe, Can God Be Free? 82. (Original emphasis.)
23. Ibid., 97.
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Bruce Langtry has provided an account of what conditions would need to be satisfied 
for a perfect being like God to create if faced with an infinite range of possible worlds. 
This account cannot simply state that God chooses the best because the infinite number 
of worlds ensures that whatever world God chooses to create there will be another even 
better. Langtry argues that if God were faced with an infinite range of good possible 
worlds he ought to simply "satisfice." That is, God ought to "select some good state of 
affairs even though [he] could select a better one."25 Rowe's contention that God's 
failing to create the best possible world, because there is no best, results in there being a
way for God to have acted better fails in situations in which the following is true.
(4) For every world that could have been selected there is a better one that could 
have been selected.
(5) The world that was in fact selected is good enough relative to the foregoing 
circumstances.
(6) Failure to select any world would have led to an outcome that is far inferior 
to each of the world which is good enough.26
In this context what Guleserian must show is that a world with creatures like what we 
find in the actual world does not satisfy the second of Langtry's three conditions.
But such a denial does not seem to be available to Guleserian because he actual-
ly believes that creatures with free PW are more excellent than those with essential PW, 
and that creatures in this world do indeed have free PW. From the fact that God's having
essential PW is a greater excellence than his having free PW, as traditionalists maintain, 
24. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 61.
25. Langtry, God, the Best, and Evil, 78.
26. Ibid., 75.
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and from the fact that God could create creatures with essential PW, as Guleserian 
maintains, it does not follow that a world with creatures having mere free PW is not a 
world that is good enough. In other words, the ability for better creatures to be created 
does not mean that the creatures actually created are worse off than if they were the only
type of creatures God could create. If I purchased a valuable painting from a prominent 
local artist that painting's value would not be diminished simply by a friend pointing out
I had the ability to purchase a much more valuable painting from an historically impor-
tant artist.
What we have seen is that even if one accepts Guleserian's argument that God 
could have created creatures with essential PW, and if one accepts Guleserian's con-
tention that traditionalists are committed to the view that such creatures would be more 
excellent than creatures with free PW, it does not follow that God would have to create 
a world with such creatures. This means that one can still appeal to the various features 
found in a free will defense to explain the existence of actual evils. As long as there is 
reason to think that the world God actually created is good enough, then the traditional-
ist's belief that God has, essentially, a perfect will cannot serve as grounds to reject the 
free will defense. While this failure of Guleserian's account means that there is no im-
mediate conflict with a broad defense and the traditionalist's account of God, it also 
means we are still without an answer to the initial question raised above. If the goods 
brought about by God are so much greater than the goods brought about by humans, 
then why would God refrain from creating us with that same type of will?
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God's Morally Superior Acts of Will
If God does not have to create the best possible world, either because there is not
one or for some other reason, then Guleserian's solution to the problem of divine action 
will have been undercut. So what are we to make of the problem of divine action? Why 
would human agents be created with an inferior will, compared to God's, especially 
since God is able to bring about even greater goods without any accompanying evils? In
answering this problem it will be helpful to explain a second way that Guleserian's argu-
ment fails. Guleserian wrongly assumes that a created being with the same type of will 
as God would be better than one with a lesser type of will. The rationale for rejecting 
that idea as found in Guleserian's argument can in turn be used to resolve our initial 
worry.
Recall that Guleserian argued that if God's having an essentially perfect will is a 
greater excellence than having a perfect will only contingently, "then it should be true 
for any moral agent who can have essential PW that it would be a greater excellence for 
that agent to have PW essentially than to have it freely and hence contingently."27 
Central to Guleserian's defense of the idea that created creatures are capable of having 
PW essentially is the belief that God's actions are metaphysically necessitated by his 
moral and factual beliefs. He writes, "Surely, then, on the traditionalist assumption that 
there is one individual whose moral volitions are metaphysically necessitated by his 
beliefs, viz., God, and therefore that it is possible for moral and factual beliefs to meta-
physically necessitate moral volitions. Further, it is possible, perhaps even plausible, 
27. Guleserian, "Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil," 350.
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that God "could create finite spirits, who possess essentially the property of always 
willing in accordance with their moral beliefs."28 This remains possible even if one does
not believe God could create creatures with attributes like omniscience because even 
finite creatures can be given the requisite moral beliefs to metaphysically determine 
their acts of will. 
What are we to make of this argument? There appears to be two deficiencies in 
this account, the second building upon the first. First, it is not clear that God's acts of 
will are metaphysically necessitated by his beliefs, but by his nature instead. Second, if 
we deny the assumption that beliefs metaphysically necessitate God's acts of will then 
we have no reason to accept the claim that God could create creatures that have their 
acts of will metaphysically necessitated by their beliefs. For creatures to have a perfect 
will, like God's, they would have to be created with a perfect nature. But there are 
reasons, consistent with a broad defense, to think a world with these sorts of creatures 
would not be as morally good as  a world where creatures do not have a perfect will.
The traditionalist's assumption that God is incapable of acting contrary to the 
moral law does not require one to accept that God's actions are determined by his 
beliefs. In fact, there are reasons to think this is not the case.29 If God's beliefs necessi-
tate his acts of will then one immediately wonders what it is that God's beliefs are 
28. Ibid., 352. (Original emphasis.)
29. The critique that follows does not explicitly take into account the possibility that 
God does not have beliefs at all, though such a critique would likely be devastating. If 
God has no beliefs then one will have trouble specifying how they could determine his 
acts of will. For development of the idea that God has no beliefs see, William Alston, 
"Does God Have Beliefs?" Religious Studies 22 (1986): 287-306. The critique I offer, 
however, may be compatible with this conception of divine knowledge.
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about. It is likely that one will answer that God's beliefs are about the moral order, espe-
cially since it is those beliefs that allegedly necessitate his actions. But we now need to 
know what sort of thing the moral order is. Is it something that is external to God 
himself or simply created by God? Here a similar worry arises as those that are associat-
ed with what is commonly referred to as Euthyphro's Dilemma. Does God believe what 
he does about the moral order because such beliefs are appropriate to a perfect being or 
is it the beliefs of a perfect being that causes the moral order to be what it is? Taking the
second horn of this dilemma is untenable. Not only does it commit one to a sort of 
divine voluntarism about morality that results in the moral order being entirely arbitrary,
but in this context it may not even be logically coherent. This view maintains that it is 
God's beliefs about the moral order that necessitates his acts of will. But on voluntarism 
it is God's very act of will that is supposed to create that moral order. If there is no 
moral order then there can be no beliefs about it. But those very beliefs are what are 
said to necessitate his moral acts.30 Taking the first horn of the dilemma fares no better, 
especially for the traditionalist, because it seems to result in the moral order being 
something distinct from God himself.
This dilemma is well known to anyone who ascribes to a divine command 
theory of ethics and some of the resources for responding to that problem will help elu-
cidate why it is is a mistake to say God's acts of will are necessitated by his beliefs. 
30. This should not be read as a general critique of those that believe God creates the 
moral order. For a recent defense of that claim see, T. J. Mawson, "God's Creation of 
Morality," Religious Studies 38, no. 1 (2002): 1-25. This is only to be a problem for 
those that say God's beliefs necessitate his acts of will and are also voluntarists about 
the moral order.
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Those resources can then be employed to solve our initial problem of divine action. 
Robert Adams has argued that the way we ought to think about morality as consisting in
the commands of a loving God. On this account one need not worry about the problem 
of arbitrariness because "it is only the commands of a definitively good God, who, for 
example, is not cruel but loving that are a good candidate for the role of defining moral 
obligation."31 This also negates worries about the moral order coming from some source
not intimately connected with God because the moral order is to be identified with the 
commands of God. What is important in this context is that it is ultimately the nature of 
God, and not his beliefs, that form the moral order. When asking what necessitates 
God's acts of will it may be correct to say it is his beliefs, but that would not tell the 
complete story. Those beliefs can only necessitate God's acts of will because of the 
nature God has. This means that if one wants to maintain the idea that God could create 
creatures with the same type of will he has, then those creatures will not only need 
beliefs sufficient to determine their actions but also a nature that determines those 
beliefs.
What would it mean for a finite creature to have her acts of will determined in 
such a way? If a finite agent’s actions are determined by her nature, using her beliefs, 
the choosing originates with God and not with that agent. A morally salient difference 
between this happening in God and this happening in some creature is that the finite 
agent would not have the same grounding for her moral and factual beliefs that God 
does. As is commonly understood, a finite agent chooses based upon her moral and 
31. Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 250.
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factual beliefs. Sometimes she may act with a great deal of prudence and make the 
correct decision that perfectly complies with the moral law, but there may also be times 
when she acts irrationally and acts contrary to the moral law. Still yet, there may be 
other times that she intends to make the correct decision, but actually makes the wrong 
one or is unable to follow through with her intention. In any of these scenarios, it is the 
agent that makes her own decision and no one else. She chooses freely without reliance 
on her beliefs or intentions being determined by someone or something else. 
In order to ensure that the agent always makes the correct choice she would need
to have essential PW coupled with enough knowledge to know what the correct decision
is and enough power to follow through with that decision. Guleserian argues that this is 
a genuine possibility; “God can create finite spirits who possess essentially the capacity 
to think and to believe, and who possess essentially the capacity to will and to form in-
tentions regarding moral acts, just as God possesses."32 But notice that it is God that 
creates in the agent the essential capacity to think, believe, will, and form intentions. 
The agent does not have the possibility to choose incorrectly, but, unlike God, it is not 
due to the agent’s own nature. Instead it is due to the active role that God played in ne-
cessitating that the agent have the nature, beliefs, and powers that she has. When asked 
why an agent with an essentially perfect will always acts in accordance with the moral 
law one could rightly reply that it is because of her perfect will, moral and factual 
knowledge, and power to carry out what ought to be done. But that is not the whole 
story. One must also ask why she has that perfect will, why she has that knowledge, and
32. Guleserian, "Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil," 352. (Original emphasis.)
140
why she has that power. In this case the only reason she has that power is because God 
created her with it. Had God chosen to create this agent without such capacities, then 
there is no guarantee she would have acted rightly. However, when one asks why God 
always acts in accordance with the moral law the whole story can be told without 
relying on anything external to God. Perfect intentional conformance to the moral law 
simply follows from his perfection. Unlike finite creatures, a perfect being's actions 
trace back to that being alone.
While it may be possible for God to create creatures that have a perfect will es-
sentially, the above discussion should raise questions about whether it would be better 
for God to create a world with these creatures than not to do so. Guleserian argued that 
if the traditionalist is correct to say that God's having a morally perfect will essentially 
is a greater excellence than his having it contingently, then it would be greater for all 
moral agents too. Further, if God were able to create creatures with a perfect will essen-
tially, that he would be obligated to do so. We saw, however, that Guleserian's argument 
for this second contention does not justify the claim that God would be obligated to 
create such creatures, and we saw that the traditionalist's assumption about God having 
a perfect will essentially does not carry over to other agents. With this in mind, the solu-
tion to our initial problem is straightforward. The proponent of a broad free will defense
can maintain the commonly held view that the goods that result from God's actions are 
greater than those that result from human actions. When asked why God would refrain 
from simply creating humans with the same type of will that he has, we now have the 
resources to show that such a creature is simply not able to be created. When God 
brings about moral goods it is only because of the type of being that God is. The moral 
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valuation of such goods starts and stops with the person of God. But that cannot be said 
of any created being. Regardless of whether God is able to create creatures with a 
perfect will essentially, the value of their moral acts of will eventually traces to God. 
When agents like those found in the actual world choose to do the good, it is not simply 
because God created them with requisite capacities that determine they choose to do the
good. Instead, they do so because of their own free will, which also means they are able 
to choose to do evil instead. And this, of course, is exactly what the proponent of a 
broad free will defense believes.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen various reasons to think that it would be appropriate
for God to create humans with a distinctly different type of will than his own. Even if 
God could create humans with the same type of will as his own it does not follow that 
God must. First, God may have no obligation at all to create the best possible world. 
Second, there are reasons to think that there simply is no best possible world. If there is 
not, then as long as this world is good enough, then it does not matter that there may be 
another possible world where creatures have a better type of freedom than what is had 
in this world. On this scenario, no matter what world God actually creates there will 
always be a better world, in fact an infinite number of better worlds that God could have
created. Finally, reasons were given that demonstrate a world where creatures have the 
same type of will as God would be less desirable than the actual world. In the actual 
world when humans do right their doing so traces to their free will. However, in worlds 
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in which creatures have perfect wills that determine their actions any moral goods that 
result from those actions would ultimately trace to God's will and not that creature's. As 
a result, adherents to traditional conceptions of divine will can retain those traditional 
conceptions while, at the same time, making use of all the resources found in a broad 
free will defense.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
Dealing with evil is something that falls to each of us. Whether we struggle to eliminate 
the actual evils we find in the world around us or wrestle with how to explain its occur-
rence at all, all will be confronted with its reality at some point or another. The theoreti-
cal, and existential, problems that arise can be particularly troubling for Christian theists
since, according to that worldview, there is a powerful and wholly good being that 
would presumably prevent any of these evils whenever he could. It is that common intu-
ition that serves as justification for many non-theists' belief that there is no God at all. 
Further, that common intuition can also be used to demonstrate that non-belief is not 
only rationally acceptable, but also that belief in God is rationally unacceptable. It is 
this latter challenge that I have attempted to address in the course of this dissertation. 
We have seen that the theist may respond to the charge that evil's existence pre-
cludes God's, and vice versa, in a variety of ways. One may initially attempt to simply 
rebut the argument in favor of the charge. This response, if successful, would demon-
strate that there is no reason to think that God and evil cannot coexist, but it is unlikely 
to be found satisfactory by the non-theist for the very same reason that arguments 
demonstrating the failure of arguments for God's existence rarely trouble committed 
theists. Even in light of the failure of an argument for P one rarely concludes that P is 
false. Instead one often defaults to the previously held belief and searches for a new ar-
gument that would substantiate P, or simply remains agnostic with respect to P. What 
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makes the free will defense so powerful is that it is not simply a negative argument 
showing arguments for P fail, but instead is a positive argument for ~ P.1 However, even 
among non-theists who agree the free will defense succeeds, we still find those skeptical
about whether there would be evil given the existence of God.
I have attempted to account for this holdout position by noting that the free will 
defense, as traditionally construed, can appear to be nothing more than sophistry. 
Because the defense does not require its details to be true in the actual world, it can 
seem disingenuous to resolve the theoretical problem of evil in such a detached manner. 
If, however, one's response includes only beliefs that are taken be true in the actual 
world, then it is more likely the response will allay the non-theist's worries. A defense 
that is limited to only these beliefs is what I have called a broad defense. Imagine the 
difference between a defendant who avoids prison because of a technicality and one 
who avoids prison because the defense counsel provided a persuasive alibi. The result in
both instances is the same, but it is much more likely the concerned parties will be more
unsatisfied with the former than they are with the latter. Just as the provision of an alibi 
does not guarantee non-guilt, neither does the provision of a broad defense. Still, such a 
provision is more persuasive than getting off on a technicality, legal or philosophical.
It is with this in mind that three beliefs central to Christian theism were exam-
ined: beliefs about original sin, beliefs about freedom in heaven, and beliefs about God's
own will. Various concerns were raised about whether a broad free will defense is 
indeed consistent with aspects of these central beliefs, and ways to address those con-
1. In the final instance, let 'P' stand for the claim that God and evil are logically 
incompatible.
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cerns were considered. However, there is certainly more work to be done.
Because a broad defense expects consistency with all of one's beliefs, and not 
just one's religious beliefs, the project should also be expanded to include one's philo-
sophical beliefs that may, upon examination, turn out to be in tension with a broad 
defense. For example, Derk Pereboom argues that while event-causal libertarianism is 
able to be squared with a scientific understanding of causation, it is not able to provide 
the desiderata libertarians typically want — the type of control over our actions that is 
sufficient for moral responsibility. However, agent-causal libertarianism would provide 
that control, but does not comport well with the empirical data concerning human 
agency.2 If Pereboom is correct, then there are philosophical reasons to deny event-
causal libertarianism and scientific reasons to deny agent-causal libertarianism. It is not 
clear what sort of libertarianism is left that could provide the sort of freedom needed for
a broad defense. 
The fact that there are countless beliefs that might cause difficulties for a broad 
defense does not mean that one must first examine each of those beliefs prior to offering
the defense as a solution. The narrow free will defender can simply dismiss that task as 
unessential since he is only concerned with the logical possibility that God and evil 
coexist. On the other hand, the broad free will defender must be willing to examine 
those beliefs as possible conflicts arise. In what follows I will provide a sketch of just 
one additional example of a religious belief that may generate tension for proponents of 
2. Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), see especially chapters two and three. John Searle makes a similar scientific 
argument against libertarianism in John Searle, Minds, Brians and Science (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
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a free will defense and, finally, illustrate how the distinction between broad and narrow 
defenses can be applied to other alleged problems for Christian theism.
A Final Doctrinal Worry
Catholic and Protestant Christians tend to agree that at Jesus' birth his mother, 
Mary, was still a virgin. In many respects, however, that is where the similarities end. 
According to Roman Catholic teaching, Mary did not only give birth to Jesus while still 
herself a virgin, but was "from the first moment of her conception, by a singular grace 
and privilege of almighty God and by virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ, Saviour of the
human race, preserved immune from all stain of original sin."3 This belief in the sinless-
ness of Mary may generate two distinct problems for a broad defense.
The first potential worry is that one may wonder why Mary was able to remain 
free from sin her entire life, but other human agents are not able to do so. As we have 
seen, central to free will defenses is the idea that in order for moral goods to come 
about, God had to create a world in which it is also possible for moral evils to come 
about. But, when it comes to Mary, it looks as if it was either not possible for her to do 
moral evil, or that it was possible, but God intervened to prevent that possibility from 
becoming actual. Whichever route one takes, problems arise. If it was not possible for 
Mary to do evil then why was it not possible for God to create all human agents with the
same type of will that Mary had? This worry is distinct from that raised in chapter four 
3. Pope Pius IX, Ineffabillis Deus (1854): DS 2803, cited in Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, 491.
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above because in this scenario all the agents in question are human. If it was possible 
for Mary to sin, but God intervened, then why would God refrain from intervening 
every time anyone was about to do evil?
A second problem that arises is more specifically related to Plantinga's free will 
defense and its use of the concept of transworld depravity.4 According to Plantinga, an 
individual is transworld depraved if it turns out that any world in which that person 
exists with morally significant freedom is a world where that person goes wrong with 
respect to at least one significantly free action. What enables Plantinga's defense to 
succeed is the possibility that every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravi-
ty. But if Mary was actually sinless then she clearly does not actually suffer from 
transworld depravity and so the defense, broadly construed, would fail. This is only a 
problem for a Plantinga-style defense in general if Mary's not actually being transworld 
depraved means that it is impossible for her to be so depraved. If it remains possible, 
then the narrow defense may still succeed. Whether this fallback position would be ra-
tionally persuasive is unclear.
Much more can be said about this problem, including potential responses by ad-
herents to the sinlessness of Mary. However, the issue is raised simply as a demonstra-
tion that what one initially finds to be unrelated to a free will defense may turn out to be
incompatible with it, broadly construed. The burden of the broad free will defender is to
examine these sorts of beliefs whenever found.
4. I would like to thank Richard Davis for bringing this to my attention.
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Expanding the Strategy of a Broad Defense
Some, theists and non-theists alike, have objected to the Christian concept of 
hell because it would be unjust for a person to be eternally punished for a finite wrong. 
The problem that hell presents for Christian theism is exacerbated by the fact that not 
everyone has the opportunity to accept an offer of salvation that would prevent such 
eternal punishment. It is the latter worry that William Lane Craig attempts to address by
making use of God's middle knowledge. According to Craig, the problem that the doc-
trine of exclusivism raises for Christian theism is this, "Why did God not supply special 
revelation to persons who, while rejecting the general revelation they do have, would 
have responded to the gospel of Christ if they had been sufficiently well-informed con-
cerning it."5 If it is true that some person would have responded to the gospel had they 
been informed of it, then how is it just to punish that person given that she had nothing 
to do with not being so informed? 
Craig's response to this worry is twofold. First, he shows that the problem has 
the same structure as the logical problem of evil. Second, he attempts to solve this sote-
riological problem in the same way that Plantinga attempted to solve the logical 
problem of evil.6 According to Craig, the problem can be stated as follows:
(1) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent 
is inconsistent with 
5. Craig, "No Other Name," 176.
6. Craig actually refers to this problem as the "soteriological problem of evil," but since 
the term 'evil' never actually appears in the problem I prefer simply the 'soteriological 
problem'.
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(2) Some persons do not receive Christ and are damned.7
Utilizing Plantinga's strategy of defense Craig argues that there is some third proposi-
tion such that, when conjoined with (1), entails (2). If this third proposition is logically 
possible, then one can confidently conclude that (1) and (2) are logically consistent. Just
as with the logical problem of evil, this third proposition "need not be plausible or even 
true; it need be only a possibly true proposition, even if it is contingently false."8 But 
what might such a proposition be?
According to Craig, it is possible that:
(3) God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved and
unsaved, and those who are unsaved suffer from transworld damnation.
By "transworld damnation" Craig means the property "which is possessed by any 
person who freely does not respond to God's grace and so is lost in every world feasible 
for God in which that person exists."9 According to (3), any person who is lost, and thus 
damnable, would have been lost in any world in which they exist. But notice, this alone 
does not explicitly answer the initial worry about those who are lost because they are 
never informed of the need to respond to God's grace. How might one use (3) to explain
away that worry?
According to Craig, there simply are no people who would have responded to 
God's grace, had they been informed of it. He writes, "If there were anyone who would 
have responded to the gospel if he had heard it, then God in His love would have 
7. Ibid., 180.
8. Ibid., 183.
9. Ibid., 184.
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brought the gospel to such a person." He concludes, "All who want or would want to be 
saved will be saved."10 So, while it is true that some never hear of God's grace, and thus 
do not respond to it, they are proper recipients of eternal damnation because God, using 
his middle knowledge, could have simply created a world in which anyone who does 
not hear of God's grace would have rejected it even if they did.
A wholesale critique of this defense to the soteriological problem is not neces-
sary in the present context. It will do to simply note two things. First, it is not clear why 
people who never hear of God's grace, and thus never respond to it, are damned in the 
actual world. Are such people damned for never responding to the offer of salvation, 
because they never hear it, or are they damned for rejecting the offer of salvation in 
other possible worlds in which they do hear it? The first response seems most plausible, 
but recall that Craig's argument is designed to explain away difficult cases of people not
responding solely because they have not had the opportunity to respond. But to say 
those people are damned for what they do in some other possible world, not what they 
do in this world, means that God is engaging in counterfactual moral appraisal of those 
individuals. And this, as we have already noted, runs contrary to our moral intuitions.11 
Until we have reason to think such practice is acceptable for God, given that it is not ac-
ceptable for humans, then this response is unsatisfactory. What role is this supposed to 
play in expanding the distinction between broad and narrow defenses to other alleged 
problems?
10. Ibid., 185.
11. See page 68 and following above.
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It turns out that even Craig finds such counterfactual moral appraisal problemat-
ic. In discussing an objection raised against his argument by David Hunt,12 Craig agrees 
with Hunt that, "it would be unjust to judge a person on the basis of what he would have
done rather than on the basis of what he actually did."13 But this appears to be exactly 
what he advocates regarding those who would have rejected had they heard. The only 
reason to make use of the subjunctive is that in the actual world, it is postulated, that the
reason these people are damned is that they never heard of God's grace and so never had
the opportunity to respond to it. Craig, for his part, must not recognize that this is what 
he is committed to. Later in the same paper he writes, "neither Molinism nor the middle 
knowledge perspective I defended implies that God judges people on any basis other 
than their actual acceptance or rejection of God's grace."14 
If it turns out, protestations otherwise notwithstanding, that Craig's Molinist so-
lution to the soteriological problem commits one to this counterfactual moral appraisal, 
something that we have reasons to reject, one can still employ the account as part of a 
narrow defense to the problem. Unless it is logically impossible that God could engage 
in counterfactual moral appraisal, the concept can still be employed as part of a narrow 
defense. It would not, however, be of any use to a broad defense. 
In the context of a broad defense one may still be able to retain the general 
12. David Hunt, "Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil," Religious
Studies 27 (1991): 3-26. 
13. William Lane Craig, "Middle Knowledge and Christian Exclusivism," Sophia 34, 
no. 1 (1995): 126.
14. Ibid., 131.
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Molinist solution to the soteriological problem and simply deny that those that are 
damned in the actual world would have accepted God's grace had they heard of it. This 
would require one to spell out how it is that one could accept God's grace without ever 
hearing of it, but it seems there are resources available already present in the concept of 
general revelation. Those who never hear an explicit account of God's grace are still 
able to, in a limited way, respond to it based on the general revelation they do have 
access to.
In this case, the response to the soteriological problem still need not be proffered
as being true in the actual world, just consistent with what we take to be true in the 
actual world. And, of course, this runs directly parallel to what we have pursued in dis-
cussing the logical problem of evil. Instead of resting content with a merely narrow 
defense, and without having to assume the burden of claiming to know what is, or prob-
ably is, God's actual reasons for allowing evil, or for the damnation of some that never 
respond to his grace, we are able to provide a more persuasive account that is true, for 
all we know. And, if we are honest with ourselves, what we know of God's reasons may 
not be as much as we would like.
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